









Toxic Criminalities in Francoist Spain  






















Submitted in partial fulfillment of the  
requirements for the degree of  
Doctor of Philosophy  



















































Ibai Atutxa  





Toxic Criminalities in Francoist Spain: The Making of a European Dictatorship 
Ibai Atutxa 
 
This dissertation investigates the transformation undergone by the Francoist 
dictatorship (1939-1978) in Spain in the 1950s and 1960s, which occurred under 
conditions of neoliberal rationalities and petroleum toxicity –petrotoxicty. It addresses 
the transformation at three levels: the dictatorship’s criminalized bodies; the Francoist 
national political project; and early transnational attempts for European unification. By 
exploring an archive of laws, mass media, and intellectual dialogues, the dissertation 
contends that there was a shift in regimes of criminality that allowed the dictatorship in 
the south and Europe in the north to establish the initial form of their coalition. 
The dissertation addresses processes of recognition of criminality by 
establishing a critical framework that examines the transition from a dominant 
paradigm of disease toxicity to one of petrotoxicity. In proposing that this transition 
took place together with the development of neoliberalism, the dissertation argues that 
the neoliberal regime operated during its period of consolidation by generalizing, at 
national and transnational scales, forms of exclusion and inclusion that were 
characteristic of what the text presents as the “petrotoxic regime of criminality.”  
  
By conducting the analysis through the lens of the petrotoxic regime of 
criminality, the dissertation offers a fresh perspective to the debate within Spanish 
Peninsular Cultural Studies about the seemingly contradictory nature that the 
Francoist dictatorship acquired during this period; both anti-modern and modern; both 
Catholic fundamentalist and neoliberal capitalist. It allows us to shed light on a process 
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After World War II, a different logic to identify people and collectives as 
criminals reproduced the paradigm of the petroleum-based toxicity, which itself linked 
inextricably the final optimization of the violence of the Francoist dictatorship in Spain 
(1939-1978) with the first scaffoldings of the coming European Union. This is, in a 
nutshell, the main argument of the present dissertation. Furthermore, I propose that 
this petrotoxicity1 informs the logic of recognition of threats and calculation of risks 
that sustain the contemporary neoliberal rationality. Unlike before, it established an 
economy of revalorization and disposal of dangerous subjects; of recycling, reusing or 
reducing dagerous individuals.  
I approach the paradigm of petrotoxicity as an economy of recognition of 
criminals that sustained the consolidation of neoliberalism. Petroleum toxicity, as the 
other side of the coin of petromodernity, established a distinct paradigm that made 
sense of the threats to life within the early neoliberal formations of the Spanish 
dictatorship and of Europe. More than just tropes and metaphors, petrotoxicity 
became an interpretive category that provides of an economy of recognition of criminal 
threats.  
																																																								
1 I borrow the concept “petrotoxic” from the sparse critical work that has started to make use of this 
term to refer in a single word to the toxicity of petroleum and the elements that derive from it. For 
example Donna Haraway’s book Staying with the Trouble refers briefly to “the great new petrotoxic lakes 
of North America” (184), in order to talk about the unconventional oil deposits known as tar sands, 
which can be found in the Canadian region of Alberta. We find another example in Adam Romero’s 
2017 talk “Manufacturing Petrotoxicity” in which he explored “the rationalization of oil as an economic 
poison across California and US agriculture.” Finally Lucas Bessire and David Bond refer to the term 
petrotoxic when they explain how tracing “thresholds of petrotoxicity in factories, cities, nations, and 
now the planet, shows how hydrocarbon problems have been instrumental in making the conditions of 
life visible, factual, and politically operable” (447).  
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I introduce four coordinates that delimit petrotoxicity as an interpretive 
category of criminality. Petrotoxicity does not refer to threats that come from the 
outside but to ones that were already there before exposing their toxicity. It describes 
economic entities, which following the rules of market economy, need to be either 
revalued or disposed of. It calculates the risk posed by threats at the molecular level of 
the dangerous agents. Finally, petrotoxicity refers to threats that are at the same time 
indispensable and poisonous for economic progress.  
This petrotoxic economy of recognition of threats posed to life emerged hand in 
hand with the development of the neoliberal governing rationalities of the time. 
Understanding the entanglement of the dissemination of petrotoxicity and the 
consolidation of neoliberal rationalities requires a situated and detailed analysis of a 
change of paradigms. I situate the juncture for the emergence of the petrotoxic 
paradigm in the 1950s, within the transformation of the south-north relationship of 
Europe that occurred with the recognition of the Spanish dictatorship as a country 
enduring an economic crisis of underdevelopment. This period stretched to the 1970s 
before the oil crisis.  
The change of paradigms, that I point to, shifts from the domination of disease 
toxicity to petrotoxicity. I examine this change at three different levels that I trace 
starting at the level of the bodies. I follow with the analysis by scaling up, first to the 
transformations in the dictatorship, and finally to the formation of Europe. At the level 
of the sovereign punishment of bodies, I examine the variation of the dictatorship’s 
criminal legislation from the 1954 law of “Vagos y Maleantes” (Vagrants and Thugs) to 
the 1970 law of “Peligrosidad Social” (Social Danger). At the level of the Francoist 
political project, I refer to the neoliberal optimization that the dictatorship underwent 
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from the earlier Falangist control, to the later Opus Dei’s technocratic government of 
the regime. I analyze this optimization by focusing on representations in mass 
consumed media and in the dictatorship’s legal scaffolding. Lastly, at the level of the 
formation of Europe I call attention to the network of dialogues that was created 
between intellectuals in the south and in the north parallel to the creation in 1951 of 
the European Coal and Steel Community and in 1957 of the European Economic 
Community. 
It is my belief that these different scales conditioned each other becoming 
interwoven under the dominating paradigm of petrotoxicity. Significantly, this 
argument is the fruit of research that was originally prompted by the questions that 
arose from my own personal experience. I believe it is worth sharing a brief account of 
this experience in this introduction as I hope it will provide this research with some 
connecting threads to some of the more contemporary pressing political concerns. 
 The lawyer that we met in a 2015 gathering of the grassroots association 
“Plataforma de Afectados por la Hipoteca” (Platform of People Affected by Mortgages, 
PAH) had a clear strategy in mind for our precarious financial situation. We had to 
approach our unpayable debt as if it were an oil spill from a tanker. This meant that we 
had to isolate the toxicity of the debt as much as possible by preventing it from 
spreading. We had to keep the toxic substance inside the tanker. We had to contain 
the toxicity of the debt away from our economies. By situating ourselves outside the 
reach of this toxic debt we could avoid becoming toxic criminals ourselves –insolvents 
and guilty of our own bankruptcy. In Spain, with no effective “fresh start” policies in 
place and a purely cosmetic “Ley de Segunda Oportunidad” (Second Chance law), which 
had been passed earlier that same year, petroleum toxicity was for this lawyer the 
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closest image to talk about the post-crisis criminalization of debt and debtors. 
Unfortunately, in our case, his strategy was not going to work. I was already toxic. 
Only a couple of years earlier the bank had informed a family member that the only 
solution to manage their debt was for another family member (myself, a jobless 
graduate student with a previous loan taken out to further my studies) to take out a 
personal loan. My own indebtedness was presented as the only solution to relieve the 
debt of others 
 What really struck me most in the meeting, even more than the precarious 
prospect of my future. was the sense of familiarity of the image of toxicity that the 
lawyer used to describe the criminal debtor. After all, for years, I had already become 
acquainted with a looming sense of anxiety in my everyday life that came along with an 
insolvent’s lack of possibilities for any thriving life-project. This was nothing new. I 
couldn't however pin down the sense of familiarity of the toxicity of criminality. 
Certainly, “toxic assets” had become more present in the media with the new language 
produced to make sense of the 2008 global financial crisis, but in my case, notions of 
toxicity fell somewhere closer. It was more situated, more specific, deeper seated. A 
search in the archive confirmed my intuition. The criminal recognition of armed 
organizations in general, and in particular Euskadi ta Askatasuna’s (ETA, Basque 
Country and Freedom) struggle for independence had been described by using similar 
paradigms of petroleum toxicity and pollution, at least since the 1970s. 
 In 1970, the article “Tajante Dilema” (The Categorical Dilemma) explained in 
the Spanish newspaper ABC that “aún peor que la contaminación atmosférica es esta otra 
contaminación terrorista” ‘even worse than atmospheric contamination is this other 
terrorist contamination” (Gallego). It was not difficult to follow the expression “terrorist 
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contamination” in a chain of repetitions that reached the second decade of the twenty 
first century. For example, the same newspaper, in 2010, referred to three 
municipalities in the Basque country as being “sometidos durante tantos años a la 
contaminación terrorista” ‘subdued for so many years to the terrorist contamination’ 
(Pagola). This phrase had become commonplace during my lifetime. Having grown up 
and become active in a left-leaning social environment that sought the independence of 
the Basque Country, this was yet another criminal toxicity that interpellated me as an 
individual. One did not need to become a member of ETA to be recognized as part of 
the terrorist contamination –to be constantly stopped, questioned and frisked, 
considered a threat by the police authorities, or to be detained and tortured as 
happened oftentimes to too many people.  
 During this course of reflection, examples poured in of toxic depictions of 
criminalized collectives, which reached beyond my own personal account. Two of the 
most obvious illustrations were the LGBTQ and the migrant communities. In the US, 
terms like “gay plague” (Eaklor) that in the 1980s intrinsically linked a so-called 
“homosexual lifestyle” with what shortly after was going to be diagnosed as AIDS, 
showcased an instance of yet another criminalized collective imagined through a 
toxicity that this time was viral and contagious –rather than petrotoxicity presented by 
the previous examples. In the particular case of Spain, Alberto Mira’s referential work 
explains that, when in 1954 the category “homosexuales” (homosexuals) entered for the 
first time as a singled out “grupo potencialmente peligroso” ‘potentially dangerous group’ 
(180) in the Dictatorship’s criminal law; it did so by carrying older understandings of 
risk posed by homosexuals, which the law explained “en términos de contagio” ‘in terms of 
contagion.’  
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The parallels between a gay disease toxicity and contemporary depictions of 
migration encountered ordinarily in the European Union, were made explicit in 
Roberto Esposito’s more theoretical work Immunitas, “immigration is […] presented 
by the media as a potential biological risk to the host country, according to a model 
that pathologizes the foreigner” (8). A look into newspaper archives confirmed and 
complemented Esposito’s assertion, insofar as the depictions of criminalized migrants 
did not only follow a disease logic of toxicity. The case of the 2007 article “La Marea 
Negra Invisible” ‘The Invisible Black Tide’ (Treceño) was maybe the clearest example 
among many in which irregular migration was characterized by referring to images of 
petrotoxicity. The description of migrants as “black tide” referred to the image of vast 
petroleum discharges that reached the coast,  and which became popularized after the 
2002 massive oil-spill caused by the shipwreck of the tanker Prestige. These references 
to oil-spills and viruses made apparent, at these early stages of the research, that 
paradigms of two different kinds of toxicity operated together by entangling logics of 
recognition of multiple of criminalized individuals and collectives.  
Significantly, side-by-side, the same paradigms of toxicity that recognized 
collectives as criminal threats were embraced by the precarized collectives themselves. 
The most contemporary example of this phenomenon of “self-naming-as-toxic” was 
epitomized by the proliferation, after the financial-crisis, of gatherings in street 
demonstrations. The chosen designation was “mareas” ‘tides.’ Following the precedent 
of the oil-spill as “black tide,” these protesting tides organized themselves in colors 
depending on their social demand. Marea blanca (white), marea granate (maroon) and 
marea verde (green) respectively confronted cuts to public health services, to public 
education, and denounced the precarious situation of young émigrés forced to leave 
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the country. The protestors appropriated the toxicity and the unruly propagation of a 
mass of oil that threatened the national territory, in order to refer to the gathering of 
great numbers of bodies that took over the streets, pressuring the state against the 
post-crisis privatizations of public infrastructures, by means of impure modes of 
organization. As the research work of Feenstra, Tormey and others have explained the 
impurity of these tides was “innovative in the way it [brought] together traditional 
structures and new dynamics. Traditional trade union tactics [were] adopted, but the 
mareas [were] more self-organized, inclusive, distributed and horizontal in their 
actions” (13). In other words, the same paradigm of petroleum toxicity that underlay 
the assemblies of those who suffered precarization after the crisis mirrored the toxicity 
that was assigned to criminalized collectives such as the irregular migrants and the 
insolvents. 
The tides were not the first collectives that embraced toxicity as form of self-
naming. Before then, for example, the punk band Eskorbuto, ‘Skurvy’ (sic) created one 
of the most significant Basque counter-cultural anthems of the 1980s, singing “somos 
ratas de Bizkaia, somos ratas contaminadas” ‘we are rats of Biscay, we are contaminated 
rats.’ This band, whose reputation travelled the Atlantic becoming of notable influence 
for Mexican and Chicanx punk scenes (Feixa), included the song “Ratas de Bizkaia” 
‘Rats of Biscay’ in their first EP titled “Zona Especial Norte” (ZEN, Northern Region of 
Exception), in 1984. In fact, the “northern region of exception” was the name of the 
plan that the, at that time, democratic Spain enforced in the Basque region in order to 
fight the terrorist contamination mentioned above. As I examined elsewhere (2011), 
this ZEN plan for citizen security, which later on was revealed to be partly anti-
constitutional, declared a great proportion of the young population of the Basque 
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region to be a potential terrorist before proven guilty. If the Zen plan aimed to contain 
the terrorist contamination, Eskorbuto assumed a double logic of contamination as their 
own and their generation’s primary trait. The name of the band claimed a pathologic 
toxicity as proper, while the “us” of the contaminated rats referred to a polluting 
toxicity. The conditions for this strategy of self-naming-as-toxic were laid in a heavily 
polluted industrial city like Bilbao, which at the time was undergoing a deep process of 
deindustrialization and precarization of workers, and heroin was becoming the staple 
counter-cultural drug, which led to an unstoppable dissemination of AIDS. 
 
The unfolding proliferation of these and other examples that resulted from 
directing the initial steps of my research towards a mapping of toxic representations of 
criminalized collectives directed my queries towards lasting theoretical and critical 
debates. As I will address in the following section, for these debates, the toxicity that 
recurred in the accumulation of disparate case-scenarios surfaced as a paradigm, in 
other words, as an overarching economy of recognition, rather than just a collection of 
simple metaphors and tropes. This connection between the primary examples of toxic 
criminalizations and the theoretical debates gave the initial form to the main argument 
presented in my opening paragraph. 
In the main argument, I situate the point of departure of my research during 
the early formation of the new paradigm of petrotoxicity, soon after WWII came to an 
end. The contemporary examples show that, both the age-old disease toxicity and the 
more recent petrotoxicity operate together in the processes of recognition of 
criminalized collectives. As it will become apparent in this introduction, the complicity 
of different paradigms of toxicity took place first at some moment during the Cold 
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War, once notions of petrotoxicity disseminated through the different social layers 
penetrating every one of them.  
My research aims to map out this early period as a process of transformation. 
Firstly, during this process, the petroleum toxicity spread entangled with the 
development of neoliberalism after WWII, disclosing the initial signs of a distinct 
regime of power. Secondly, alongside this process, both toxicities became entangled 
affecting transformations at the street level of individuals and also at the level of 
political projects. To put it another way, they shaped criminalizations, while becoming 
intertwined too in the shaping the neoliberal political projects of national and 
transnational assemblages.  
In order to decipher, in a nuanced non-generalizing manner, the specific 
characteristics and consequences of the paradigm of petrotoxicity as an economy of 
recognition of criminals that sustained the consolidation of neoliberalism, I decided to 
situate my research-work as precisely as possible. This is a work of precision with 
regard to multiple coordinates. Firstly, I laid out the theoretical and critical debates 
regarding toxicity and its relationship with different regimes of power. Secondly, I 
located and time-framed the work of research precisely –post-WWII crises of the 
Spanish dictatorship and early formations of the European Union. Finally, I clearly 
delineated the archive (legislation, mass media and intellectual discourses) which leads 
to the determination of particular criminal figures –the homosexual, the terrorist, and 
its apologist. In what follows, I will elaborate, in turn on the theoretical debates, the 




The Paradigm of Petrotoxicity 
As opposed to petrotoxicity, disease toxicity has been widely addressed from a 
theoretical perspective. Paradigmatically, Michel Foucault’s work, from the 1960s to 
the 1980s, organized distinct regimes of power around multiple “diagrams of disease” 
in which contagion had been present since the middle ages (Allen, Carter et al.). Later 
on, Roberto Esposito proposed the concept “immunitas” (2002) as an interpretive 
category that served as a paradigm of modernity for the protective response against 
those that trespassed borders –in realms such as the social, the political and the legal. 
That response was framed as the threat and fears of contagion. 
In turn, petroelum toxicity has been the focus of more recent research work, of 
which Paul B. Preciado’s 2008 Testo Yonqui might be the most significant example. 
Picking up where Foucault left off, Preciado focused on reorganizations of notions of 
gender, sex and sexuality to explore the formation of a new regime of sexuality. This 
new regime lay on paradigms of toxicity produced by petroleum byproducts and 
nuclear energy right after World War II.  
I engage with this theoretical debate in a twofold manner. Firstly, I aim to 
prolong Foucault’s and Esposito’s work by shedding light on a toxicity that is not viral. 
Secondly, I intend to complement Preciado’s proposal by adding to their work notions 
of criminality focused on sex, gender and sexuality. In this section, I will expand on 
each of the theoretical explorations, I will bring to the surface the connections between 
them, and finally, I will trace the general outline of the particularities of the paradigm 
of petrotoxicity.   
 Since his earlier work Foucault established connections between paradigms of 
contagious diseases and the categorization of deviants. Already in 1961, his book Folie 
	 11 
et Déraison: Histoire de la folie à l’âge classique (translated as History of Madness)2 made 
apparent the spillage from the knowledge linked to the treatment of leprosy in the 
middle-ages to the scientific knowledge regarding the seventeenth- and eighteenth- 
century categorization of madness. As Foucault put it, “the true heir of leprosy […] is 
madness,” and it was madness because both “elicit[ed] similar reactions of division, 
exclusion and purification, which are akin to madness itself” (8). This early work on 
madness put the contagiousness of leprosy at center stage insofar as it offered the 
foundation of the logic behind the deployment of relations of power.  
There was a fully fleshed-out proposal of interdependencies between different 
“disease diagrams” and regimes of power when Foucault delivered his 1977-78 lecture 
published as Sécurité, territoire, population (Security, Territory, Population). Foucault 
determined that “in the domain of law, in the domain of medicine, and in other 
domains also […] you can see a somewhat similar evolution and more or less the same 
type of transformations” (10). Within these transformations he identified three 
“general economies of power” (or regimes of power): sovereignty, discipline and 
security, which were dominated by sets of techniques that had been used to treat 
leprosy, plagues and smallpox respectively. The overlapping production of legal, 
medical, statistical and other types of knowledge went hand in hand with mechanisms 
of power and sets of techniques that were reproduced in the treatment of toxic 
contagious diseases. 
These mechanisms of power that mirror diagrams of disease treatments have 
been spelled out, perhaps rather too neatly, by the collective work carried out by Steve 																																																								
2 When referring to and using direct quotes from critical work that has been translated into English, 
which is the case, for example, for most of Foucault’s work, I will use the translation into English rather 
than the original. 
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Hinchliffe, Nick Bingham, John Allen and Simon Carter. Nevertheless, they argue 
that “rather than one mode of ordering or [disease] diagram achieving dominance, 
there tend to be numerous orderings and materials that together produce the social 
world” (30). The entanglement of sovereignty and leprosy surfaced in banishments 
under the law insofar as they both shared techniques of exclusion and division. 
Discipline and plague connected within political economy through the measure of the 
quarantine, which operated by inclusions that organized and categorized. Finally, 
security overlapped with treatments of vaccination of smallpox, which operated by 
interventions and normalizations, overtaking public health discourses and actions. 
Despite presenting an order that feels too tidy, it proves helpful when pointing to the 
differences between contagious disease toxicities and petrotoxicity. 
Significantly, this relationship between regimes of power and diagrams of 
disease, which Foucault referred to as “inheritance,” is not a just a matter of 
overlapping of techniques of treatment and regimes of power. Already in the 1960s, 
Foucault argued that it revealed “the relationship of a culture to the very thing that it 
excludes, and more precisely the relationship between our own culture and that truth 
about itself which, distant and inverted, it uncovers and covers up in madness” (543). 
Thus, the implications that the transformations of these moments of inheritance 
revealed were far-reaching, and signified profound social transformations. 
Following Foucault’s approach disease toxicities operate by generalizing forms 
of exclusion and inclusion with the consequent formation of the community. The 
understanding of the toxicity of diseases, generalized forms of exclusion and inclusion, 
and the consequent formation of the community came together already under 
Foucault’s approach.  
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This is where Roberto Esporito’s term “immunitas” intervenes. Esposito traces 
immunity back to classical Rome and Greece to elucidate the modern paradigm 
through which contemporary community is established, and argues that it 
“progressively extended to all sectors of modern society” (9). The fundamental 
coordinates of the immunitary paradigm that Esposito identifies as employed in the 
consideration of individual and political bodies, can be summarized in the image of the 
inoculation of non-lethal quantities of a virus that is taken in order to form antibodies 
to avoid contracting a contagious disease. 
 What is external and what internal; negation and affirmation; and exclusion 
and inclusion are reconsidered under this immunitary paradigm. What Esposito calls 
“the pathogenic matrix” (123) reinforces the division between the inside of the 
community that needs to be protected, and the external viral threat, “the pathogen was 
transmitted through the infiltration of a contagious element that was not engendered 
by the body.” However, the formation of the community is not based on the simple 
negation of the external threat, instead it negates the negation by means of inclusive 
exclusions. In other words, with the controlled inclusion of the external threat the 
community’s “identity is simultaneously affirmed and altered at the same time (177). 
This is, in short what the inoculation of a contagious virus produces and is, for 
Esposito, reproduced in the logics of formation of modern communities. 
 
 Another kind of toxicity, the toxicity of petroleum, was propagated after World 
War II together with the development of neoliberalism. Paul B. Preciado’s work opens 
the critical path to argue that it was petrotoxicity that became predominant after the 
1950s. Certainly, it did not make obsolete the social formations and power regimes that 
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were inheritors of viral or disease toxicities. As argued by Foucault, we should not 
think in terms of succession but in terms of an ongoing addition of types of power that 
inform new regimes. I borrow from those who have expanded on Foucault’s work the 
name for the regime that became entangled with petrototoxicity; this is, the neoliberal 
regime.  
 From Foucault’s 1978-79 lectures Naisscance de la Biopolitique (translated as The 
Birth of Biopolitics) to Wendy Brown’s Undoing the Demos and Judith Butler’s Notes 
toward a Performative Theory of Assembly, both from 2015, the neoliberal regime has been 
extensively studied. Foucault proposed the notion of “neoliberal governmentality” 
(192) as a governing rationality that encompassed the configuration of states as well as 
the production of subjects. This governmentality demanded at every level “the return 
to the enterprise […] or a policy of the economization” (242). The state as an 
“enterprise society” and the subject as “the entrepreneur of himself” (226) 
encapsulated the different social layers that the neoliberal regime circumscribed and 
also its modes of circumscription.  
Brown follows Foucault when she conceives of “neoliberalism as an order of 
normative reason that […] extend[s] a specific formulation of economic values, 
practices, and metrics to every dimension of human life” (29) and approaches the term 
“economization” from a more nuanced perspective. She argues that neoliberalism does 
not “literally marketize[…] all spheres;” instead it “configures human beings 
exhaustively as market actors” (31). Meanwhile, Butler points to the trappings of such 
a neoliberal regime: “neoliberal rationality demands self-sufficiency as a moral ideal at 
the same time that neoliberal forms of power work to destroy that very possibility at an 
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economic level” (14). This neoliberal regime lay its foundations before WWII, but had 
to wait until the war ended to fully develop. 
Paul B. Preciado mentions three fundamental transformations that point to the 
entanglement between the neoliberal regime and petrotoxicity. Firstly, they refer to the 
inauguration of the “Plastic times,” after WWII, indicating the moment in which a 
myriad petroleum byproducts took over the material landscape of Europe and the US. 
As a close equivalent to Preciado’s term “plastic time,” I use, in the dissertation, 
Stephanie Lemenager’s widely accepted notion “petromodernity.” Secondly, they 
explain plastics as producers and product of the new “toxic environment” of the 1950s. 
Behind this toxic environment, plastic and nuclear toxicities surfaced as historically 
related, “DuPont, who pioneered the development of plastics from the 1930s on, was 
also implicated in nuclear research for the Manhattan project” (32). Both plastics and 
the multiplication of the manufacture of transuranic elements became part of the new 
highly toxic environment, however, as Lemenager argues decisively, today 
“petromodernity has enveloped the Euro-American imagination to the extent that ‘oil’ 
has become synonymous with the world” (68). Finally, Preciado addresses the 
domination of petrotoxicity to that of disease toxicity, when they indicate that after 
WWII, “infectious diseases in wealthy countries fell behind illnesses related to aging, 
the management of sexuality, […] and the regulation of reproduction and the body’s 
immune system in highly toxic environments” (172). Among the rest of the toxicities, 
petrotoxicity started dominating, being researched by a new set of knowledges and 
demanding distinctive techniques of management and regulation, all the while 
penetrating hence constituting the neoliberal regime. 
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Both what I call the “petrotoxic regime of criminality” and Preciado’s 
“pharmaco-pornographic regime of sexuality” were consolidated after WWII. For 
Preciado, the post-WWII plastic environment of high toxicity is “the point at which 
the production and commercialization of synthetic hormones unveil their true 
pharmacopornographic function” (172). This regime of sexuality entails the 
government of sexual subjectivity through biomolecular and semio-technical processes, 
which are characterized by the introduction of the notion of “gender” and the 
consequent possibility to modify the body; and also by the techniques of social control 
filtering into this individual body (211). If the pharmacopornographic regime is a 
regime of sexuality, then the petrotoxic regime is one of criminality, both of which 
were formed under neoliberal conditions of petromodernity. 
In order to examine the petrotoxic paradigm, which the regime of criminality 
inherits, I will focus on the set of laws passed under the Francoist dictatorship in 
Spain. It was during the 1960s that petroleum as a matter was regulated for the first 
time, either in the form of oil or in the form of byproducts (pesticides, dangerous 
substances…). Significantly, this set of laws was incorporated from international 
legislation and was presented as part of the Europeanization of the regime. Below, I 
will the give the general account of the four main characteristics of this toxicity by 
showcasing the contrast with the disease paradigm of toxicity. This brief account will 
be fully fleshed out later in the dissertation, with the analysis of the legislation of the 
Francoist dictatorship imported from Europe.  
Petrotoxicity reconsiders the division between the inside and the outside of the 
immunitary paradigm. It does not follow the movement of penetration delineated by 
either a disease-causing virus that enters the body, or the inoculation of the vaccine 
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that prevents it. Instead, petrotoxicity presents no outside. As explained by Tom 
Cohen, “toxic, it is waste when exposed, draping itself around life forms” (92). In other 
words, petrotoxicity is already there by the time it is revealed.  
Secondly, petrotoxicity requires a set of technologies different to the ones 
applied to treat the diverse diseases interwoven with the overlapping regimes of power. 
Two main reasons require this divergence. Oil and petroleum byproducts are not 
contagious; and they are commodities, economized entities that operate within the 
rules of market economy. This means that within the market economy commodities 
unveiled as toxic are not banished, kept in quarantine, or used as vaccines; instead they 
are either revalued or disposed of –recycled, reused or reduced.  
The third contrasting characteristic of petrotoxicity comes with molecular 
scientific knowledge that calculates risk. It is through a production of knowledge that 
operates at the level of the molecules, atoms and hormones that we see petrotoxicity 
acting. Preciado associates, at this very level, the production of plastic and the notion 
of the pharmacopornographic regime of sexuality. The former is the “artificial 
propagation of carbon atoms in long chains of molecules of organic compounds derived 
from petroleum, and whose burning is highly polluting” (32). The latter stemmed from 
to extraction of the “first natural molecules of progesterone and estrogens” (26) in the 
1940s. Thus, after WWII, the categorization and manipulation of elements reached an 
unparalleled precision by classifying and calculating risks at atomic and molecular 
levels. 
The last characteristic of the petrotoxic invokes the nature of oil and petroleum 
byproducts as both indispensable and polluting. Tom Cohen connects the idea of waste 
and the etymology of the term toxic, to the Greek “toxicon” and “pharmakon” (95) in 
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order to open a dialogue between the influential thinkers Paul de Man and Jacques 
Derrida. For us, this double meaning of cure and poison that the petrotoxic paradigm 
acquires insofar as petro-pharmakon, reveals itself under the calculation of market 
parameters and within the rationality of the neoliberal regime. Oil and petroleum 
byproducts are presented as the cure for economic progress, and at the same, their 
poison acts against the lives of self-entrepreneurs. 
 
These four coordinates of the petrotoxic paradigm permeate every social field. 
As historicized by Timothy Mitchell, oil had been enveloping the planet since the late 
nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth. Oil reached Europe through a 
network of refineries, pipelines and oil tankers that traversed Iraq and the Gulf, and 
arrived to the Mediterranean through the Suez Canal. The development of the oil 
tanker allowed oil to be transported cheaply between continents, such that “from the 
1920s onwards, about 60 to 80 per cent of world oil production was exported. So much 
oil was moved across oceans that, by 1970, oil accounted for 60 per cent of seaborne 
cargo worldwide” 3 (37). Preciado consolidates this sense of lack of externality of 
petrotoxicity when considering non-recycled plastics.  
Preciado refers to the “Trash Vortex, a floating mass the size of Texas in the 
North Pacific made of plastic garbage” (33), which was discovered in the 1980s. There 
is no way out from the worldwide network created by oil transportation and plastic 																																																								
3 Timothy Mitchell’s Carbon Democracy and James Marriott and Mika Minio-Paluello’s The Oil Road trace 
both the geographical and political journey that oil makes from the wells into Europe, which has been 
rendered invisible. Both publications allow us to understand the multiple violences, the asymmetrical 
relations of dominations and the potentialities of resistance allowed by the historical transformations 
underwent in the energy production and distribution industry. Their work lies in the background of our 
dissertation insofar as those transformations and those relations of domination sustain the conditions of 
possibility of the criminal discourses regarding toxicity. 
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disposal. Not only are oil and petroleum byproducts already toxic before being 
detected and exposed; they are also part of a global circulation of commodities and 
residues. This circulation penetrates and transforms the individual at the atomic level.  
As a series of articles published by The Guardian in 2017 explained, “Plastic 
fibres [were] found in tap water around the world” (Carrington). This “ubiquitous 
plastic pollution,” the article explained, became a health hazard because “plastics often 
contain a wide range of chemicals to change their properties or colour and many of 
these are toxic or hormone disruptors.” The indispensability of oil and petroleum 
byproducts encountered its toxic counterpart, not only in the harm to the environment 
but also in the threat to and transformation of individuals’ lives.  
In the present dissertation I will address the dissemination of the petrotoxic 
paradigm, which developed entangled with the consolidation of the neoliberal regime. 
In order to do so, I will focus on the accumulation (instead of substitution) of the 
paradigms of toxicity that took place during the 1950s and 1960s under the Francoist 
dictatorship in Spain, while scrutinizing the different entanglement that petrotoxicity 
allowed between Francoism and the formation of Europe. 
 
In a Specific Time and Place 
The specific approach to the toxic criminalization of collectives from under 
Franco’s dictatorship in Spain (1939-1978) vis-à-vis the early configuration of Europe 
as a transnational unity (1947-1975) allows for a situated elaboration of a perspective 
of the neoliberal post-war period that developed conditioned by oil and petroleum 
byproducts. This perspective accumulates at least two different margins to look 
through and think from. Firstly, criminalized collectives were stigmatized and 
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condemned to living on the margins of society. Secondly, Spain and the rest of the 
Southern European countries endured what was referred to as the underdevelopment 
crisis, which led to the consideration of this zone as peripheral and marginal for the 
development of Europe.  
Yet, I approach both processes of marginalization as central for the formation 
of post-war Europe. I will elaborate on criminals in the coming section of this 
introduction, which deals also with the different kinds of archive that I have examined 
to carry out my analysis. In this section, I will turn to the centrality that a Southern 
European dictatorship like the Spanish one acquires in the post-war formation of early 
transnational Europe. I will address this centrality together with the development of 
neoliberalism and the transformations with regard to the perception of oil in society.  
 
To begin with, I follow Étienne Balibar’s work on contemporary Europe to flip 
on its head the presupposed center-periphery logics of certain territories. The French 
thinker points to another one of the Southern European countries when he argues that, 
“If Europe is […] the name of an unresolved political problem, Greece is one of its 
centers, […] because of the current problems concentrated there” (2). Surely, the 
Spanish dictatorship operated as yet another of Europe’s peripheral centers for the 
concentration of political, religious and economic issues, which as examined by 
contemporary Iberianist scholars, remain unresolved still today. Either by thinking it 
as a ghost story, as proposed by Jo Labanyi (2003); by linking the dictatorship and the 
democratic state at a macroeconomic and sociological level, as elaborated by 
Emmanuel Rofriguez and Isidro López (2010); or by pointing to continuities regarding 
depolitization and consumerism, as examined by Luis Moreno-Caballud (2015); the 
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unresolved character of the problems formed under Franco remain, still today, 
unresolved. In fact, I will argue that it was the active perpetuation of those problems, 
rather than the intention of a resolution, that consolidated the early forms of the 
European Union.  
The unresolved political problem named Europe and the dissemination of a 
paradigm of petroleum toxicity are two processes that need to be addressed hand in 
hand. When, for example, Timothy Mitchell argues for the consolidation of the age of 
oil, he does so by thinking of it as an entangled phenomenon, “like twentieth-century 
democracy, twentieth-century economic expertise developed in a specific relationship 
to the hydrocarbon age” (123). Tom Cohen too refers to this entanglement when he 
thinks of oil as “the invisible core of hyperindustrial culture” (92). From this 
perspective, elements such as the increasing dependence on petroleum that accelerated 
in the 1950s; the staggering penetration of petroleum byproducts that took place 
during the late 1950s and the 1960s; the dissemination of a new petrotoxic paradigm; 
the dissemination the expansion of the neoliberal governing rationality after WWII; 
the transformations of political, religious and economic issues within the Francoist 
dictatorship; and the early formations of the European transnational project cannot be 
considered in isolation.  
As will become clear throughout this section, the various different 
transformations that developed simultaneously after WWII give order to the present 
dissertation. Divided into two main parts, before and after the widespread 
dissemination of petroleum toxicity, this text assembles the multiple elements 
mentioned above in a single narration. At the same time, this narration sets the frame 
that sheds new light on the relations of domination deployed under neoliberal 
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rationality by means of the criminalizations of various collectives under the 
dictatorship. 
To be sure, the importance of oil had been acknowledged in Spanish legislation 
before the Civil War (1936-1939) that lead to the dictatorship, hence also before 
World War II, and before the point of departure of this dissertation. Since the 1920s 
two notions, oil and national sovereignty, had become increasingly intertwined in 
legislation. In 1927 and 1928 the government formed CAMPSA, an oil and fossil fuel 
state monopoly established in the name of national sovereignty and national security. 
CAMPSA coincided with the cartel formed by US and British major oil companies in 
the 1920s, which responded to the sudden abundance of oil. The formation of this 
monopoly led to the first aggressive promotion of the utilization of oil for 
transportation and byproduct manufacture.  
During the Spanish Civil War the entanglement between the two notions, oil 
and sovereignty, became clear beyond legal texts and state institutions. Oil supply for 
the two sides reflected what would later be called the Cold War.4 The military coup 
and nationalist campaign for sovereign control of the territory was led by Franco, who, 
allied with Hitler's Nazi regime, Mussolini's Fascist dictatorship and Salazar's 
authoritarian Estado Novo, was sustained by U.S. oil corporations. In contrast, the 
republican side had its oil requirements met by the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics. Oil and sovereignty became entangled as the fundamental matter for 
waging war.    																																																								
4 The history of the oil supply during Spanish Civil War has been well documented in historiographical 
literature, as well as the active roll taken by Thorkild Rieber –President of Texaco and Nazi 
sympathizer. Starting with the 1973 book Capitalismo español: de la Autarquía a la estabilización (1939-1959) 
and the 1994 A New International History of the Spanish Civil War oil supply is presented as a fundamental 
resource that conditioned the outcome of the war.  
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After both Franco's victory at the end of the Spanish Civil War in 1939 and the 
defeat of Franco’s allies at the end of WWII in 1945, Spain became one of the political 
crucibles for continental Europe. In fact, While Winston Churchill, now considered 
one of Europe's founding fathers, uttered in his 1946 Zurich speech, “if we are to form 
the United States of Europe or whatever name or form it may take, we must begin 
now” Southern European dictatorships, such as the Portuguese and the Spanish, and 
later on, the Greek stood out as unanswered problems for any possible formation of a 
transnational unity. At this moment, it was oil that allowed the dictatorship to come up 
with solutions to international isolation and to the consequent autarchic policies.  
In 1947, Franco’s regime passed the first law of the dictatorship that addressed 
the pre-war state monopoly over oil, with the aim of reinforcing it. It was passed by the 
Falangist ruling family, which was notoriously close to the national socialist agenda, 
and during that time ran the administration. This law that “Reorganiza el Monopolio de 
Petróleos” ‘Reorganize[d] the Monopoly of Petroleum’ brought back to the center-stage 
the relationship between the two notions, oil and sovereignty. This time around, the 
legal text made a distinction. If during the Spanish Civil War oil products were “vitales 
productos en el periodo de nuestra Cruzada Nacional” ‘vital products during our National 
Crusade’ (Franco, 77); after WWII, oil was not related to a wartime sense of national 
defense anymore, but to the “evolución del concepto de la soberanía estatal” ‘development of 
the concept of state sovereignty.’ Along with providing a possible solution at a 
European level, this call for oil to sustain the development of sovereignty received a 
response from the US. 
The 1953 Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement, also known as the Pact of 
Madrid, signed between the Harry S. Truman’s administration and the Francoist 
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Spain shifted gears internationally with regards to the discourses produced about the 
dictatorship. This Pact allied the US and the dictatorship in their anti-communist 
quest. Part of this shared anti-communist agenda implied more than just the 
permission to build military infrastructure on Spanish soil. More significantly for us, it 
allowed the US to carry out oil explorations in the dictatorship’s territory. In exchange 
for these oil-infused concessions, Spain was granted economic aid by way of credit 
acquisitions, and addressed, internationally, as an underdeveloped country in 
economic crisis.  
The recognition of the dictatorship as a country enduring an economic crisis of 
underdevelopment sets the turning point for the beginning of our dissertation. 
Following Janet Roitman, “the term “crisis” serves as a primary enabling blind spot for 
the production of knowledge” (13). From this perspective crises become 
transcendental placeholders that allow and disallow the opportunity to pose particular 
questions about the territories in crisis. Hence, the classification of the Spanish 
dictatorship as an underdeveloped country in economic crisis, rather than, for example 
a country in political crisis because of the lack of democracy, framed the Francoist 
regime in purely economic terms, disallowing questions that addressed its political 
violence and the Catholic fundamentalism. Classifying the dictatorship as an 
underdeveloped country in economic crisis directed questions solely to fostering its 
capitalist-style economic progress. 
Whilst living still under the dictatorship, the cultural critic Manuel Vazquez 
Montalbán unveiled the logic of domination implicit in the narration about the crisis of 
underdevelopment that required aid in the form of loans from international 
institutions. Montalbán explained in 1974 that Franco’s regime endured, since the first 
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Pact of Madrid, in a state of dependence, which he named the American financial 
penetration of Spain (31). Following contemporary critics such as Wendy Brown, I 
understand this financial penetration through indebtedness, as a process of 
financialization, in which “States persist as non-sovereign actors” (2010: 23). 
Meanwhile, the image of a new western military ally that was undergoing an economic 
crisis of underdevelopment began to overshadow the political problem of opening 
relationships with a non-democratic regime.  
In this Southern European crucible of unresolved problems, where 
undemocratic practices were overlooked in the name of western alliances and so-called 
economic development, the presence of religion became apparent only a month after 
the Pact of Madrid. The Vatican and Franco’s dictatorship signed the Concordat in 
1953. This was the second sign of international openness and support for the 
dictatorship. Meanwhile it gave the Catholic Church access to extraordinary 
privileges.  
This “climax of the neo-catholic orientation” (185), as labeled by the historian 
Stanley Payne, reinforced the Catholic fundamentalist stance of the Francoist regime. 
Certainly, international recognition did not come without cost –a cost that further 
eroded the sovereignty of the dictatorship, this time, in favor of the Catholic Church. 
Among the many concessions numbered by Payne, the reaffirmation of “the 
confessionality of the Spanish state, […] the right of presentation of bishops by the 
head of state […] the juridical personality and independence of the Church [and] the 
restor[ation of] the legal privileges of the clergy” (186), which had been abolished 
before the dictatorship, stood out as sovereign concessions that the dictatorship 
exchanged for international acceptance. In this concatenation of agreements with the 
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US and the Vatican, the possibility of finding oil under Spanish soil should be 
recognized as one of the triggers that reconfigured problems concerned with the 
dictatorship’s political sovereignty, economic financialization and religious 
dependency. 
 
Alongside the new categorization of the dictatorship as an internationally 
accepted albeit underdeveloped country in crisis, oil and hydrocarbons also 
conditioned the wider transnational territorial configuration and its organization 
within a particular political and economic rationality. I am referring to the first forms 
of a united Europe and the consolidation of neoliberal rationality. I will address each 
of them in turn.  
The centrality of oil did not become apparent in the first European treaty, but it 
surfaced shortly after, as a lack, rather than a possession. As showcased by the very 
name Coal and Steel Community, signed in 1951, the first treaties aimed at creating 
transnational Europe did not address oil. However, the treaties of Rome for the 
European Economic Community (EEC) and of the European Atomic energy 
(EURATOM), both signed in 1957, were written with an awareness of the 
dependency on oil that conditioned the Euro-American capitalist project for economic 
development. As argued by Timothy Mitchell, “the Marshall Plan and the construction 
of the Cold War in Europe […] helped engineer a political and financial setup in 
Western Europe that was […] increasingly dependent on oil and the dollar” (122). 
The Messina dialogues leading to the 1957 treaties, which took place among the 
members of the European Coal and Steel Community in 1955, worked “towards the 
setting up of a united Europe,” (Ministers of Foreign Affairs, 1955: 2), by addressing 
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the connection between the future economic project and the necessity to counteract the 
lack of oil. Hence, remarks on “l'énergie au sens traditionnel” (7-8)  ‘energy in the 
traditional sense,’ “l'énergie nucléaire” ‘nuclear energy’ and “l'intégration économique 
générale” ‘general economic integration’ followed one another in Messina. If under 
Franco oil became entangled with sovereignty, for the European transnational project 
oil was intertwined with economic progress. Significantly, the Marshall plan was not 
implemented in Spain, but the Madrid Pact of 1953 with the US government served 
similar purposes. It aligned the dictatorship with the anti-communist west and 
introduced notions of capitalist style progress and wellbeing into the dictatorship. 
Even bearing in mind that under the Francoist dictatorship in Spain oil did not 
take over coal as a source of energy until 1968, for the new future European union it 
was “une tâche urgente de réaliser une coordination des principales formes d'énergie en Europe, à 
savoir, le charbon, l'énergie hydraulique, le pétrole et l'énergie nucléaire” ‘an urgent task to 
coordinate the main forms of energy in Europe, namely, coal, hydropower, oil and 
nuclear energy”. Against the relentless growth of the consumption of oil and its 
prominence in comparison to coal and hydropower, the case of nuclear energy 
remained of particular importance for its potential to free Europe from growing 
hydrocarbon dependency. For this reason it carried “non seulement une importance 
économique, mais encore une importance politique particulière au développement de la coopération 
dans le domaine de l'énergie nucléaire” ‘not only economic importance but also particular 
political importance to develop cooperation in the field of nuclear energy.” In other 
words, the lack of oil became the backdrop against which it was possible to take “un 
pas en avant vers l'établissement d'un marché commun general” ‘a step forward towards the 
establishment of a general common market.” The amount of energy increasingly 
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produced by oil and the hope that nuclear energy could end this dependency allowed 
for the imagination of a European common market.  
 
The position of oil as the invisible core behind Francoist sovereignty and 
European economic development was established hand in hand with the neoliberal 
rationality, which consolidated its frame of thought alongside the booming oil industry 
of the 1940s. Since the early 1920s, oil was understood as an infinite resource and this 
made it possible to turn economics into the neoliberal abstraction that rationalized 
every social sphere. Following Mitchell once again, “If oil played a key role in the 
making of ‘the economy’, it also shaped the project that would challenge it, and later 
provide a rival method of governing democratic politics: the ‘market’ of neoliberalism” 
(142). The first meeting of the Mont Pelerin Society took place on April 10th 1947 two 
years after the Bretton Woods system came into force. This meeting was a gathering of 
the many members (from the United States and Europe) of the so-called neoliberal 
thought collective.5 The following year, in 1948, the journal Ordo was born giving its 
name to the Ordoliberals. As argued by Thomas Biebricher, the Ordos became the 
most influential neoliberal thinkers since the 1938 “Colloque Walter Lippmann” 
(where the term “neoliberalism” had been officially coined) and throughout the 1950s.6   																																																								
5 I borrow the term “neoliberal thought collective” from Philip Mirowski and Dieter Plehwe’s 2009 The 
Road from Mont Pèlerin. They argue that “the central thought collective that has conscientiously developed 
the neoliberal identity for more than sixty years now. We will consider any person or group that bears 
any links to the Mont Pèlerin Society (MPS) since 1947 as falling within the purview of the neoliberal 
thought collective” (4). Franco’s technocratic government’s ties with this neoliberal thought collective 
might not have been one of affiliation, however, we should be able to speak, using Foucault’s own 
language (2008: 185), of neo-liberalism in its Spanish form.  
6 Beyond Foucault’s analysis delivered in his lectures of 1978 and 1979, our dissertation also follows 
more contemporary analyses of Ordoliberalism such Pierre Dardot and Christian Laval’s The New Way 
of the World and Thomas Biebricher’s articles on the topic. The latter argues, “the first, and more 
authoritarian, strand of neoliberalism is best represented by one of its oldest varieties, namely German 
ordoliberalism. In the writings of Eucken, Rüstow and Röpke —three of the main figures of the 
	 29 
Certainly, the influence of the Ordos reached Francoist Spain. In 1956, two 
years before the dictatorship joined the Bretton Woods architecture by entering the 
OEEC, the IMF and the World Bank, and thus officially embracing capitalist 
economic growth and reinforcing its anticommunist stance, Rafael Calvo Serer 
published La aproximación de los neoliberales à la actitud tradicional (The Neoliberal 
approach to the Traditional Attitude), which dialogued mainly with Ordoliberal 
authors and particularly with Wilhelm Röpke. Calvo Serer’s work became something 
of a precocious declaration of intents. It was a proposal to overcome the dictatorship’s 
crisis of underdevelopment, by persisting as an “estado fuerte” ‘strong state,’ and 
bringing together, under the umbrella of neoliberal rationalities, European economic 
development and the regime’s Catholic fundamentalism. 
In less than eight months from the publication of La aproximación, in February 
1957, the Opus Dei family of technocrats, which Calvo Serer was officially affiliated 
to, took over the control of regime’s administration. They took it from the hands of the 
Falangist family that had been in power until then. These Opus Dei technocrats, who 
were, as anticipated by Calvo Serer’s book, part of the neoliberal thought collective, 
became the elite that managed the economic and social policies aiming to modernize 
the dictatorship in crisis. Since then, a relationship of interdependence between oil, 
national sovereignty, economic development and neoliberal rationalities stitched the 
dictatorship together with the European project of economic integration. 
 
																																																																																																																																																																					
movement— one can find a recurring concern about the rise of the masses and the formation of mass 
democracies in many Western countries” (2015: 257). In a latter interview he explained “throughout the 
1930s, the 1940s and even early 1950s –the ordoliberals were probably the most influential members of 
the broader family of neoliberal scholars” (2016: 3). 
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 After the formation of the European Economic Community and during the 
technocratic neoliberal rule of the dictatorship, petroleum’s realm of influence reached 
unprecedented heights. The insistence on the relationship between oil as a commodity 
related to abstract calculations concerning the market and sovereignty remained 
unchanged, but the ever-increasing penetration of oil and petroleum byproducts that 
permeated the everyday lives of people during 1960s demanded a different approach to 
this matter. Always a step behind European regulations of the toxicity of oil and 
petroleum byproducts, the Francoist legislation begun to replicate, address and 
regulate the toxic effects of the pollution of these materials. Spanning from the law to 
the most popular cultural objects and mundane activities, the new “toxic environment” 
of the post-WWII “plastic times” examined by Preciado ultimately reached the 
Spanish dictatorship –while still enduring as one of the crucible of European 
unresolved problems.  
 This period points to the establishment of the conditions of possibility that 
allowed for the paradigm of petroleum toxicity to disseminate the dictatorship’s 
culture. As will become clear in the following sections, this dissemination affected too 
the economy of recognition of criminals. 
 At this moment, we see multiple coinciding transitions happening at once, and 
they all depended on each other. The dictatorship changed hands from the Falangist 
rule, to the Opus Dei technocrats. Their neoliberal governing rationality deepened the 
financialization of the dictatorship while keeping the political violence and Catholic 
fundamentalist principles in place. As argued by Tatjana Pavlovic and Justin 
Crumbaugh one consequence of the process of financialization was that international 
corporations had access to the dictatorship’s territory allowing for oil and petroleum 
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byproducts to envelop the regime. It was this wrapping of the mundane in plastic that 
brought the dissemination of a new notion of a threatening petrotoxicity. 
If under the Falangist ruling family, Franco’s dictatorship accepted loans from 
the US Government, under the technocrats that relationship of dependency increased. 
The dictatorship kept acquiring a succession of international loans of over a billion 
dollars from credits given by the US, European Institutions, Eximbank and the 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development.7 As the historian Stanley 
Payne argues, the growing international recognition was closely associated with the 
loans assumed by the dictatorship. If in 1950, still under the Falangists “a loan of $62.5 
million was approved [by the US], and […] by the close of 1950 [under the 
technocrats] the most severe aspects of the international ostracism had come to an 
end” (1986: 383); later during the 1960’s “more than a billion dollars in additional 
funding was made available from foreign sources through various loan and credit 
devices” (1987: 474). This increasing process of financialization and consequent loss of 
sovereignty came hand in hand with the dissemination of a world of oil and plastics. 
The connection between the process of financialization and, let us call it 
following Stephanie LeMenager, the “petromodernity” (68) of the dictatorship, was 
made evident in the thorough account given of the “penetración económica” ‘economic 
penetration’ in 1974 by Vázquez Montalbán. He detailed the many corporations that 
settled in the dictatorship during the process of growing international consent towards 
the heavily indebted regime. They reached the dictatorship and penetrated the regime’s 																																																								
7 The process of indebtization of the Franco regime during the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s has been well 
documented. Authors from different fields of inquiry such as Payne, Raymond Carr, Juan Pablo Fusi, 
Manuel Vázquez Montalbán and Nicos Poulantzas agree with the loss of sovereignty that this national 
indebtedness produced from credits given by the US, Europe, Eximbank and the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development.  
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territory either by purchasing local companies’ capital or by establishing their own 
branch offices. From our perspective, it is possible to organize these corporations as 
related either to the financial sector, or depending heavily on the production and trade 
of oil and petroleum byproducts. Bank of America and Deloitte were two of the most 
recognizable names of the financial institutions. Monsanto, General Motors, Coca 
Cola, Firestone, Unilever, Shell and many other’s activity was tightly related to oil and 
petroleum byproducts, insofar as they developed pesticides; they created, assembled 
and painted cars and car parts; they depended on oil for distribution and on plastics for 
labeling; they produced tires; they marketed self-care products, detergents and soaps 
based on petroleum byproducts; or they were, put simply, international oil 
corporations. 
The petro-modernization of the dictatorship meant that plastics, varnishes, 
synthetic fibers, paints, pesticides, plastic-packaging, detergents and other petroleum 
byproducts were being used for the first time for the myriad commodities that arrived 
to the stores and households. It also meant that imported oil was progressively 
becoming the main source of energy and transportation of the dictatorship. Finally, 
and most importantly, it meant that the toxicity of oil and petroleum byproducts took 
over the dictatorship’s collective imagination. Petrotoxicity and petromodernity 
became two sides of the same coin. 
A search for the term “toxic” in the archives of the two newspapers with the 
highest circulation during the dictatorship, ABC and La Vanguardia, confirms the 
widespread dissemination of this new kind of petroleum toxicity. The research reveals 
that during the 1940’s and 1950’s, the notion “tóxico” appeared in ABC just over 260 
times, while in La Vanguardia it surfaced over 670 times. In the following two decades, 
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during the 1960’s and 1970’s the references to the toxic, more than doubled in ABC 
with over 590 results and multiplied for over one and a half times in La Vanguardia with 
more than 1170 outcomes. More significantly, the object that the notion of “toxic” 
referred to varies significantly with the passing of time. The former uses of toxic were 
connected to cases such as health problems related to uric acid and medications to 
alleviate them; non-dangerous properties of phosphorus extracted from vegetable 
seeds (La Vanguardia, 1940); or terms linked to “toxicómano” that referred to 
individuals that consumed alcohol in excess (ABC, 1959). Contrastingly, the later uses 
of toxic referred to the infinite proliferation of petroleum byproducts that can be 
arranged in groups such as the many pesticides, varnishes, cooking gases, paints, and 
also to the environmental pollution of toxic gases produced by car emissions.  
 Petrotoxicity took over the dictatorship’s collective imagination to the extent 
that influential newspaper writers started using this new model of toxicity to make 
sense of the dangers that threatened the dictatorship. The 1970 article “Tajante Dilema” 
(The Categorical Dilemma) mentioned earlier was written by Vicente Gallego, one of 
the founders of EFE the Francoist international news agency. In his text published in 
ABC he argued, “no parece que la sociedad civilizada sepa defenderse del terrorismo internacional” 
‘it seems that the civilized society does not know how to defend itself from 
international terrorism” and sentenced “aún peor que la contaminación atmosférica es esta 
otra contaminación terrorista” ‘even worse than atmospheric contamination is this 
other terrorist contamination.” Ten years earlier, in 1960, the renowned Falaginst writer 
and journalist José del Río Sainz wrote for La Vanguardia the article “El Principio de las 
Nacionalidades y el de la Autodeterminación” (The principle of Nationalities and of Self-
determination). Here he argued, “Si Francia muere algún día de muerte que no sea la natural 
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[…] la mataron dos de las palabras de efecto tóxico […]. Esas dos palabras […] son ‘el principio 
de las nacionalidades y la autodeterminación’ de los pueblos” ‘If France ever dies from an 
unnatural death […] two words of toxic effect killed her […]. Those two words […] 
are ‘the principle of nationalities and self-determination’ of people.’ Petrotoxicity and 
the representation of the risk to live, both individual and national, became entangled 
between the 1960s and the 1970s, which is the same period when the period when the 
dictatorship and Europe became integrated. 
The first form of official integration between the Francoist regime and the 
European Economic Community took place in 1970 by means of a Preferential 
Commercial Agreement. The agreement was signed with the consolidation of the 
transitions that entangled the accession to power of the technocratic family of the 
Opus Dei and their neoliberalizing rationality; the financialization of the dictatorship 
that burdened it with unplayable debts, which resulted in the loss of national 
sovereignty; the petromodernization of the regime due to the penetration of 
international corporations in the territory; and the dissemination of notions of 
petrotoxicity expanding the utilization of this toxicity as paradigm to describe threats 
that put at risk the lives of both the population and the dictatorship. In other words, 
this partial integration of the dictatorship in the EEC needs to be thought in relation to 
the entangled transformations that took place for the previous ten. 
In 1959, two years after the European treaties were signed in Rome, the 
Organisation for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC) published a report 
regarding the admission of Spain. Following the footsteps of the 1953 Pact of Madrid 
with the US, the OEEC’s report disregarded issues related to Francoist undemocratic 
politics and problems linked to its religious fundamentalism. It instead addressed the 
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territory as an underdeveloped country in crisis that was short of international aid. 
Narrations of economic crisis allowed, once again for Francoism to be framed as an 
economic problem alone. As “an under-developed economy” Spain needed “to prepare  
the ground for a successful effort to solve the longer-term problems of the Spanish 
economic development” (134). In this respect, the OEEC could “contribute to the 
sound economic development of the country” and the analysis by the dictatorship in 
the report agreed with the Organization that there was a “necesidad de incrementar los 
créditos para el desarrollo de los paises atrasados” ‘necessity to increase the credits for 
development for under-developed countries’ (534). Under this financializing umbrella, 
the OEEC argued that by 1950 the Spanish economy had transitioned from the 
previous stages of “abnormality” to a situation of “relative normality.”  The "basic 
longer-term problem" for its development was "modernizing" (209) the economy, 
which would happen by becoming indebted.  
As a response, the technocratic Francoist regime passed, later in 1959, the 
decree-law of “Ordenación Económica,” (Economic Order) also known as the Plan of 
Stabilization. This law explained that after the "Guerra de Liberación, la economía española 
[…] se veía retardada” ‘war of liberation, the Spanish economy […] was 
underdeveloped,’ (Franco, 10005) but that, by then, Spain had already achieved the 
“nivel de vida de los países de Occidente” ‘life standards of western countries.’ The 
consonance between the OEEC’s report and the dictatorship was notable in their 
understanding of what the problems were and of what normality meant. The 
dictatorship was catching up with development, and the proposals for any possible 
solution took the form of acquisition of credits from international financial institutions 
and on-the-spot investment of foreign companies that eventually plastified the 
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dictatorship. Still in 1959 the concept “war of liberation” that the dictatorship could 
not let go of, with their sense of crusaders, gave away the Catholic fundamentalist 
sublayer that the financializing Europe concealed under discourses of economic crisis 
of underdevelopment. 
In 1963, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) 
published The Economic Development of Spain. This was one year before the Francoist 
technocrats launched the first “Plan de Desarrollo Económico” (Economic Development 
Plan), which continued to deepen the financialization of the regime and foster access of 
international corporations with their world of oil and petroleum byproducts. The text 
of the IBRD argued, again, for a normalized dictatorship, celebrating that “the forces 
of competition [had] emerged again” (1963: 47). A year earlier, the Dictatorship had 
applied for the accession of Spain as a full member to the European Economic 
Community but had been rejected, following the democratic political character that the 
Birkelbach report acknowledged to the EEC and as a result of the intense campaigns 
against this accession from European activists, media and communities of exiles.8 For 
example, the National Catalan Council in exile had to remind the Union about the 
non-democratic character of Francoist Spain by presenting a memorandum that dealt 
with the “le Génocide contre les Nations Catalane, Basque et Galicienne” ‘The Genocide 
against the Catalan, Basque and Galician Nations’ (1964: 2). Sometimes, the 
																																																								
8 The Birkelbach report argued, “La garantie de l'existence d'une forme d'État démocratique, au sens d'une 
organisation politique libérale, est une condition à l'adhésion. Les États dont les gouvernements n'ont pas de 
légitimation démocratique et dont les peuples ne participent aux décisions du gouvernement ni directement ni par des 
représentants élus librement, ne peuvent prétendre être admis dans le cercle des peuples qui forment les Communautés 
européennes” ‘The guarantee of the existence of a democratic form of state, in the sense of a liberal 
political organization, is a condition for accession. States whose governments have no democratic 
legitimacy and whose peoples do not participate in the decisions of the Government either directly or by 
freely elected representatives cannot claim to be admitted to the circle of the peoples forming the 
European Communities’(1961: 8).  
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concealment of the dictatorship as one of the crucibles of European political and 
religious problems behind discourses of underdevelopment and the need for economic 
progress became object of resistance. 
The 1963 IBRD report aimed to respond directly to the EEC’s rejection of the 
dictatorship based on undemocratic practices. This report argued that for Spain to be 
“equipped to play her part in the European scene” the answer was not democracy but 
“the transition toward a freer economy, […] development and modernization.” This 
combined response of the dictatorship and the IBRD was successful to a certain 
extent. In 1964 the European commission and the regime opened conversations 
deciding to establish by 1970 a Preferential Commercial Agreement that progressively 
eliminated barriers between the two territorial entities. During these years, the Opus 
Dei technocrats further implemented two more Economic Development Plans, the 
latter of which was interrupted by the 1972 oil crisis. Somehow, the end of the 
Dictatorship’s underdevelopment crisis was declared in 1970, with the Preferential 
Agreement and conditional membership of the EEC. However, this narration of 
underdevelopment crisis, which served to conceal the centrality that the unresolved 
problems of the dictatorship acquired for the unity of Europe, led to yet another crisis.  
Thus, between the 1957 accession of the technocrats to the control of the 
dictatorship, which coincided with the formation of the EEC, to the 1970 Preferential 
Agreement and the 1972 oil crisis, the hefty penetration of oil and petroleum 
byproducts disseminated a new kind of toxicity based on petroleum-based pollution. 
This toxicity established a distinct paradigm that made it possible to make sense of the 
threats to life inside the neoliberal formations of the dictatorship and of Europe. More 
than just semantics, petroleum toxicity became an interpretive category that provided 
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an economy of recognition of those threats. For example, it was this new petroleum 
toxicity that allowed the newspaper writers mentioned earlier to explain, for instance, 
the right to national self-determination and revolutionary armed action for national 
liberation. Finally, this economy of recognition of the toxic threats to life came hand in 
hand with the development of the neoliberal governing rationalities of the time. With 
the beginning of the oil crisis, the present dissertation ends. 
 
Criminal Archives 
I examine mainly three kinds of archive, which were produced in the twenty or 
so years that span from the recognition, early in the 1950s, of the Francoist 
dictatorship as an underdeveloped state in crisis, to the early 1970s oil crisis. Firstly, I 
critically approach Francoist legislation, penal and otherwise. Secondly I search for 
representations in the mass media that dialogue with the logics that surfaced in the 
legislation. I focus mostly on cinema, newspapers and newsreels. Thirdly, I examine 
the most significant intellectual discourses of those who put together the scaffolding of 
Europe after WWII.  
The wide-ranging scope of the primary archives responds to an analytic 
necessity, while being as thorough as possible in trawling archival resources. The 
reading of a far-reaching body of cultural texts is fundamental to map, in the extended 
social field, the capillary reverberations and the social, cultural and political 
implications that arise through the different paradigms of toxicity and their inheritance 
in the recognition of criminals. I argue that the widespread cultural objects studied in 
this dissertation aligned with the emergence of the petrotoxic paradigm.  
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The law, the mass media and the intellectual discourses present critical 
differences in their dominant characteristics depending on whether petrotoxicity had 
already taken over the Euro-American imagination or not. Their representations and 
effects varied. They became a productive part of a change that developed under the 
expansion of neoliberal rationalities. Below, I elaborate on the critical approach I 
adopt toward each kind of archive and on the shifts that each of them underwent. 
   
The Law 
In 1954 and 1970, two criminal laws brought to the surface two different 
paradigms of toxicity. The former reproduced the paradigm of the toxicity of a virus, 
and the latter introduced petrotoxicty to the recognition of criminals. This shift, which 
follows the expansion of neoliberalism, the financialization of the regime, and the 
petromodernization of the everyday, reiterates the transition that took place from the 
Falangist control of the Francoist dictatorship to the Opus Dei’s technocratic 
management; from the creation of the Coal and Steel Community to the European 
Economic Union. 
As has been widely argued (Pérez-Sánchez, Mira, Mora, Baidez), the 1954 
amendment of the 1933 law of “Estados Peligrosos” (Dangerous States) also known as 
the law of “Vagos y Maleantes” (Vagrants and Thugs), showcased a disease paradigm of 
toxicity, and recognized the criminal categories included in the law as contagious. 
Notably, the same researchers have called attention to the fact that, together with this 
contagious disease toxicity, the text incorporated, for the first time in Spanish penal 
legislation, two new dangerous groups. They were the “homosexual” and the “apologist 
of terrorism.”  
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The 1970 law of “Peligrosidad Social” (Social Danger) repealed the law amended 
in 1954. As I argue, this revocation of the previous law came hand in hand with the 
introduction, in the new text, of the petrotoxic paradigm, which for over ten years had 
been penetrating the imagination of the dictatorship. This time, the law preserved the 
category of the homosexual as a dangerous state, however it let go of the apologist of 
terrorism. Significantly, the “terrorist” as the criminal category that was summoned in 
the very name of the apologist of terrorism, persisted in the multiple antiterrorism laws 
since 1947 through the criminalizing of different collectives across the years. Anti-
terrorism laws mutated from addressing communist, anarchist and other anti-Francoist 
political parties and disident organizations in the 1940s and 1950s, to interpelating 
revolutionary anti-capitalist anti-imperialist thirdworldist social movements of the 
1960s and 1970s.  
Under the new light shed by the framework built upon Preciado’s perspective 
of the “plastic times” and the formation of new “toxic environments,” LeMenager’s 
“petromodernity,” and the notion of “petrotoxicity” I propose here, previously ignored 
differences have become noticeable. The 1970 law did not apply, as the previous one 
did, a protocol to put in quarantine the so-defined contagious “psycopathology,” which 
was considered a threat that penetrated the dictatorship from the outside. Instead it 
put in place an economic and moral task of either revalorization or disposal of “bio-
psycopathologies,” which as with petroleum residues and dangerous substances, their 
threat was calculated at the molecular scale of chemical and hormonal transformations. 
Accordingly, these dangerous states were not regarded as external threats; instead, as 
with plastic and petroleum waste, it was an action of exposing a sovereign menace that 
was already inside. Finally, the dangerous states in 1970 were not contagious. 
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This critical foucus allows us to understand the escalating effects that the 
different criminal toxicities exerted both at the level of the dictatorship and at the level 
of Europe. Michel Foucault’s work is one of the most productive theoretical 
productions that can help in this respect. As argued by legal scholar Bernard 
Harcourt, one can find a “political theory of criminal law” (28) in Foucault’s lectures 
“Théories et Institutions Pénales” (translated as Penal Theories and Institutions), “Société 
punitive” (The Punitive Society), and “La Vérité et les Formes Juridiques” (Truth and 
Juridical Forms) delivered between 1971 and 1973. One of the components that 
Harcourt distills from this political theory of criminal law is that for Foucault “penal 
law can only be understood as a weapon in a social struggle” (29). This component 
bears a heightened significance in the case of a dictatorship, such Franco’s in Spain, 
which imposed its law after a civil war, and was trying to make room internationally by 
becoming part of a transnational Europe.  
Francoist penal practice was a weapon that revealed the process of production 
of knowledge effects. These effects surfaced in the inclusions and exclusions in penal 
law of dangerous groups, such as the homosexual and the apologist of terrorism, and 
their varying recognition throughout the years by way of different toxicities. Penal law 
did not only repress. Instead it became, as argued in “Penal Theories…” a “scène où se 
nomme une vérité” ‘scene where truth emerges’ (198, translation by Harcourt) and also a 
scene where truth was transformed.  
Ultimately, when Truth and… states, “in the concept of crime […] The 
infraction […] was an […] injury done by an individual to order, to the state […] to 
sovereignty” (43), we can inversely interpret that it is in the categorization of crime 
and criminals as “social enemies” (54) of the state that a definition of sovereignty can 
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be found. Following this line of thought into Foucault’s The Punitive Society, we 
understand that “the transformation of penality does not belong just to a history of 
bodies; it belongs more precisely to a history of the relations between political power 
and bodies” (261).  In other words, the political project of the dictatorship revealed 
itself in the unstable categorization of the punished bodies; in the reason to include the 
homosexual and the apologist, in the rationale behind excluding the apologist later on, 
and also in the transit from a viral toxicity to a petrotoxicty. Indeed, this political 
project was one with an ever-growing entanglement with the European transnational 
enterprise, which makes the transformations in the penal law, as defining of the former 
as of the latter. 
Following the dialogue with Foucault, authors such as Harcourt, Wendy 
Brown and Janet Haley, Chandan Reddy, and Siobhan Somerville have addressed in 
different ways9 that criminals are indeed the effects of the law with a particular world-
making force, instead of mere reflections of a previously existing reality. In the present 
dissertation too, I address the world-making force of inclusions and exclusions; and of 
the domination of divergent paradigms of criminal toxicities. They permit us to 																																																								
9 As Bernard Harcourt argues in Illusion of Order, there is a theorization of law in Foucault’s 1975 book 
Discipline and Punish (1972-1973), which can be traced back to the French philosopher’s lectures 
collected in the book The punitive Society (2015). In Harcourt’s words, the “positive functioning” 
(Foucault, 2015: 145) and productive work of law and of punishment is revealed in the creation of 
subjects; “power produces; it produces reality […]. The individual and the knowledge that may be 
gained of him belong to this production” (Foucault, 1995: 194). Harcourt follows Foucault’s lead in 
order to argue, “punishment has fundamentally altered the subject’s self-understanding, habits, emotions 
and desires” (144). Like Harcourt, other contemporary scholars that critically address the law have 
dialogued with Foucault’s productive hypothesis. Wendy Brown and Janet Halley, for example explain, 
“law has a penchant for hiding itself in background rules so minute that they facilitate or activate 
regulatory regimes that seem immune from legalistic effects” (2002: 11). Chandan Reddy argues that the 
law “is not a passive domain in which differences, […] can be found, extracted, and restored to their 
fullness, if necessary. It is the active technique by which sexual, racial, gendered, and national 
differences[…] are suppressed, frozen, and redirected as the occasion for a universal knowledge” (2005: 
115). Finally, Siobhan Somerville takes “a genealogical approach […] with an eye to the legislative 
production of the law […] the unacknowledged logic […] that ties constructions of race and 
homosexuality together within the same legal history” (2005: 347).  
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decipher the connections between the neoliberal optimization of the dictatorship’s 
violence, and the formation of a transnational Europe.  
 
The Mass Media 
 The mass media opened up to the population the productive relationship that 
existed between the penalized bodies and the configuration of the dictatorship’s 
political project. This was not a unidirectional relationship of production of knowledge. 
If the law affected mass representations, mass culture too affected legal frameworks of 
knowledge and encodings. Importantly, the mass media created a space for readers of 
newspapers and cinema spectators to decode the meaning of images and narrations 
that permeated the dictatorship. In other words, the mass media multiplied the sites of 
production of effects of truth regarding criminalized collectives, and pointed to the 
reticular formation of Francoism and of Europe.  
 
During the 1950s and 1960s, among North American and European states, 
Spain was second only to the US in number of cinemas per person, making it the 
ultimate sphere for consumption of mass popular culture. As Aurora Bosch and  M. 
Fernanda del Rincón explain, “cinema was cheap, warm in winter and cool in summer. 
There were movie theaters in every neighborhood of the large towns, and at least one 
in most of the rural villages” (1988: 113-114). The dossier of articles published under 
the umbrella of the research project An Oral History of Cinema-Going in 1940s and 1950s 
Spain collected accounts of cinemagoers that recounted the intense cinema consuming 
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activity, which was reinforced outside the theaters by orally retelling plots and 
scenes.10  
Cinema’s dominance in mass popular culture surfaced in different ways. One 
good example materialized when the dictatorship’s statistical work calculated that, in 
1960, only one percent of the population owned a television.11 The dominance of 
cinema as a mass culture phenomenon became perhaps more clear in the fierce work of 
the Superior Censorship Committee. Their work, carried out since 1937, included 
decreeing, in 1941, the dubbing of foreign films. This allowed the dictatorship to 
control and alter what was said in the original films to make it more appropriate for the 
dictatorship’s politics.  The committee made cinema one of the battlegrounds for the 
production and proliferation of narrations that brought a world in transformation into 
being. Hence, the intimate connection between mass-consumed cinema and the 
dictatorship’s political project. 
However, cinema consumption was more nuanced than mere indoctrination. As 
part of the project An Oral History…, Eva Woods and Jo Labanyi agree when they 
distance themselves from more orthodox studies that understand cinema under Franco 
as plain escapism, an experience “politically neutralizing at best and highly supportive 
of the Franco regime at its most powerful” (Woods, 126). Instead, as argued by 																																																								
10 The exact number provided by Aurora Bosch and  M. Fernanda del Rincón are the following, “In 
1947, Spain, with a total of just over 3,000 movie theatres and an average capacity of 525 seats, was 
second in the Western world behind the United States in terms of cinemas per head of the population—
one for every 8,666 persons as compared to 7,277 for the US” (1988: 113-114). More recently Manuel 
Palacio and Kathleen M. Vernon referred in their chapter “Audiences” of the 2012 A Companion to 
Spanish Cinema to more contemporary work regarding cinema going under Francoism. Palacio reads 
box-office statistics to establish “cinema-goers as the largest audience for any form of public 
entertainment” (473).  
11 Regarding the number of television owners in Spain, the Third Plan of Development explains that “El 
número de televisores por mil habitantes, que era 5 en 1960, pasa a 70 al final de la década” ‘The number of 
televisions for every thousand inhabitants, which was 5 in 1960, increases to 70 at the end of the decade’ 
(Franco, 1972: 8248). 
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Labanyi, spectators could “use their practices so effectively as an aid to social and 
emotional survival” (2005:107). Woods adds that if cinema-going meant disconnecting, 
this act should be interpreted as a “tactic [that] allow[ed] them to read film and star 
texts across class, ethnic, political, and sex-gender boundaries” (126-127). Cinema was 
not only one of the preeminent spaces for the dissemination of the Francoist political 
project, which included representing criminality. It was also a space of negotiation 
between the institutional production of knowledge and the spectator’s work of 
decoding that knowledge in order to survive.  
Between the mass consumption of cinema and the scant readers of the law, 
there was a diversity of mass media. In this dissertation I examine the dictatorship-
controlled Noticiarios y Documentales (“news and documentaries”) or “No-Do” newsreel, 
and newspaper current affairs sections and opinion articles. Different kinds of mass-
media archives demand a divergent approach. If films aimed to be singular 
productions, the pieces of news became sequences of narrations that were consistently 
duplicated. I have modeled the selection and examination of these cultural objects 
accordingly. 
No-Do newsreels were required to air in cinemas before movies, which made 
them as mass consumed as films. With regard to the press, taking into account the high 
rates of illiteracy, which as studied by Antonio Viñao (72), were around the 15% of 
population during the 1950s and 1960s, the impact of the written word was less than 
that of the moving image. Moreover, a strict control of information was first, 
“juridically defined by a tough […] press and censorship law introduced on April 22, 
1938” (The Franco…, Payne, 181), and later, in 1966 with a second press law, which 
“eased restrictions” but that still imposed “a variety of sanctions, such as stiff fines, 
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suspension, confiscation, or even arrest, could still be imposed on those publishing 
material damaging to the state, religion, or general mores” (512). Hence, the No-Do and 
the written press combined generated an effective machine of duplication of 
information that aimed to consolidate the dictatorship’s political project. 
Under these conditions, what became significant was not so much the novelty 
of news, but the constant repetition and drilling of the same pieces of information. 
Alejandor Quiroga explains that with the combination of written press and No-Do “la 
Dictadura podía mantener un partido de fútbol (y la narrativa nacionalista que conllevaba) 
durante semanas en la mente de los españoles” (206) ‘the dictatorship could keep a soccer 
match (with the nationalistic narration that it entailed) for weeks on, in the minds of 
the Spaniards.’ In contrast with the diversity and specificity of films that reached the 
cinemas, these news outlets aimed to establish a homogeneous controlled discourse 
about the dictatorship. 
With cinema I have tracked the box-office control, which began in 1966, in 
order to identify the particular movies that both impacted and focused distinctly on 
notions of social enmity, deviant criminality, or exemplary representations of the 
Spanish man and woman. For the movies that were released during the years that the 
box office control was not in place the approach has been different. I identified the 
films that became long-term successes, which ended up being shown for over a decade, 
well into the 1960s –hence appearing in the box office control. As a result, the selection 
of films was based on their ability for widespread repetition and variation of certain 
effects of truth, which could also be found in the penal law. Hence, I approach films 
unlike the press and the No-Do, as I examine them in their singular force to reproduce 
and question the dictatorship’s political project. 
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With regard to news outlets, I have examined trends of repetitions, and selected 
the most paradigmatic examples related to criminality, the formation of Europe, 
petromodernity of the regime, and petrotoxicity. I dug into the archives of ABC and La 
Vanguardia, for being the two highest-circulating newspapers of the dictatorship, and 
also into the archives of the No-Do. More than the singularity of the cultural object, 
these articles and short documentaries represent the everyday life of the dictatorship 
and positions of the regime that were constantly drilled –which showed changes under 
the management of different administrations and were conditioned by a transforming 
material landscape.  
 Three crucial concepts, “encoding/decoding,” “processes of performative 
repetitions,” and “precarity” provide the tools necessary to understand the productive 
work of dissemination and proliferation of effects of truth undertaken by the mass 
media. The former refers to the classic text “Encoding/Decoding” written by the 
member of the Birmingham Center for Contemporary Cultural Studies, Stuart Hall, 
and published first as a stenciled occasional paper. For the latter two I follow the work 
that connects research focused on women, gender and sexuality, with a wide range of 
relations of domination. This is the work undertaken by Judith Butler, Paul B. 
Preciado and Isabell Lorey to name just a few. A combined reading of the three 
concepts makes it possible to analyze the transformation of criminalizing paradigms of 
toxicity in the process of dissemination of popular culture. 
 Processes of criminalization appear closely associated with the notions 
“precarity” and “performative repetitions”. Following Lorey’s definition, “Precarity 
involves social positionings of insecurity” distributed “in relations of inequality” (12). 
Precarity is the induced sense of insecurity; the vulnerability that is inflicted with 
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violence and distributed differentially to the extreme of producing disposable lives. 
From this perspective, criminalization and precarization are to be understood as 
processes that went hand in hand when the new categories “homosexual” and 
“apologist of terrorism” entered the penal law in 1954. Butler follows up on this 
connection between precarity and criminalzation, “By asking who will be criminalized 
[…], who will be treated as a criminal, and produced as a criminal […]; who will fail 
to be protected by the law or, more specifically, the police […]? Who will become the 
object of police violence?” (34). If as mentioned earlier, penal law is the scene of 
emergence of the effects of knowledge; this is a scene shared with popular culture. 
Mass consumed cultural objects too encoded and decoded violent precarizations of 
collectives in the form of criminalizations.  
However, if the precarity of criminalized collectives and individuals is to be 
understood as a social positioning of insecurity and inequality, then a multiplicity of 
repetitions of discourses on criminality that stream from different outlets becomes 
necessary. Following Preciado on the units of specific knowledge, “it’s possible to 
assemble an entire collection of discourses and performative practices” (117). This 
collection of discourses and practices is what “performative repetitions” refers to. 
Taking into account that performativity is the “characteristic of linguistic utterances 
that in the moment of making the utterance makes something happen or brings some 
phenomenon into being” (28), criminalizations too respond to what utterances bring 
into being. They are product of knowledge effects established by legal, scientific, media 
and other utterances; and also, as the entire collection of repetition of discourses and 
practices that negotiate, vary and affect each other. 
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Stuart Hall’s “encoding/decoding” provides a frame to situate these precarizing 
performative repetitions within particular historic and social determinations. With this 
notion Hall refers to the limits of the repetitions and variations. Repetitions are always 
different form each other because they can never use codes that are “perfectly 
symmetrical” and cannot “constitute ‘immediate identity’” (4). Repetitions are 
conditioned by socio-historical conditions, which in our case applies to the Francoist 
dictatorship; the European transnational unit; and the shift of toxicities, from virus to 
petrolum.  Hence, following Hall’s proposal, I understand processes of criminalization 
as acts of encoding and decoding that varied in each act of repetition.  
For example, the 1954 law of Vagrants decoded earlier medical discourses, 
which had been encoded following the “framework of knowledge” (4) that thought of 
homosexuality and communism as contagious diseases; and encoded them again as 
dangerous groups under the penal law. The 1970 law of Social Danger decoded, 
instead, paradigms of scientific models of petroleum toxicity of plastics and oil when 
encoding the dangerous states within this new framework of knowledge. The mass 
media open up these processes of coding and decoding by including the wider public 
and popular knowledge into these practices where frameworks of knowledge varied. 
Inside the chain of performative repetitions, the dictatorial aim to tightly control 
processes of encoding and productions of knowledge, contrasted with the survival acts 
of decoding performed by the population as spectators and readers –which produced 






By examining the discourses produced by key intellectuals that dialogued with 
each other, I address two types of connections. One establishes the critical connection 
between ideas about the modern European north and the underdeveloped south –
between the early administrative formation of a transnational unit and the dictatorship. 
The second points to the interdependence between the legal punishment of bodies and 
the European political project for unity and economic development. In other words, 
the analysis of intellectual discourses focuses on the shifting asymmetrical character, 
which the European project acquired built upon either a disease or a petrotoxic 
criminality, through notions of modernity, petromodernity and capitalist development 
while trying to resolve the conflicting relationship between the south and the north.  
This approach introduces the examination of the south-north network of 
intellectual dialogues in a longstanding critical debate within Spanish peninsularist 
cultural studies. The debate interrogates the seemingly contradictory formation of a 
Catholic fundamentalist dictatorship, which came to operate under neoliberal 
rationalities. Examining the intellectual dialogues through the perspective of 
petromodernity and petrotoxicity sheds additional light and brings a different 
standpoint from which to approach this critical discussion. 
 One of the latest contributions to the debate about modernity and Francoism is 
Luis Moreno-Caballlud’s 2015 Cultures of Anyone. In this work, Caballud traces back 
his main interlocutors to two different critical traditions. Firstly he identifies the 
seminal 1995 work Spanish Cultural Studies. The Struggle for Modernity introduced and 
edited by Jo Labanyi and Helen Graham. Secondly, he establishes bridges with 
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Spanish political thinkers such as Emmanuel Rodríguez and Isidro López and their 
work. This critical triangle provides crucial interpretations of Francoist modernity.  
Graham and Labanyi point to the transformation of Francoism into an 
anticommunist Western ally, after WWII, in order to understand the dictatorship’s 
modernization. It was during this period that a “cleavage within modernity […] was 
institutionalized as the basis of the dictatorship,” between an “anti-modern, anti-
rationalist official culture” and becoming a “consumer society in the making” (17). 
What is significant to us is that Graham and Labanyi did not approach the relationship 
between the official anti-modern culture and the regime’s capitalist modernization as 
contradictory, but instead as dependent on each other.  
Rodríguez makes the link between the dictatorship’s incorporation of capitalist 
style progress and consumerist modernity, referred to by both Graham and Labanyi 
and the manufacturing of subjects of the regime through hegemonic forms of 
domination. As they explain, the significance of consumption under Franco was related 
to its force of “subjetivación” ‘subjectification,’ because “el consumo se convirtió en el criterio 
determinante de ‘pertenencia’ a la sociedad en sentido lato –y no a una clase particular, como la 
clase obrera” ‘consumption became the defining criteria of ‘belonging’ to society in a 
wide sense –instead of a particular class, such as the working class’ (72). Rodríguez’s 
proposal allows us to approach the Francoist sense of capitalist modernization as 
operating simultaneously at the level of the political project and at the level of the 
subjects. Capitalist modernization permitted the dictatorship to create new 
international alliances while establishing widespread forms of domination at the level 
of the subject –preserving unaltered the Catholic fundamentalist principles. 
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Moreno Caballud adds nuance to the debate, by referring to the cultural shift 
instigated together with the capitalist implementation, which had been examined 
mostly in economic terms. Caballud understands Opus Dei’s particular technocratic 
neoliberal project as a work of a reduced elite that created a “pre-established order that 
it would then impose biopolitically on society” (42). In the case of the dictatorship’s 
technocrats the control of the productions of knowledge and the subsequent exercise 
of power became particularly acute. As elaborated by Caballud, what distinguished 
“technocratic (‘modern’) reasoning from other forms of cultural authority is the very 
small space the former leaves for any other intelligence or production of meaning” 
(50). Thus, the technocratic tight control of the sources of production of knowledge 
with regard to capitalist consumerist modernity and other fields was the factor that 
permitted the Francoist project to preserve power in the form of “anti-modern” 
Catholic fundamentalism. 
 
I argue that by opening up the question to both European intellectual 
discourses and to notions of petromodernity and petrotoxicty, we can keep working on 
the critical knot of an anti-modern Catholic fundamentalist regime that develops 
neoliberal capitalist policies in original ways. Petromodernity and petrotoxicity expand 
on the understanding that the Francoist modernization operated simultaneously at the 
level of the political project and at the level of the individual. Indeed, approaching the 
petrotoxic economy of recognition of criminals and the neoliberal petromodernity as 
two sides of the same coin establishes that relationship of interdependency from the 
start. It was not only consumerism that was able to establish hegemonic forms of 
domination under Franco. It was petrotoxicity that operated as the interpretive 
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category for the deviants against which the neoliberal Catholic consumerist norm was 
defined. 
Opening up the discussion to a wider European intellectual circle proves 
necessary when we understand that the immunitary disease paradigm and the 
petrotoxic paradigm are different forms of organizing the national community. They 
differ with respect to modes of arranging the relationships of the inside and the 
outside; of inclusions and exclusions. The immunitary and the petrotoxic paradigms 
operated distinctly through notions of Catholicism and capitalism that were being 
deployed by the dictatorship in the south, and also from the transnational unit 
designed in the European north.  
In order to complement the peninsularist critical debate, I map out the 
dialogues of four intellectuals. In these dialogues the asymmetrical relations of power 
between the developed north and the underdeveloped south blended with productions 
of knowledge that situated the preservation of a shared Catholic European spirit. I 
argue that these productions of knowledge and relations of power transformed with 
the shift in the domination paradigms of toxicity (from disease to petroleum), which 
made the first form of accession of the dictatorship to the European administration 
possible, in the form of a preferential agreement. Briefly, if the immunitarian paradigm 
organized the dictatorship and Europe as being external to each other; the petrotoxic 
paradigm, which presented no outside, allowed the dictatorship and Europe to think of 




The close relationship of two European thinkers traverses the dissertation. On 
the one hand there is the Russian-born transplanted French Hegel scholar turned 
bureaucrat, Alexander Kojève. On the other hand, his long lasting interlocutor was the 
German legal scholar condemned to oblivion in Europe while remaining a referent in 
Spain after WWII, Carl Schmitt. Their intellectual exchange gives us access to the 
transformations of the European discourse in the north, with links to the south. 
Under Franco, two political figures and jurists established connections with 
Kojève’s and Schmitt’s works. Still under the Falangist government of the dictatorship, 
the Opus Dei member Rafael Calvo Serer’s work gave a precocious form to the 
neoliberal optimization that Francoism was going to undergo. Later on, Manuel Fraga, 
who was at odds with some of the technocratic principles of the dictatorship’s 
administration, acted, nevertheless, as one of the main designers of the renovated 
relationships between the Dictatorship and Europe –referred to as “apertura” 
(opening).12 Through Calvo Serer and Fraga, Kojève’s and Schmitt’s designs 
encountered their counterparts in the Francoist south. 
The four-sided intellectual dialogue was open to multiple influences. Three 
other important interlocutors that will emerge in this dissertation are the Falangist 
intellectual Pedro Laín Entralgo, one of the chief jurists of the dictatorship, Francisco 
Javier Conde, and one of the leading German Ordoliberal economists Wilhelm Röpke. 
The connections between the discourses of all the intellectuals mentioned above took 
place at different moments of the domination of the paradigm of disease toxicity and 																																																								
12 For Justin Crumbaugh “Fraga was, without a doubt, Franco’s most high-profile official and the 
figurehead of the new politics of apertura in the 1960s. During his tenure as minister of information and 
tourism, Fraga became a mass culture icon, appearing frequently in the Spanish news media and 
featured regularly in the foreign press” (2009: 11). As Tatjana Pavlovic examined, apertura did not 
bring democratization, “Fraga’s intricate politics of apertura was designed both to strengthen the Franco 
regime and to assimilate Spain into a Western democratic ‘normality.’” (2011: 14). 
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the emergence of the petrotoxic paradigm. They related differently to the 
dissemination of petromodernity. These dialogues worked through notions of economic 
progress, Catholicism, modernity and backwardness addressing and solving in 
different ways the seemingly contradictory anti-modern modernity (as in Catholic 
fundamentalist neoliberalism) of the dictatorship, while attempting to resolve what the 
place was of Francoism in Europe. 
 
Structure and Chapter Layout 
The two-part structure of the dissertation responds to the two types of toxic 
paradigms of criminalizations that dominated the formation of the Francoist 
dictatorship and its relationship with Europe after WWII –disease toxicity and 
petrotoxicity. Part One, comprised of Cahpters One, Two and Three, focuses on the 
domination of the disease toxicity and its immunitary paradigm at the levels of 
criminalized bodies, of the Francoist project and of the European transnational unit. It 
spans from the consideration of the dictatorship as a country in a crisis of 
underdevelopment, to 1957 when the Opus Dei technocrats took over control of the 
administration of the Francoist regime, and also when the European Economic 
Community was created. Part Two (made up of Chapters Five, Six and Seven) in turn, 
focuses attention at the domination of the petrotoxic paradigm in the same threefold 
scaling-up social layers, stretching from 1957 to the 1973 oil crisis. Between the two 
parts the connecting Chapter Four “Petrotoxic Transition to Petromodernity” acts bas 
a connecting chapter that transits from one part to another –from the domination of 
one toxicity to another. Significantly, in both parts, the bigger the social scale, the less 
the inheritance of the toxic paradigm became a matter of semantic spillages, as was the 
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case with the processes of criminalizations. For the Francoist dictatorship and for 
European unification it became more an issue of inheritance of neoliberal technologies 
of power that were present in the petrotoxic paradigm. In what follows, I briefly 
address the content of each chapter. 
In Chapter One titled “Contagious Vagrancy” I focus on the Francoist 1954 
amendment of the law of Vagrants and Thugs. By drawing comparisons with the 
amended 1933 law passed during the previous Republican government two main 
differences surface. One is the addition of the homosexual and the apologist of 
terrorism as two new dangerous categories; and the other is their recognition as being 
contagious. These two particularities allow my analysis to present the main 
characteristics that the Francoist immunitary paradigm acquired after WWII, and the 
way in which this immunization operated by overlapping different regimes of power 
against threats to Catholic morality and economic progress. 
 In Chapter Two, “After Innoculation,” I focus on the political project that the 
dictatorship was able to build, which was sustained by the new criminalizations that 
inherited the paradigm of disease toxicity. In order to do so, I examine the married 
woman and the national man. They were the two categories that the law manufactured 
as lives to foster. Immunized against the homosexual and the apologist, the central 
subjects of the regime became the anti-bodies, circumscribed under distinct relations of 
domination. It was mandatory for the Catholic married woman to reproduce the nation 
biologically, and the modern man was defined by homeownership, which involved 
forms of subordination through indebtedness. Finally, by examining the mass 
consumed No-Do newsreels and films, together with the work of censorship, I direct 
my analysis to the places in which openings for political dissidence and emotional 
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survival occurred within the tight repetition of the discourses that perpetuated the 
dictatorship. 
“Intellectual Immunizations” is the third and last chapter of Part One. Three 
intellectuals and their proposals become entangled in this chapter. They are Alexandre 
Kojève, Carl Schmitt and Rafael Calvo Serer. The first mirrored at the level of Europe 
the relation of immunization that the dictatorship established against dangerous groups 
such as the homosexual and the apologist. At the European level, however, it was the 
Francoist dictatorship that was referred to by using notions of vagrancy and idleness. 
Meanwhile, Carl Schmitt’s fundamental notions of enmity were incorporated and 
tweaked within the dictatorship’s understanding of disease toxicity in a way that 
thought of the enemy, not only as public, but also external to the Catholic 
fundamentalist dictatorship. These contrasting approaches between the north and the 
south began to be resolved with the incipient petroleum-influenced technocratic 
discourse of Calvo Serer, who made use of neoliberal rationality in order to put 
together ideas of capitalist modernity and Catholic fundamentalism. 
In “Petrotoxic Transition to Petromodernity,” which is the fourth chapter and 
operates as the transition to Part Two, I address the penetration of petrotoxicity and 
petromodernity in the dictatorship before its domination. The first legal regulations of 
oil spills and petroleum byproducts during the 1960 offer us access to the introduction 
of the petrotoxic paradigm in the law, before it was inherited by the criminal legislation 
of the dictatorship. In this chapter I also point to the dissemination of petroleum 
images before the establishment of the petrotoxic regime of criminality. I examine, 
indicatively, some of the anti-Francoist resistance groups that had begun to perform 
petroleum-based acts of self-naming.  
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Part Two opens with the fifth chapter “Residual Threats.” In this section I 
focus on the 1970 law of Social Danger, which repealed the 1954 amendment of the 
law of Vagrants in the name of modernization. I examine how the traits of the 
petrotoxic paradigm were inherited by the 1970 text, and how this transformed the 
regime of criminality and punishment of bodies. The prostitute, the porn dealer and 
other figures joined the homosexual, while the apologist fell out of the legal code –
instead it would referred plainly to as terrorist. The calculation of the threat of each 
one at a molecular level, the economic condition of the criminal as one to be either 
revalued or disposed of, the usefulness of these criminals for the dictatorship’s to 
Europe, hence identifying them as both poisonous and necessary were all signs of the 
petrotoxic regime of criminality.  
Chapter Seven, “Petrotoxic Iterations of the Nation,” goes back to the figures 
of the national man and the married woman which survived the transition to the new 
toxic environments and cultures. The persistence of these figures allows us to discern 
the variations in the manufacturing of the lives that the dictatorship aimed to foster. 
This shows more an optimization rather that a complete rupture in the dictatorship. In 
a fully economized reality, the married woman had to remain as the exceptional non-
economized body for the preservation of the Catholic fundamentalist principles of the 
regime. Contrastingly, the configuration of the national man as a market actor went 
beyond indebtedness and was framed as stakeholder of the nation. These were 
petrotoxic iterations of the older figures of the man and the woman. Their manufacture 
depended on the exposition and disposal of the criminal residues. Beyond the 
perpetuation of the dictatroship’s doctrine, mass-consumed cinema gave the spectator 
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access to the petrotoxic blind spot of the dictatorship, which was inhabited by toxic 
residues. 
The dissertation ends with the chapter “Slick Intellectuals.” Kojève, Schmitt 
and the dictatorship’s technocratic project kept dialoguing with the arrival of 
petromodernity, while introducing Manuel Fraga Iribarne as the new main Francoist 
interlocutor. I argue that the dictatorship’s solution to its categorization as 
underdeveloped functions as a revaluing, sustained by the petrotoxic regime 
criminalization. This solution emerged from the response to Kojève’s proposal to solve 
southern European crisis of underdevelopment by means of credit acquisition, and 
from the petrotoxic threat of Schmitt’s new notion of oil fueled petrotoxic enmity, 
which made of Spain the guardian of a common European Catholic spirit. In the form 
of a Catholic fundamentalist and capitalist spirit, the Francoist solution was finally able 















Chapter One  
Contagious Vagrancy 
 
In this first chapter I will start by focusing on the 1954 Francoist amendment of 
the pre-dictatorship 1933 law of “Vagos y Maleantes” (Vagrants and Thugs). This 
amendment allows us to recognize the particular shifts in the dictatorship with regard 
to its sense of immunity and the different regimes of power that inherit disease logics of 
toxicity. To put it another way, the 1954 text reveals a Francoist immunitary 
paradigm, within which technologies of discipline, sovereignty and security operate 
simultaneously in the recognition and punishment of criminality. Because the 
amendment it is a tweaked version of the earlier law in response to the singular 
conditions of the dictatorship’s political project of the moment, it allows us to identify 
the distinct blend of regimes of power that the Francoist dictatorship put together, 
once it had been categorized as an underdeveloped country.  
The 1954 amendment introduced two new dangerous groups, which were 
identified as contagious. These groups were the “homoxesual” (sic.) ‘homosexual’ and 
“los que inciten a la ejecución de delitos de terrorismo […] y los que públicamente hagan apologia 
de dichos delitos” ‘those who incite the realization of crimes of terrorism […] and who 
publicly make apology of such crimes’ (Franco, 1954: 4862) –from now on the 
‘apologist of terrorism.’ Besides, the “apologist of terrorism” is not a category that can 
be approached in isolation, but one that summons yet another criminal figure, the 
terrorist, which was legislated by the dictatorship in 1947 in order to act against the 
political dissidence of the time. The additions of the homosexual and the apologist, 
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together with the summoning of the terrorist, create a triangle of criminality that, by 
being examined together, makes it possible to discern the dictatorship’s particular 
combination of regimes of power and its use of the disease toxicity. The knowledge 
produced in the punishment of the new dangerous groups, with regard to their 
contagious character allows us to grasp the immunitary paradigm of the regime.  
Three key political coordinates presented in the introduction give context to the 
amendment of this law of Vagrants passed by the Francoist “Cortes”13 in 1954. The 
first is the Falangist party’s rule, which even though its power diminished after WWII 
would be in charge of the dictatorship’s administration until 1957. Secondly, there was 
the establishing of the Coal and Steel Community, which was inaugurated in 1951. 
Finally, there were the international agreements signed between the dictatorship and 
the US and with the Vatican, which signaled the first openings and inclusions of the 
dictatorship to western politics. The amendment of the law of Vagrants and its 
contagious disease toxicity sustained and responded to these political conditions that 
coincided with the categorization of the dictatorship as a country in an economic crisis 
of underdevelopment.  
During this period, the Francoist dictatorship was not an exception in its 
criminalization of the homosexual and left-leaning political associations. The 
dictatorship was not an exception either in the categorization of these threats as 
contagious. Geoffroy Huard examines the criminalization and the contagious character 
of the homosexual in France. Alison Blunt and Jane Wills refer to a similar case 																																																								
13 The historian Stanley Payne explains that the Spanish Cortes, established in the 1943, " was a new 
corporative parliament, called after the spanish custom the Cortes. […] the function of the Cortes would 
be more technical than political. It would provide a covering of legitimization and support to the regime, 
but it would have the right to pass on legislation introduced by the government. […] The first Cortes 
would show itslef totally subservient to the government in every way" (323-324). 
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scenario in the 1950s England under the 1885 Labouchère Amendment to the Criminal 
Law Amendment Act. Finally, Priscilla Wald has examined the contagious 
representations and the criminal legislation created in the US against the homosexual 
and Communism during the Cold War. Thus, Francoism was part of a wide 
international wave of categorization of threats through the lens of contagious disease 
toxicity. The dictatorship’s particular version was its way of resolving the new place 
that the regime was beginning to occupy among other western capitalist countries. 
From this perspective, we can identify different rationalities behind each one of the 
new contagious dangerous groups.  
With regard to the figure of the homosexual, Gema Pérez-Sánchez refers to the 
need of the dictatorship to exclude the embodiment of the long lasting feminization of 
the South. It was the anxious response of the regime to the opening up of relationships 
with institutions and nations internationally. As explained by Pérez-Sánchez, “in a 
dictatorship so concerned with rigidly fixing proper gender roles and heterosexual 
practices, men who did not seem acceptably masculine, […] dangerously literalized 
both Francoism’s feminization of the population and the regime’s position with respect 
to the rest of Europe” (22). Hence, after the Pact of Madrid and the Concordat, the 
addition of the homosexual in the criminal legislation should be read as responding to 
anxieties of the dictatorship with regard to the need to preserve fundamental notions of 
masculinity “modeled on the Catholic, aggressively heterosexist macho, a stereotype 
reinforced through institutions such as the military service and upheld by compliant, 
conservative women;” and to the perception of it by Europe. 
In relation to the apologist of terrorism, Jorge Marco’s examination of the early 
post-Civil War armed resistance of the anti-Francoist guerrillas is revealing. 1952 was 
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the year when the anti-Francoist dissidence ceased their armed action with official 
demobilizations of guerrilla groups commanded by the “Partido Comunista de España” 
(Spanish Communist Party) and the anarcho-syndicalist “Confederación Nacional del 
Trabajo” (National Confederation of Labour). As explained by Marco, “the armed 
resistance cannot be understood without the backdrop of the war, and, above all, 
without the process of political cleansing” (342). Until 1952 the dictatorship performed 
this political cleansing by applying the 1947 anti-terrorism law against the guerrillas. 
However, after the armed activity ceased, the 1954 law of Vagrants became the tool to 
maintain the work of political cleansing under the new anti-communist coalition with 
the US. The new amendment permitted the prosecution of populations that were 
under surveillance without them breaking the law. 
In this chapter, I will first introduce the 1954 amendment, to then continue 
with the analysis of the overt presence of the contagious disease toxicity. I will begin 
this analysis by examining the new immunitary paradigm that the law disclosed. I will 
complete the analysis by establishing the connections between the sovereign, 
disciplinary and securitarian regimes of power with the disease-based categorization of 
the new dangerous groups as contagious.  
 
Vagrants Refigured  
The 1933 law of Vagrants was passed during the Second Spanish Republic 
(1931-1939) and designed by, among others, the socialist politician and jurist Luis 
Jiménez de Asúa.  The law defined “medidas de seguridad” ‘measures of security’ (Azaña, 
1933: 874) for “estados peligrosos”  ‘dangerous states’ considered to be “ante-delictuales” 
‘pre-criminal.’ As examined by Igancio Tébar (103-107) this law, which became the 
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first of this kind at an international level, was accepted unequivocally by the Spanish 
republican parliament and sustained a dualist approach distinguishing measures of 
security and punishments. 
Under this law an array of collectives became categorized as groups to be 
targeted by the law. The categories included “vagos” ‘vagrants,’ “proxenetas” ‘pimps,’ 
“mendigos” ‘beggars,’ “ebrios” ‘drunkards,’ “toxicómanos” ‘drug addicts,’ “los que ocultaren 
su verdadero nombre” ‘those hiding their real names,’ “los extranjeros que quebrantaren una 
orden de expulsion” ‘expelled foreigners who refuse to leave’ and “los que observen […] 
inclinación al delito” ‘those inclined to commit a crime.’ None these groups had 
committed a crime; however, they were considered to be internal threats to the social 
life of the state.  
Luis Jiménez de Asúa argued that the design of the law aimed to respond to the 
fact that “la mayor parte de las grandes ciudades se limpian de sus malvivientes por métodos 
policiacos a extramuros de la ley” ‘most of big cities clean their thugs by police methods 
that act outside the law’ (635). Sebastián Martín (924-928) explains that this attempt 
to bring within the realm of the law acts of police brutality against the most precarized 
groups of society had, in practice, acute repressive consequences, apparently 
unforeseen by Jiménez de Asúa. As explained by Tébar, to the surprise of Asúa, “la 
prensa publicó que sólo en Barcelona los jueces podrían aplicar la ley sobre 6000 individuos” ‘the 
press published that only in Barcelona the judges could apply the law to over 6000 
individuals’ (107). For both Martín and Tébar, an enemy criminal law14 is revealed in 
																																																								
14 Carlos Gómez-Jara Díez summarizes Günther Jakobs’ first characterization of the “enemy criminal 
law” as the “provisions that are not aimed at law-abiding persons (that he generically termed as 
“citizens”), but at potential dangerous individuals (that he broadly identified as “enemies”). In the latter 
case, sanctions are not imposed retrospectively, i.e., punishing prior wrongdoing, but prospectively, i.e., 
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this repressive turn of the law of Vagrants, in which it operated by categorizing the 
political and social enemies of the state. 
The law of Vagrants endured the military coup against the Second Republic led 
by Franco, and also the Spanish Civil War. After the war, it was applied during the 
Francoist dictatorship until it was repealed by the 1970 law “sobre Peligrosidad y 
Rehabilitación Social” (regarding Social Danger and Rehabilitation). The examining 
magistrate of a Special Court of Vagrants and Thugs Domingo Teruel Carralero, 
explained in his 1949 handbook about the 1933 law that not only was the republican 
law a “magnífico instrumento de gobierno” ‘a magnificent tool of government;’ he argued 
further by explaining that “podría tachársela de tímida” ‘it could be described as modest’ 
(5). In fact, the Francoist additions of new dangerous groups to the Republican law 
responded to this alleged modesty. 
The homosexual and the apologist of terrorism embody the intensification of 
the repressive character that the dictatorship gave to the law of Vagrants. This 
intensification did not only refer to the addition of new categories, which allowed 
wider ranges of the population that had broken no laws to be targeted. As argued by 
Martín, during Francoism the notion of danger put forward by the law of Vagrants 
became the “estatus que englobó a todo aquel superviviente que de un modo u otro, próximo o 
remoto, tenía lazos de unión con el bando derrotado” ‘status that encompassed every survivor 
of the war, who in one way or another, either from a close proximity or from afar, had 
connections with the defeated side’ (916). Hence, within the notion of the enemy 
criminal law, the homosexual and the apologist of terrorism epitomized those within 
the territory of the regime who lost the war and their values. The contagious disease 																																																																																																																																																																					
preventing future harms” (531). 
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toxicity emerged along with this intensification of the repressive character of the law of 
Vagrants, which targeted those considered to have lost the war. 
 
A New Immunitary Paradigm  
 In the 1954 law of Vagrants the disease diagrams ceased to be just inherited 
patterns of regimes of power. Instead, disease toxicity became a prevailing 
characteristic proper to the bodies that belonged to the new dangerous groups 
recognized in the law as bodies to be punished. That they were toxic diseases was a 
constitutive part of the figuration of these threatening bodies against which the 
Francoist community needed to become immune. To put it simply, the law addressed 
the homosexual and the apologist of terrorism as contagious.  
The Francoist amendment to the law of vagrants addressed two seemingly non-
related figures, the homosexual and the apologist of terrorism. However, the law 
connected them by arguing that both of them produced “hechos que ofenden la sana moral 
de nuestro país” ‘offenses to the moral health of our country’ (Franco: 4862). Hence, 
there was a need for the “health of our country” to become immune to both dangerous 
groups. The Francost immunitary paradigm became more apparent when the law 
explained that the existence of these dangerous groups “justifican la adoptación de medidas 
para evitar su difusión” ‘justif[ied] adopting measures that avoid their diffusion.’ The 
scientific term “diffusion” referred to the contagious character of both the homosexual 
and the terrorist. This common logic of contagion was a mode of representation that 
was absent in the 1933 Republican law of Vagrants.  
The work of the psychiatrist Antonio Vallejo Nágera was published some years 
before the Republican law of Vagrants and the Francoist amendment. As explained by 
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Aurora Morcillo (45), Vallejo Nágera’s prolific work produced a body of texts in 
which racial regeneration, Catholic nationalism and the Francoist political project 
became entangled. His 1937 Eugenesia de la Hispanidad y Regeneración de la Raza 
(Eugenics of Hispanism y Regeneration of the Race) is a paradigmatic example of the 
taxonomization of both the homosexual and the communist as contagious threats to the 
dictatorship within the framework of the early Francoist political project.15  
In this text, Vallejo Nágera argued referring to homosexuals that “la importancia 
que tienen para el porvenir de la raza las psicopatías sexuales y la difusión de las perversiones 
sexuales. Su profilaxis es trascendente desde el punto de vista racial” ‘the importance that 
sexual psycopathies have for the future of the race and the diffusion of sexual 
perversions. Their prophylaxis is transcendent from the racial point of view’ (1937: 
135). With regard to Marxist ideas and the communist virus he explained that “son los 
jóvenes quienes deben dar un ejemplo que no puede esperarse de una masa social contaminada por 
los virus democrático y marxista” ‘the youth need to give an example that cannot be 
expected from a social mass contaminated with the democratic and Marxist virus’ (6). 
Either as diffusion or as contamination, the notion of threat of the dictatorship’s 
political project surfaced in the form contagion. As analyzed by Morcillo, for Vallejo 
Nágera the tool for immunization, “the most powerful racial ‘disinfectant’ was religion” 
(48) and the objective was, as explained by Francoist psychiatrist, the “profunda 
																																																								
15 As Alberto Mira (301) and Aurora Morcillo (57) remind us, before and during the Civil War Spanish 
psychiatrists found in their German counterparts the models to think about eugenics and the Hispanic 
race. Vallejo Nágera’s 1932 article “Ilicitud científica de la esterilización eugénica” (Scientific illicitness 
of Eugenic Sterilization) and the1937 work Eugenesia de la Hispanidad y Regeneración de la Raza [Eugenics 
of Hispanism y Regeneration of the Race] are examples of this relationship, in which the abnormal, 
aberrant and pervert character of the homosexual and sexual deviants is made clear. Victor Mora’s Al 
Margen de la Naturaleza (2016: 43-45) follows Vallejo Nágeras work after the war and points out that 
homosexuality is considered to be manifested in gestures and acts of the contrary sex, which 
consolidated an epistemology of sexual dimorphism. 
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recristianización de la sociedad” ‘deep re-Christianization of Society.’  
 
Importantly, the double approach of Vallejo Nágera blended eugenics and 
Catholic fundamentalism. This double approach dialogued with different political 
trends within Falangism, which were in dispute before the end of WWII. As explained 
by the historian Ismael Saz, the National-Catholic front and the fascist front were “two 
contradictory ideological and nationalist agendas [that] came together within Franco's 
regime, each of which embraced a different political project” (349). By 1941, Saz 
explains that preceding “the turning of the tide in the Second World War, […] [and] 
the country's agreements with the United States” (356) the fascist agenda was defeated 
by the Catholic fundamentalist position.  
Numerous studies have addressed the significance of Vallejo Nájera for the 
characterization as contagious of the homosexual and of the groups that fell under the 
umbrella of terrorism. These works have also addressed the persistence of the 
characterization of the contagious disease toxicity during the Catholic Falangist rule. It 
was during this period that the Francoist court passed the 1954 amendment to the law 
of Vagrants.  
For example, Alberto Mira and Victor Mora explain that the pathologization of 
homosexuality had long been disseminated before 1954, which influenced the 
amendment. Just before the Spanish Civil War, the psychiatrist Antonio San de Velilla 
argued, unsuccessfully, for including  “homosexualism” in the penal code. Since the 
end of the 19th century, the term had been taxonomically classified as a contagious 
psycopathology and consolidated as such in Spain by the influential scientist Gregorio 
Marañón, among others. In the early years of Francoism Vallejo Nágera, following 
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Marañón’s work, inscribed the representations of contagiousness within the 
psychiatric production of knowledge of the Hispanic race blending eugenics and 
national-Catholic fundamentalism.  
With regard to the post-WWII use of the contagious disease toxicity in the 
1954 law of Vagrants, Mira explains that, “no se castiga el acto […] sino el hecho de que 
pueda [terminar] […] ‘contaminándoles.’ El peligro de la homosexualidad está en su visibilidad 
[…] [que] aparece en términos de contagio” ‘what is punished is not the act […] but the 
fact that it can [end up] […] ‘contaminating’ them. The danger of homosexuality is its 
visibility […] [which] surfaces in terms of contagion’ (186). Thus, the contagious 
character of the criminalized collectives emerges as one of the immunitary partadigm’s 
most significant traits. Significantly, this characterization entered the regime of 
criminal legislation during Catholic fundamentalist Francoism, after World War II. 
 The representations as contagious diseases of the early anti-Francoist political 
dissidents have been addressed by Joan Ramón Resina and Antonio Polo among 
others. As explained by Resina, notions such as “psychic contagion” introduced by the 
discipline of crowd psychology made it possible to establish a connection between the 
pre-dictatorship work of the philosopher José Ortega y Gasset and Vallejo Nágera. As 
argued by Resina, “In Spain, this doctrine led to the belief that political forms […] 
such as communism or syndicalism, were cases of mass contagion” (233). Polo refers to 
“contagio psíquico” ‘psychic contagion’ as part of a medical production of knowledge that 
categorized as mental illness “aquellos que mostraran una tendencia a 'padecer' ideas 
marxistas […] o bien aquellos otros que se dejaran contagiar de tales ideas por la debilidad que sus 
sistema inmunitario” ‘those who displayed a tendency to ‘suffer’ from Marxist ideas […] 
and those others who became infected by the same ideas due to the weakness of their 
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immunitary system’ (109). In this case, political opposition fell into the category of 
“enfermedad ideológica” ‘ideological sickness.” 
The legal scholars Igancio Tébar and Sebastian Martín agree when they make 
the connection between Vallejo Nágera’s work and the Francoist amendment to the 
law of Vagrants. The former explains that theories such as Vallejo Nágera’s “sirvieron 
para sustentar con mayores dosis de cientificidad algunos puntos de vista criminológicos” ‘served 
to sustain with greater doses of scientificity some of the criminological point of views’ 
(92). The latter argues further that against “el vaporoso concepto de comunismo […] 
abogaban por el establecimiento de un derecho penal preventivo basado […] en la peligrosidad de los 
agentes. […] para ello autores […] desde la ciencia médica [en referencia a Vallejo Nágera] 
estigmatiza[ban] al disidente” ‘the hazy concept of communism […] they advocated for 
the establishment of a preemptive penal law, based […] on the danger of the agents. 
[…] For that, authors […] of the medical science [referring to Vallejo Nágera] 
stigmatized the dissident’ (919). Under the 1954 law of Vagrants, notions of contagion, 
homosexual, terrorism and its apologists appear entangled informing the formation of 
the Francoist sense of immunity after WWII.  
 
A particular immunitary paradigm becomes apprehensible in the critical 
reading of the 1954 amendment of the law of Vagrants. This paradigm goes hand in 
hand with the post-WWII classification of the dictatorship as a country in an economic 
crisis of underdevelopment, and the fundamentalist understanding of Catholicism as 
the ideal disinfectant. At the level of the punished bodies, this paradigm was an 
entanglement between the contagious pre-criminal character of the apologist of 
terrorism and of the homosexual. The punishment of these bodies connects with the 
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necessity of openness announced by the Pact of Madrid with the US and the signing of 
the Concordat with the Vatican –which brought the first processes of financialization 
of the dictatorship, and the climax of the neo-Catholic orientation of the regime.  
The continuity that Antonio Sabater Tomás gave, in the late 1950s and early 
1960s, to the psychiatric work of Vallejo Nágera paradigmatically displays the main 
coordinates of the refurbished Francoist immunitary paradigm. In Sabater’s 1962 
Gamberros, Homosexuales, Vagos y Maleantes. Estudio Jurídico-sociológico (Vandals, 
homosexuals, Vagrants and Thugs. A Psychological-Juridical Study) the duplicity was 
not so much about eugenics and Catholicism any more, but about Catholicism and 
notions of progress. In the text, homosexuality was an uncontrollable desire, an 
“anomalía del instinto sexual” ‘anomaly of the sexual instinct’ (Sabater Tomás, 1962: 180) 
that posed a threat to fundamental Catholic “barreras éticas” ‘ethical barriers’ and 
notably, also to the crucial “progreso de la humanidad” ‘human progress.’ This sense of 
progress was framed, during that period, as economic and European.16 To put it 
another way, the criminalization and confinement of the contagious homosexual, and 
by extension of the apologist of terrorism, embodied the dictatorship’s necessary 
immunity against a desire that was not only wrong in term of Catholic morality, but 
also, acted against development. The threatening virus-like dangerous group operated, 
since its legal birth, as the node sustaining at once capitalistic modernity and Catholic 
fundamentalism.  
 																																																								
16 Both Gema Pérez-Sanchez and Victor Mora refer to this passage and address Francoist discourses 
regarding the threat that the homosexual instinct posed to progress. Pérez-Sanchez, for example, 
explains “homosexuality became a site of crisis and disruption of the regime” (2007: 24), however none 
of them develop on the encounter between threats to desire, progress and morality that the category 
homosexual present against the Francoist project of modernity as a whole. 
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The need to protect, in the words of the law, the healthy morality of the 
dictatorship against contagious dangerous groups that threatened Catholic morality 
and economic progress revealed a particular pathogenic matrix. The inside of the 
dictatorship needed to be protected from the contagious elements that the regime’s 
body did not engender –homosexuality and marxism were not natural to the Catholic 
spirit of the nation. Protection happened by means of imprisonment and isolation, 
which did not mean just negating the contagious threat. Instead the acknowledgment 
in the law, and the confinement of the dangerous groups reveal an inclusive exclusion 
–inclusion in the law and in labor camps, and exclusion of public and social life. 
Through this pathogenic matrix of immunity the identification of the dictatorship was 
simultaneously affirmed and altered.  
The homosexuals and the apologists of terrorism affirmed the dictatorship’s 
Catholic fundamentalist nationalism, while bringing alterations to economic progress 
in a crisis of underdevelopment. The Francoist regime’s endurance during the crisis of 
underdevelopment was contingent on the preservation of the Catholic fundamentalist 
morality of the dictatorship, while at the same time, it depended on its realignment 
with the side of the victors of WWII and their capitalist sense of economic progress. 
The disease toxicity of the homosexual and the apologist of terrorism sustained these 
two seemingly conflicting narratives. In other words, the crisis of underdevelopment 
enabled the emergence of the first signs of a production of a particular immunitary 
paradigm. This was a paradigm that allowed narrations of capitalist-style economic 
progress and Catholic fundamentalist morality to be framed as non-contradictory. 
After 1957, the technocratic government of the Opus Deis would optimize this 
immunitary paradigm under the conditions of petrotoxicity. 
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Disease Toxicity and Regimes of Power 
 Sovereignty, discipline and security, the three overlapping regimes of power 
put forward by Foucault as inheriting the treatments of different disease toxicities 
(leprosy, plague and smallpox) acquired a distinctive form under the dictatorship. 
These regimes consolidated the Francoist immunitary paradigm. Precisely because 
under Franco the new dangerous groups were understood to be contagious viruses, the 
regimes of power were not veiled forms of disease-treatments. Instead, they were 
exercises that actually aimed to protect public health. The homosexual and the 
apologist of terrorism conflated the three regimes of power for their threatening 
contagious character.  
 The law argued that it had a “finalidad doblemente preventiva, con propósito de 
garantía colectiva y con la aspiración de corregir a sujetos caidos al más bajo nivel moral. No trata, 
esta Ley de castigar, sino de proteger y reformar” ‘doubly preemptive purpose, with the aim 
of collective assurance and with the aspiration of correcting the subjects fallen to the 
lowest level of morality. This law does not aim to punish, but to protect and reform’ 
(4862). In this brief statement, traits of security, discipline and sovereignty surface in 
the form of normalization, correction and exclusion. 
The contagious character made the new dangerous groups a matter of public 
health. Their treatment was directed to the main objective of the securitarian regime. 
In other words, it made power operate through the fostering of the life of the 
population by intervening and normalizing.  The channeling of the treatment of the 
dangerous groups through the penal system of the dictatorship put in motion the 
disciplinary power. Following what the law argued, labor camps and isolations aimed 
to correct and discipline the bodies into succumbing to the Francoist Catholic norm. 
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Finally, even if unacknowledged by the law, sovereign power became present for those 
who could not be corrected. They were excluded from public life, in the form of death 
encountered in labor camps or death sentences –as was the case of those categorized as 
terrorists. Below, I will expand on this continuum between Francoist mechanisms of 
security, discipline and, sovereignty. 
 
 In order to think of Francoist security, it is important to address the fact that 
the law of Vagrants did no punish a criminal act. Instead, it punished the natural 
tendency of some bodies to commit crimes in the future and their contagiousness. As 
such, it operated as a mechanism of security insofar as it was the population in its 
totality that became the target. Everybody could potentiality be part of a contagious 
dangerous group. The way to discern ended up focusing on individual conducts. 
As decided during the 1950s and 1960s by the dictatorship’s psychiatrists such 
as Peréz Argilés and Sabater Tomás, it was precisely homosexuals’ responsibility 
towards this risk of contagion that made them a matter of legal punishment, instead of 
just a matter of public health.17 The scholar Ignacio Tébar explains that “bastaba la 
delación de un vecino para que el homosexual fuera procesado por escándalo publico” ‘the 
accusation of a neighbor was enough for the homosexual to be tried for public scandal’ 
(111). In the case of the apologists of terrorism, the fear was to be accused of 
“significarse” ‘signification’ as a political enemy of the regime. As explained by the 																																																								
17 Germ theories of harm and responsibility come together when Sabater Tomás refers to Pérez Argilés’ 
work in order to build up on their position against Marañón’s arguing “tampoco el tuberculoso es culpable de 
su tuberculosis; pero tendrá una grave responsabilidad cuando […] desinteresado del riesgo de su contagiosidad […] se 
dedique a la siembra de esputos bacilíferos” (1962: 180) ‘neither the tuberculous is guilty of his tuberculosis; 
but his responsibility will be important when […] dismissing the risk of his contagiousness […] he 
dedicates himself to spreading bacilliferous phlegm.’ Victor Mora (2016: 79-86) explains in depth 
Sabater Tomás’ notions of spirit and instinct, regarding the need for man to dominate his instincts by 
means of the strength of the spirit. 
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historian Fuensanta Escudero, the network of solidarity created between neighbors, 
family members and old militants that did not agree with the dictatorship “les llevaba a 
‘significarse,’ a estar en el punto de mira, porque una persona que ayudara a un ‘rojo’ corría el 
riesgo de ser acusado de ayudar al enemigo” ‘led them to ‘signify’ themselves, to be targeted, 
because a person that helped someone ‘red’ ran the risk of being accused of helping the 
enemy’ (106). In other words, the supposedly natural tendency for criminality was 
displayed in the individual behavior of the dangerous groups. 
The Francoist fundamental Catholic norms of conduct had already been 
transcribed into the first post-war laws by the 1938 and the 1945 legal codes “Fuero del 
Trabajo” (Code of Jobs) and “Fuero de los Españoles” (Code of the Spaniards). These 
laws, which I will examine in more detail in the coming chapter, had two objectives. 
Firstly, it aimed to “perfeccionar la salud física y moral de los españoles” (Franco, 1967: 
5251-5253) ‘perfect the physical and moral health of the Spaniards.’ Secondly, they 
aimed to “salvaguard[ar] la moral y el orden público” ‘safeguard the public morality and 
order’ by professing the Catholic religion. It was the behavior of homosexuals and 
apologists that the dictatorship had to immunize against, in order to carry out the 
biopolitical work of perfecting the moral and physical health of the population.   
 
Once the individual behavior was deemed dangerous by the Francoist court, 
disciplinary mechanisms segregated the discrete elements of contagion. They were 
different kinds of “sujetos caidos al más bajo nivel moral” ‘subjects fallen to the lowest 
moral level’ (Franco, 1954: 4862). For each of them, the 1954 law set out distinct 
mechanisms of confinement. In contrast with the apologist, the homosexual’s 
confinement had to take place “con absoluta separación de los demás” ‘with absolute 
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separation from the others’ (Franco, 1954: 4862). The different disciplining 
mechanisms of imprisonment made apparent that the homosexual and the apologist 
virus presented differentiated cases of disease toxicity.  
I argue that desires were crucial for the segregation of different contagious 
dangerous states in distinct spaces of confinement. As explained before, scientific 
discourse defined homosexuals on the basis of their desires as an ‘anomaly of the 
sexual instinct.’ When referring to the apologists, it was the terrorist who defined their 
desire –as the criminal that the dangerous category summoned. In this entanglement of 
desires we see discipline and sovereignty surface as dependent on each other. 
If homsexuals had instincts, then apologists and terrorists had “impulsos “ 
‘impulses’ (Franco, 1947: 2686). According to the 1947 law “Sobre Represión de 
Terrorismo” (Regarding Repression of Terrorism), terrorists were “las más graves especies 
delictivas de toda situación de postguerra, secuela de la relajación de vínculos morales y de la 
exaltación de los impulsos de crueldad” ‘the most grievous criminal species of the whole 
postwar situation, consequence of the relaxation of moral ties and the exaltation of 
impulses of cruelty’. Due to these impulsive desires they “requieren especiales medidas de 
represión, cuya gravedad corresponda, a la de los crímenes” ‘require[d] special measures of 
repression that should correspond to the seriousness of the crimes’ (Franco, 1947: 
2686). In other words, terrorists were punished with death.   
By punishing terrorist impulses with the death penalty and by intending to 
reform homosexual instincts with isolated confinement, each figure was allocated a 
different position with respect to the regime. By taking the life of “terrorists,” the 
sovereign regime expelled them from any kind of management of life. Meanwhile, the 
discipline of the homosexual situated them in the verge of still inhabiting the inside of 
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the Francoist political project insofar as their lives had to be either first corrected to 
then foster, or disallowed during treatment. The apologist of terrorism bridged both 
spaces of discipline of bodies and sovereign death. 
The regime could define its inside and outside depending on the knowledge 
produced about disease toxicities, desires and behaviors of the dangerous groups. It 
could decide on who was part of the Francoist “we,” and who was instead the enemy –
who fell into the group of the victors of the Civil War and became the lineage of the 
defeated. It was this work of a regime in an underdevelopment crisis that became part 
of the efforts to become a member of an outside modern Europe that the dictatorship 
was not yet part of. Simultaneously, this work of re-ordering and manufacturing 
dangerous groups in a new social sphere allowed the reproduction of an inside in the 
form of the fundamentalist Catholic rule of law. The birth of the homosexual and the 
apologist disease toxicities in the law and the violent precarization of their lives and 







In this chapter I will focus on the Francoist political project that the Falangist 
administration built upon the disease toxicity of criminality. Specifically, I will 
examine the Francoism that the regime put together by means of the immunization of 
the dictatorship’s “we” against the contagious character of homosexuals and apologists 
of terrorism. The main categories that informed the “we” of the new political project 
that was emerging under conditions of economic crisis of underdevelopment were the 
“national man” and the “married woman.” These categories served as antibodies that 
affirmed and altered the dictatorship due to the controlled inclusion in confinement of 
homosexuals and apologists of terrorism.  
The Fundamental Laws of the regime characterized the men and women that 
comprised the population of the dictatorship. Theirs were the lives that the 
dictatorship aimed to foster. The 1938 law “Fuero del Trabajo” (Code of Labour) made 
the following distinction between the woman and the married woman, “El Estado […] 
en especial prohibirá el trabajo nocturno de las mujeres y niños, regulará el trabajo a domicilio y 
liberará a la mujer casada del taller y de la fábrica” ‘The state […] will especially forbid 
night jobs to women and children, will regulate the work made from home, and will 
free the married woman from the workshop and the factory’ (Franco, 1967: 5255). This 
approach to womanhood as an evolution from children-like women, to married woman 
established a teleological understanding of who the Spanish woman was and what her 
functions were. Women existed, in short, to be purposed for the biological 
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reproduction of the dictatorship in the form of the “married woman.” 
The 1945 “Fuero de los Españoles” (Code of Spaniards) refers to the man as 
follows, “la comunidad nacional se funda en el hombre, como portador de valores eternos, y en la 
familia; como base de la vida social; pero los intereses individuales y colectivos han de estar 
subordinados siempre al bien común de la Nación” ‘the national community is founded on 
the man, as carrier of eternal values, and in the family; as foundation of social life; but 
the individual and collective interests need to be subordinated always to the common 
good of the Nation’ (Franco, 1967: 5251). What I summed up as “national man” is this 
particular subject of the dictatorship, on which the national community is founded and 
who is, at the same time, subordinated to the nation’s common good.  
As antibodies, these two categories became immunized, after 1954, against the 
contagious threat of the homosexual and the apologist of terrorism. Consequently, 
because of this 1954 immunization they also transformed from previous Francoist 
definitions. As explained in Chapter One, the threat posed by both toxic diseases was 
twofold. Firstly, they acted against the Catholic fundamentalist ethics of the regime. 
Secondly, they put barriers against notions of development that at the time were being 
framed in terms of the economic progress that the dictatorship desperately needed in 
times of crisis.  
I argue that each of these antibodies responded more clearly to one of the 
different threats posed by the criminal diseases. The married woman appeared 
connected to the threat to Catholic morality, while the national man responded more to 
the threat against economic progress. The assemblage, against the threat of toxic 
diseases, of these categories informed the Francoist political project that after WWII 
was just being accepted by the international community.     
	 81 
Below, I will first examine the two categories and their representation in the 
law. Then I will scrutinize the mass consumption of the embodiments of the national 
man and married woman in films and in the No-Do. In these cinematic incarnations 
viruses and antibodies gather together –the married woman, the national man, the 
apologist of terrorism and the homosexual encounter each other in the mass media. In 
this range of archives I will point to the chains of performative repetitions that 
sustained the reformed post WWII Francoist political project. The legal and filmic 
production of knowledge dialogued with decodings and encodings in different 
platforms that in turn could allow for messy processes of consolidation, contestation, 
and survival within the dictatorship’s doctrine.     
 
Nationalist Bodies as Antibodies  
 The contagious disease criminality became one of the realms for the 
dictatorship to resolve new contradictions, once the dictatorship let go of the most 
clear eugenicist position, and the Falangist administration became a stronghold of 
national Catholicism. The categorization of the dictatorship as a country in an 
economic underdevelopment crisis allowed for the regime to be able to rethink itself in 
economic terms, while preserving its Catholic fundamentalist rule. Below, I will 
examine in turn the positions that the married woman and the national man occupied 
as antibodies in the solution that the Francoist political project found before the 1957 





The Married Childbearing Woman  
The dictatorship had laid out a clear agenda for the married woman. The plan 
was to “liberar […] a la mujer casada del taller y de la fábrica” ‘free the married woman 
from the workshop and the factory’ (Franco, 1967: 5255). With the newly acquired 
freedom, the woman would be free to fulfill her natural duties. As extensively studied 
by Aurora Morcillo, under the dictatorship “motherhood represented the main and 
only natural destiny for Catholic women. […] Motherhood [was] at the center of 
women’s patriotic duty in Franco’s Spain” (160). What Morcillo also makes clear is 
that because “Vatican precepts weighed heavily on Spanish political and moral 
consciences […] The rationalization of motherhood was imbued with Christian values” 
(158). Hence, the liberation of the married woman from the factory had one function, 
which was to put in place a compulsory motherhood constrained by Christian 
morality. 
Three more theoretical conceptions allow us to develop connections between 
Francoist Catholic fundamentalist nationalism and the Christian monopolization of the 
woman as a childbearing wife. Gayatri Spivak elaborates on the link between women’s 
subordination and imagined nations as follows, “Nationalism is the product of a 
collective imagination constructed through rememoration […] temporizing toward a 
future that will fall due is of women as holding the future of the nation in their wombs” 
(288-289). Silvia Federici’s work, which proposes “that women have been the 
producers and reproducers of the most essential capitalist commodity: labor-power” 
(8), becomes key to understanding the underlying signification of the dictatorship’s 
term “freedom” when referring to women. Finally, Lee Edelman argues that “if […] 
there is no baby and, in consequence, no future, then the blame must fall on the fatal 
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lure of sterile, narcissistic enjoyments […] responsible for the undoing of social 
organization” (13). This last theoretical approach brings the figure of the homosexual 
and the apologist to the understanding of the category of woman. These proposals 
makes possible to keep examining links between the position of antibody that the 
category of the married woman acquired within the dictatorship threatened by 
contagious dangerous groups. 
The law itself imagined the nation in terms of rememoration and temporization 
based on the nation’s biological reproduction. The Code of Spaniards explained that 
the nation was “constituida por las generaciones pasadas, presentes y futuras” ‘constituted by 
past, present and future generations’ (Franco, 1967: 5251). Likewise, when the law of 
Vagrants referred to the healthy Christian morality of the nation, it argued that this 
morality had been “fielmente mantenido en la sociedad española” ‘faithfully kept by the 
Spanish society’ (Franco, 1954: 4862). This invoked the same imagination based on 
rememoration and biological reproduction of the nation. The compulsory Christian 
motherhood of the dictatorship situated the woman in the position of sustaining the 
endurance of the nation through biological reproduction. 
The man-producing function of the woman was also introduced in this 
Christian temporality of rememoration of the nation. The Code of Spaniards referred 
to the national man as being the “portador de valores eternos” ‘carrier of eternal values’ 
(Franco, 1967: 5251) of the nation. As such, the law allocated distinct positions of 
identification. If the man carried the eternal values, the woman produced and 
reproduced him who carried the eternal values. The law not only subordinated the 
woman to the man by making him the sole carrier of the national spirit. The law also 
erased any sense of personality of the woman by situating the family as the unit that 
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was subordinated to the common good. The married childbearing woman, “freed” from 
the factory, became herself the factory of the Spanish national man, by Christian, 
moral and natural duty.  
 Finally, under Francoism notions of sterility and narcissistic enjoyments 
became entangled with the threats against which the married woman needed to be 
immunized. Sterility was related to the figure of the apologist of terrorism and the 
political dissidents that the concept terrorism included. As examined by Enrique 
Gonzalez Duró and Maud Joly, during the Civil War and the first of the dictatorship 
women signified as dissident and republican were systematically raped, had their hair 
shaven off and were obliged to ingest castor oil for their vulnerated bodies to then be 
paraded in public. These scholars explain that the spectacular display of sovereign 
power signaled the infertility of the republican women, while dividing friends from 
enemies –victors from vanquished. Later on, as explained by Victor Mora, narcissistic 
desires became entangled with plague-like homosexual instinct and non-reproductive 
excessive sexual desire. The truth about the godly reproducibility of the Francoist 
antibody-woman, and hence of the vaccinated dictatorship, was consolidated first by 
rendering the terrorist enemy’s female body diseased, toxic and sterile, and then by 
confining the homosexual contagious virus in isolation.  
 
The Indebeted National Man  
If the married woman dialogued clearly with the threat that the homosexual 
and the apologist posed against the fundamentalist Catholic morality, the national man 
responded mainly to the risk that the dangerous groups presented for human progress, 
which was paradigmatically economic and European. In that respect, the “eternal 
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values” bestowed upon the national man by the fundamental laws meant too that, by 
law, he was the only subject that could be administrator of private property. As 
examined by Emmanuel Rodríguez and Isidro López, it was the accessibility of 
homeownership particularly, which disguised as progress, economic development and 
the population’s wellbeing, “estaba destinado a someter al creciente proletariado urbano al valor 
de la propiedad” ‘was destined to subdue the growing urban proletariat to the value of 
the property’ (239). As they conclude, property became since then “una forma 
hegemónica de dominación” ‘a hegemonic form of domination’ (270). As such, the national 
man was made an antibody against the economic threat posed by contagious 
dangerous states.  
This man was manufactured under the dictatorship as a homeowning indebted 
man and at the same time as the carrier of economic progress. During the 1950s, 
parallel to the categorization of the dictatorship as a country in crisis of economic 
underdevelopment, the most prominent policies directed to the national man were 
heavily aimed to foster home-ownership through credit acquisition. The economist 
José Luis Naredo (17-18) has analyzed the backstory of this making of the Francoist 
indebted man, which he divides in three different stages. First, the laws consolidated 
and reinforced the Francoist oligarchic families in power by putting the private sector 
in charge of the construction and execution of public housing.18  Secondly, against 
																																																								
18 In his analysis José Manuel Naredo refers to “la presión de los más poderosos para beneficiarse de 
las oportunas recalificaciones de suelos” and to the inforcement, by law, of “el deterioro de los edificios 
arrendados para conseguir el expediente de ruina que les permitía expulsar a los inquilinos y demoler o 
reconstruir el edificio aumentando el volumen edificado para su posterior venta” (2010: 18). As 
Emmanuel Rodríguez and Isidro López explain, “salió reforzada la fórmula de la subvención pública de 
los operadores privados. A partir de entonces, se construyó masivamente vivienda de protección oficial, 
pero no era el Estado, sino un emergente sector privado quien se encargaba de su ejecución. […] la 
promoción inmobiliaria y la expansión del crédito a la construcción permitieron la acumulación de 
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European trends, the dictatorship dismantled the pre-Civil War model of social 
housing, which was based on renting instead of buying.19 Finally they addressed the 
urban overcrowding in slums of the most precarized population of the dictatorship 
with privately invested to-buy public housing.  
Rodríguez and López conclude by pointing to a divergent process of formation 
of subjects related to accumulation of wealth, or lack thereof. On the one hand, there 
was “la acumulación de inmensas fortunas” ‘the accumulation of huge fortunes’ (274) for 
the oligarchic families. On the other hand, this process was sustained by the subjection 
of the national man by means of acquisition of debt.  
The character of antibody that the national man acquired, when entangled with 
home-ownership and mortgage acquisition, can be examined by analyzing the more 
than 90 laws directed to housing policies betwen 1940s to the early 1960s. This allows 
us to identify the overarching narration of wealth, wellbeing and economic progress 
that the dictatorship used to disguise relations of domination. The early legislation, 
which was directed to the consolidation and reinforcement of the oligarchic class of the 																																																																																																																																																																					
inmensas fortunas y la formación de un pujante grupo de grandes empresas que tienen continuidad 
hasta la actualidad” (2010: 274). 
19 Jose Manuel Naredo’s 2010 “El modelo inmobiliario español y sus consecuencias” and the 2011 El 
Modelo Immobiliario Español, and Isidro López and Emmanuel Rogriguez’s 2010 Fin de Ciclo and 2011 
“The Spanish Model” present in depth studies of the transformations of the Spanish housing policies 
since Franco’s dictatorship. Precisely, all of their point of departure is the Francoist U-turn under the 
Falangist ruling family. Naredo explains, “en lo que concierne al peso mayoritario del alquiler en 
España, el Censo de edificios y viviendas de 1950 acredita que en ese año más de la mitad del stock de 
viviendas se encontraba en régimen de alquiler, y este porcentaje alcanzaba cerca del 90 % en las 
grandes ciudades, como Madrid (94 %), Barcelona (95 %), Sevilla (90%), ... o Bilbao (88%). Como es 
sabido, esta situación se invirtió drásticamente […] la nueva política mostró clara preferencia por la 
vivienda en propiedad, como vacuna contra la inestabilidad social” (2010: 17-18). López and Rodriguez 
argue further, “Todavía en 1950, la propiedad no era el régimen de tenencia mayoritario, y en las 
grandes ciudades, como Madrid y Barcelona, este porcentaje descendía hasta el 5 % y el 6 % 
respectivamente. […] Para la dictadura, la generalización del acceso a la vivienda de protección oficial 
en alquiler, podía suponer la aparición de múltiples focos de conflicto político en la interlocución directa 
entre inquilinos y Estado. En consecuencia, la política de vivienda intentó deshacerse, desde muy 
pronto, de este tipo de problemas mediante la generalización de la vivienda en propiedad” (2010: 270-
272). Renters were, for the dictatorship, a source of unruliness and potential political struggle, hence the 
need for the disciplining force of mortgage indebtedness. 
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dictatorship argued that it was carrying out “una contribución directa a la tarea 
reconstructora de los daños causados por la guerra liberadora, con la siguiente creación de riqueza” 
‘direct contribution to the work of reconstruction of the damages caused by the war of 
liberation, with the subsequent creation of wealth’ (Franco, 1944: 8959). When during 
the 1950s, the dictatorship needed to address the overcrowding of the urban 
peripheries by the new working class,20 the law proposed that having access to 
homeownership and credit acquisition was the solution for  “el escaso poder económico de 
las familias que integran este núcleo […] situado al margen de los beneficios de la protección que el 
Estado” ‘the reduced economic means of the families that form this core […] situated in 
the margins of the benefits that come from being protected by the state’ (Franco, 1954: 
4094). Finally, by the time that the Francoist legislation addressed housing policies in 
the early 1960s, it did so by arguing that it was responding to “la constante aspiración de 
las gentes a aumentar su bienestar” ‘the constant aspiration of people to increase their 
wellbeing’ (Franco: 5091). From the 1940s on, Francoist legal epistemology worked 
incessantly to connect narratives about homeownership, credit acquisition, wealth 
accumulation, economic development, wellbeing and desires in the form of 
“aspiration,” all of which informed the antibody character of the national man. 
 
Two critical articulations allow us to develop links between the Francoist early 																																																								
20 Luis Moreno Caballud and Emmanuel Rodriguez have analyzed accurately this double process. 
Caballud’s 2010 dissertation Topos, Carnavales Y Vecinos explained “los demógrafos habían proporcionado 
ya ciertos datos sobre las dimensiones del cambio: entre 1955 y 1975 seis millones de españoles (el 20% 
de la población) se mudaron de provincia; de ellos, dos millones emigraron a Madrid, un millón 
ochocientos mil a Barcelona y un millón y medio a Europa. Desaparecieron así del campo el 60% de los 
pequeños agricultores y el 70% de los jornaleros” (4). In 2015, Caballud’s book Cultures of Anyone 
elaborates further, “hundreds of towns were drowned under Francoism’s reservoirs, and others were 
deserted due to massive emigration. Despite being used by Francoist propaganda to symbolize Spain’s 
roots, hundreds of thousands of rural peasants had to be ‘transplanted’ to the cities, and faced serious 
problems in trying to adapt” (46). 
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project for economic development and the making of the indebted national man. 
Maurizio Lazzarato elaborates on Foucault’s biopolitics, while Laurent Berlant 
introduces the notion of cruel optimism. Lazzarato focuses on the reconfiguration of 
biopolitics under conditions of debt and the work on the self demanded of the indebted 
subject, “the beneficiary as ‘debtor’ is not expected to reimburse in actual money but 
rather in conduct, attitudes, ways of behaving, plans, subjective commitments, the time 
devoted to finding a job, the time used for conforming oneself to the criteria dictated 
by the market and business, etc.” (104). Berlant elaborates on a sense of optimism that 
goes against the optimistic subject herself, which connects optimism and situations of 
precarity. She referes to this sense as “cruel optimism” arguing that it “is the condition 
of maintaining an attachment to a significantly problematic object,” (24) which is an 
attachment based on pursuing “fantasies of the good life” (27). These proposals make it 
possible pursue the analysis of the production of assemblages of individual desires of a 
good life and acquisitions of debt, which gave the character of antibody to the national 
man, thereby vaccinating of the Francoist economic project of development under 
economic crisis against the contagion of dangerous groups encoded in the law of 
Vagrants. 
Under Franco, the work on the self demanded by debt and the problematic 
object, which the indebted man got attached became clear in the execution of public 
housing policies. As collected by Emmanuel Rodriguez from a resident of a working 
class neighborhood in the city of Bilbao “Aquí construyeron casas nada más” ‘Here they 
built houses and nothing else’ (205). As Rodríguez develops “la política productivista en 
materia de vivienda no se acompañó de una inversión pública siquiera modesta: ni equipamientos, 
ni transportes, en ocasiones ni la urbanización propiamente dicha de los nuevos barrios” ‘the 
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productivist policies in matter of housing was not accompanied by public investment, 
not even a modest one: [there were] no equipment, no transport, and sometimes not 
even the urbanization of the new neighborhoods’ (207). Hence, the wellbeing 
promised by getting access to homeownership through the acquisition of debt 
encountered a problematic reality. The poor working conditions together with the poor 
living standards delivered by the Francoist public housing project encountered the 
self-work demanded by the newly acquired debt obligations. This was the process of 
domestication and domination of the new urban populations that hid behind the 
illusion of the homeowning national man. 
A critical approach to the speeches by the Falangist Housing Minister José 
Luis Arrese makes it possible to establish links between the immunization against 
dangerous groups and the national indebted man. Arrese famously declared in his 1956 
inaugural speech as Minister that the regime wanted “un país de propietarios no de 
proletarios” ‘a country of proprietors and not of proletarians.’ He argued that home-
ownership would guarantee that workers build families far from dangerous habits. A 
year later, in the 1957 presentation of the “Plan de Urgencia Social” (Social Urgency 
Plan), Arrese followed the same line of thought when he argued that “el hombre, cuando 
no tiene hogar, se apodera de la calle y […] se hace subversivo, agrio, violento” ‘The man, when 
he does not own a home, takes over the street […] and becomes subversive and 
violent.’21 Arrese’s reference to the politicized term “proletarian” suggests that the 
political threat of those included under the umbrella of terrorism was linked with the 																																																								
21 I have borrowed these references to José Luis Arreses Speeches from José Manuel Naredo’s and 
Emmanuel Rodríguez’s work. The former argues, “con la retórica falangista del momento, el nuevo 
ministro percibió el problema de la vivienda como un problema de orden público a resolver […]’ 
(Discurso de Arrese ante el pleno de las Cortes, presentando el Plan de Urgencia Social)” (2010: 18). The 
latter explains, “‘Queremos un país de propietarios no de proletarios’, gritó el falangista J. J. Arrese en 
su discurso de investidura como ministro de la Vivienda en 1956” (2015: 73). 
	 90 
mismanagement of the self of the indebted man.  
Arrese’s words implied that the domesticating aspiration of homeownership 
was the vaccine to immunize against the contagious character of the terrorists’ and its 
apologists’ impulses. Under the category of the national man, precarized populations 
living in urban slums had to either own a home, hence learn how to conduct their 
behavior following the disciplining time-constraints and everyday life obligations 
assumed with the mortgage, or risk falling into criminal figures such as “terrorist,” 
which the term proletarian evoked. Here proletarian as potential apologist of terrorism 
merged with older figures related to unemployment and bankruptcy such as “vagos” 
‘vagrants,’ and “mendigos” ‘beggars.’ Indeed, if the “instinct” defined the homosexual, 
and the “impulse” defined the terrorist and its apologist, the new Spanish national 
man’s character of antibody was determined by his “aspiration” to possess, which 
became the taming vaccine against threatening desires. 
  
Cinema and Censorship as Viral Encoding  
Spanish cinematic productions and newsreel documentaries, which preceded 
every film session showed in cinemas, infused bodies with categories such as national 
man, married woman, apologist of terrorism and terrorist –the homosexual, as we will 
see, had a harder time getting through censorship. Disease toxicity permeated and 
traversed the representation in the films as well as the decision to censor them. They all 
became entangled in the immunitary paradigm of the dictatorship, in a chain of 
repetitions and differentiations that had no outside, only acts of encoding and 
decoding. It was in these acts of decoding that possibilities of emotional survival 
surfaced. 
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Below I focus first on the dictatorship’s No-Do newsreel for being a privileged 
space for the indebted national man to be embodied. Then, to consider the national 
man, I examine the 1955 film Congreso en Sevilla (Congress in Seville) in which the 
spectator encountered one of the early representations of what has been called the 
Francoist Cinderella motif of the development years. This motif situated the woman in 
the position of the protagonist. The relationship of these central figures of the 
dictatorship and the contagious dangerous states was messier in the mass media than 
what was presented in the law. The dividing line between antibody and virus became 
blurry. 
With regard to the dangerous states, I examine first the strict work of 
censorship imposed on homosexual desire in the 1950s and I compare it to the 
possibility of representation that opened up for political dissidence in hybrid noir films, 
such as 1956 Los Ladrones Somos Gente Honrada (We Thieves are Honorable People). In 
all these productions the categories did not appear in isolation but in contact with each 
other. These gatherings between the spectators and the different bodies, which were 
categorized distinctly in the law, created the potentiality for the Francoist immunitary 
paradigm to be reconsidered. 
 
Homeowners  
The No-Do newsreel was aired in cinemas before every film session. This made 
the Francoist newsreel as mass consumed as the films themselves. As explained 
Vicente Sánchez-Biosca, “NO-DO had no ideological diversity, no rough edges. […] 
NO-DO had a hugely powerful role to play: that of providing Spaniards with 
knowledge of a previously codified reality in a visually attractive manner” (528-529). 
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In order to provide what was codified by the housing policies in the law, several 
sections throughout the 1950s insisted on Arrese’s ideas of modernity and home-
ownership. Paradigmatically, in 1959, two of these short documentaries focused on the 
Social Urgency Plan.  
The first one was aired on January 1st and the second one on June 29th. These 
short documentaries inform the production of the national man as antibody, beyond 
what was established in the law. They do so by bringing notions of Catholic 
fundamentalism into narrations of economic development. What the law presented as 
separated, the mass media was able to blend. 
The piece of January 1st focused on modernity, development and 
homeownership. It explained that the buildings were made of a “linea moderna y agil” 
‘modern and agile line,’ it refered to “modernos rascacielos que llevan al espacio esveltas 
estructuras” ‘modern skyscrapers that introduce slender structures into the sapce,’ and 
described the “moderno y limpio poblado de Entrevías” ‘modern and clean Entrevías town.’  
Francoist modernity and progress were reflected in the modern architecture itself, 
enabling the architecture to represent the end of a war-filled past. As the newsreel 
explained “al terminarse nuestra cruzada y Guerra de liberación […] para dar la batalla 
decisiva contra este cinturón de miseria y albergues infra-humanos Franco creó el ministerio de 
vivienda” ‘when our crusade and the War of Liberation ended […] in order to fight 
decisively against this belt of misery and infra-human shelters Franco created the 
Minstery of Housing’ (Noticiarios, 1959). This architecture of modernity indicated the 
separation between the Spanish Civil War, or as it was called, ‘War of Liberation,’ and 
the Francoist present.   
In this Francoist present the enemy could be found in the slums. As the 
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newsreel kept explaining, it was in the “chavolismo donde anidaba la desesperación y el odio” 
‘slums where desperation and hatred nested.’ The defeat of this enemy was the final 
aim of the “gloriosa empresa del hogar” ‘glorious endeavor of home-building’ and the 
construction of new “albergues dignos” ‘dignifying shelters.’ Arrese’s speeches that 
opposed homeowners and terrorist proletarians resonated in the hatred that the short 
documentary found in the slums. So far, we see duplicated the legal characterization of 
the national man. 
The short documentary aired on June 29th introduced Catholic fundamentalism 
as the other face of this process of Francoist modernization –which was not so clearly 
stated in the legal texts. This time it was a short documentary that showed the 
inauguration of the Social Urgency Plan in the city of Bilbao. As the voice-over 
explained, the presentation took place together with the 22nd anniversary of the 
“liberación por los ejercitos nacionales” ‘liberation by national armies’ (Noticiarios, 1959). 
The images of the event blended a popular mass in a public square “en la presencia del 
ministro de la vivienda el señor Arrese y otras autoridades” ‘with the presence of the minister 
of housing mister Arrese and other authorities,’ a military march on the streets by 
officials from the dictatorship making the Roman salute, and the inauguration 
ceremony presenting sketches of the future modern buildings, where Arrese 
proclaimed that, out of the fifty thousand homes planned for Bilbao, four thousand 
were going to be built right away.  
Now we can argue that the double threat posed by the contagious homosexual 
and apologist of terrorist to both a Roman Catholic fundamentalist morality and to 
senses of progress and modernity operated as mass consumed in the backdrop of 
Arrese’s Social Urgency Plan. The Spanish national man did not only immunize 
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against economic backwardness but also against anti-Catholic threats. 
 
Noir Dissidence 
Representations of the “despair and hatred that nested in the slums,’ that was 
mentioned in the No-Do took a potentially dissident twist in noir cinema. In contrast 
to No-Do’s duplicating repetition of the Francoist doctrine, noir films became a mass 
consumed phenomenon that allowed for messy and not so veiled representations of 
political dissidence against the dictatorship. This presence allowed for potential 
dismantling decodings of the contagious character that the vagrant threat posed under 
the different figures. 
As explained by Francesc Sánchez Barba (2007), noir cinema experienced 
unprecedented prominence in Francoist Spain during the 1950s and 1960s, which is, 
significantly, the period that we cover in this dissertation. To be more precise on the 
historical context, Jo Labanyi refers to the 1940s and 1950s and argues that if “the 
murky world of noir” allowed Hollywood to “express […] the paranoia of persecuting 
political right and persecuted political left in the McCarthyite era of anticommunist 
witch hunts;” this was  “a paranoia that was even more keenly felt in the politically 
repressive climate of 1940s and 1950s Spain” (265). Thus, once the 1954 law of 
Vagrants extended the legal punishment of political dissidence from criminal acts to 
pre-criminal behaviors and political “significations,” noir cinema became more timely, 
if possible, in the dialogue between this genre and the heightened anti-communist 
Francoist paranoia. 
Los Ladrones somos Gente Honrada (We Thieves are Honorable People) was the 
noir film staying the longest period in cinemas, which was released between the 
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Francoist amendment of the law of Vagrants and the configuration of the new 
government of the Opus Dei technocrats. Following Sánchez Barba, it was the fifth 
longest exhibited Spanish noir film under Franco (90), it followed the aesthetic and 
thematic consistencies of the “cine de delincuentes” ‘criminal cinema’ (173) and 
reproduced the type of the “golpe perfecto” ‘heist movie’ (220). It was based on the 1941 
Enrique Jardiel play of the same title, and its original author labeled it as a “comedia 
casi policiaca” ‘an almost police-mystery comedy.’ This subheading announces for us the 
impurity of the uses of the noir of the time. To this respect, it should not be surprising 
that the combination of these two highly successful genres took over the box-office of 
cinemas during the 1950s.   
Despite being a comedy Los Ladrones engaged directly with noir themes, which 
allowed the film to be a crucial terrain for representation of those punished by the 1954 
law of Vagrants. As explained by Labanyi, Spanish noir “focused on the dark 
underbelly of society, revealing the moral rot of postwar Spanish society, contradicting 
the illusion of wellbeing that Francoism attempted to instill into its citizens” (261). The 
comedic aspect lightened up the darkness of noir, and granted the film with a morally 
comforting ending. However, the dark underbelly of Francoist society and “the dark 
side of human subjectivity” were present in the movie, sometimes obliquely, sometimes 
in the silences, sometimes as a parody, but always insistently present. 
The film starts by presenting three vagrants, el Castelar (José Luis Ozores), el 
Tío Galbán (José Isbert) and el Pelirrojo (Antonio Garisa) enduring in poverty and 
trying to deceive the citizens of Madrid as low-life confidence tricksters –and always 
failing to do so. When the leader of the crew of thugs Daniel el Melancólico (Carlos 
Miguel Solá) returns from exile they design a heist, whith the aim to steal a valuable 
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piece of jewelry from a mansion in the city. Three characters live in the mansion. 
Herminia (Encarna Fuentes) the step-daughter with concealed working class origins; 
Don Felipe Arévalo (Rafael Bardem), the head of the household who hides his 
questionable past from the rest; and Teresa (Isabel Pallarés), Herminia’s wealthy 
stepmother who is planning to steal her stepdaughter’s inheritance. The heist fails to 
come through when Daniel el Melancólico and Herminia fall in love, and all the 
baseborn characters ally, sending Teresa to prison. In the end, Daniel and Herminia 
marry and relocate to Latin America bringing all the members of the crew of vagrants 
with them. 
The reviews of the movie were generally positive. All of them referred to its 
theatrical original version and to the laughter of the audience. A review in ABC 
explained first that “Coello y Escrivá han reaflizado una inteligente y acertada adaptación 
cinematográfica de “Los ladrones somos gente honrada” ‘Coello and Escrivá have produced 
an intelligent and polished film adaptation of ‘We Thieves are Honorable People’ (40). 
The text ended by addressing that “el público salió muy complacido de la proyección, en cuyo 
transcurso rió alborozadamente repetidas veces” ‘the audience left very pleased from the 
projection, throughout which they laughed ecstatically in repeated occasions.’ I argue 
that this laughter allowed looking through the illusion of development produced by the 
dictatorship. It allowed an act of decoding of emotional survival that undermined the 
disease toxicity imposed to dissident collectives in the law.  
The comedy allows the film to be built upon silences. The spectator is not told 
why, but the three vagrants, having committed no crime, run away terrified every time 
they come across a police officer –always represented as kind and helpful. The 
spectator does not know why, but the leader Daniel had to flee the country. The 
	 97 
spectator does not receive all the information about Herminia’s adoption process, only 
that the biological mother has been trying to reach out and wants to help her. The 
spectator briefly gets to know about Don Felipe’s humble origins when he deters 
Daniel from explaining his own past –in none of the cases do the spectators receives 
any information. 
In all these silences a potentiality emerges. This is a potentiality for the moral 
rot of postwar Spain to surface; and for the illusion of Francoist wellbeing to be 
contradicted. The silences point to the fact that the three tricksters may elude the 
police because of legislation like the 1954 law of Vagrants that punished profiles 
instead of acts. They open up the possibility that Daniel had to escape Spain during 
the Civil War and having returned with no protection of the dictatorship, permit the 
understanding that he was not on the side of the victors. The silences create the 
probability for Herminia’s adoption to point to the widespread practice of the 
dictatorship that transferred newborns from the dangerous groups to Catholic 
households. They allowed the spectator to imagine that Don Felipe hid his origins in 
order to avoid signifying himself against the dictatorship.  
All these possible interpretations of the silences of Los Ladrones… point to what 
Labanyi has referred to as the “continuous process of ideological and aesthetic 
negotiation between the demands of the internationally operative mode of address and 
the idiosyncrasies of Spain’s political environment” (261). This was a negotiation 
between the non-conforming representation of pre-criminality of some noir films and 
the ongoing work of censorship. This negotiation allowed the spectator to question the 
dictatorship’s immunitary paradigm. 
A final feature of the film forwards this potential work of questioning. Unlike 
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other noir films, Los Ladrones… offers a morally comforting and normative ending to 
the spectator. The romantic love story between Herminia and Daniel ends in Catholic 
marriage. However, this time marriage offers a line of flight from the dictatorship’s 
moral and social rot that becomes too clear for those who, like in the movie, do not 
profit from the narrations and discourses of development. Not only are Herminia and 
Daniel able to flee Francoism, but so too is every other character. 
 
Productive Censorship of Maricones  
It was harder for homosexuals to make their way on to the big screen. By 
focusing on the presence of the figure of the homosexual and their desire in the mass 
consumed cinema during this period, we immediately encounter the intense work of 
censorship by the dictatorship. The dictatorship’s censorship apparatus directly 
targeted representations of homosexuality. It attempted to address the many “vicios 
contra natura” ‘vices against nature’ through dubbing films, demanding cuts and 
imposing prohibitions.  
Roman Gubern, who has extensively examined censorship during the 
dictatorship, explains that in “1946 the Censorship Board was given the sanitized name 
of Junta Superior de Orientación Cinematográfica (Higher Film Guidance Board), 
with the Church censor granted a veto” (395). This enhanced presence of the Catholic 
Church became more prevalent in 1951 with “the establishment of the Ministerio de 
Información y Turismo (Ministry of Information and Tourism), under Gabriel Arias 
Salgado, whose Catholic fundamentalism was reinforced by the 1953 Concordat with 
the Vatican.” The connection was unambiguous between one of the signs of 
international openness of the dictatorship, such as the Concordat, and the treatment of 
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homosexuals in cinema. By the time the homosexual was added as a dangerous group 
in the law, the Ministry of Information and the Guidance Board had been banning 
representations of homosexuals in cinema for some years. 
The censors’ preoccupation with the figure of the homosexual and their 
capacity of contagion became present in their notes. The historiographical and 
archivist work of Alberto Gil brings examples of the cases of the censorship of this 
dangerous group, which give access to the reasoning of the censors. Some were simple 
and straightforward. Others establish a clear rationality for censoring a piece.  
The evaluation of the 1959 comedy Some Like it Hot, in which the main 
characters Joe (Tony Curtis) and Jerry (Jack Lemmon), have to disguise as women, 
hence the deviance, in order to hide from the mob in an all-women band led by Sugar 
Kane Kowalczyk (Marilyn Monroe) was brief. The censorship aimed to “subsistir la 
veda de maricones” ‘make the ban on faggots last.’ Contrastingly, the argument to forbid 
the 1959 action movie Tarzan’s Greatest Adventure, in which the half naked male body of 
Tarzan (Gordon Scott) had to fight diamond thirsty British Villains, was detailed. The 
censor was able to spell out the way that contagion worked in homosexuality: “la 
admiración física hacia el arquetipo puede dañar psíquicamente a los adolescentes poco 
diferenciados […] desviando peligrosamente su atención de la sexualidad femenina” ‘the physical 
admiration of the masculine archetype [could] psychically harm non-differentiated 
teenagers dangerously […] deviating their attention from feminine sexuality.’ To put it 
another way, the censor addressed the way in which the young spectator became 
infected of homosexuality.  
Judith Butler’s critical work on censorship allows us to point to the productive 
work of effects of truth and knowledge that occurred in these repressive Francoist acts 
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of censorship. The dictatorship’s was an obviously explicit form of censorship, which 
aimed to silence what it stated. As explained by Butler, it was in this contradictory act 
of uttering what was meant to be suppressed that the production and proliferation of 
effects of truth took place. In her own words, “the effort to constrain the term 
culminates in its very proliferation –an unintended rhetorical effect of legal discourse” 
(131). The unspeakabilty and unrepresentability of the term homosexual was not 
absolute but limited to the contexts that the dictatorship deemed inappropriate.   
Even if the chain of decodings and encodings had to be cut off in the realm of 
mass consumed filmic productions, it proliferated in the legal realm. As examined in 
the previous chapter, the law had just introduced the figure of the homosexual as 
contagious, which allowed the work of censorship to be carried out, together with 
previous medical treatises. The silence in cinema only revealed the proliferation of 
discourses regarding the contagious disease toxicity of the homosexual. Within this 
context, Francoist censorship was designed not to silence, but to monopolize the 
proliferation of discourses. The regime, its administration and its sanctioned media put 
in place a sense of a contagious desire of the homosexual, which in the scientific and 




With regard to the figure of the woman and mass consumed cinema, the 
Cinderella motif was one of the most successful formulas that situated a woman 
protagonist in the center of the plot. What Jorge Pérez (139-147) has referred to as 
the Francoist Cinderella motif of the development years, rose as one of the most 
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consumed popular cinema of the 1950s and 1960s, together with the first international 
signs openness. Prominent figures of the dictatorship’s star system such as Marisol and 
Rocío Dúrcal led these types of stories in the 1960s. We encounter one of the most 
notable early forms of this development-years Cinderella recipe in the 1955 film 
Congreso en Sevilla (Congress in Seville).  
The significance of Congreso en Sevilla becomes apparent in Pepe Coira’s 
analysis, which refers to the successful shift of careers that the film brought to both 
director Antonio Román and main star, Carmen Sevilla. The director had become 
notorious for his work on what has been called “cine de cruzada” ‘crusade films’ with 
productions such as “Escuadrilla” (Squadron) and “Los Últimos de Filipinas” (Last Stand 
in the Philippines) which, as explained by Núria Triana-Toribio became “undoubtedly 
emblematic in the construction of a national cinema and national identity after the 
Civil War” (47). The protagonist Carmen Sevilla, described by Coira as “una de las 
grandes estrellas del cine español, si no la mayor en aquella época” ‘one of the biggest stars of 
Spanish cinema, if not the biggest of that period’ (180) had been working on roles that 
embodied the “típica imagen de folclórica” ‘typical folkloric image.’ With Congreso en Sevilla 
both Román’s and Sevilla’s careers made a U-turn. As elaborated by Coira, this film 
implied for the director to work with big stars, and new and shallow popular comedies, 
while for the actress it meant to act roles that lived in a modern developed world. 
Hence, with the make over of what Coira calls the “new Carmen” and “new Román” 
they became associated with previously unexplored themes of modernity and 
blockbuster narratives, which became characteristic of the regime’s Cinderella motif of 
the development years. Thus, in this film we get a glimpse of the early emergence of 
the post-WWII Francoist political project in a mass consumed cultural platform. More 
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importantly, the body of the woman acquires a central role in this emergence. 
The Cinderella motif of Congreso en Sevilla situates the main character Carmen 
Fuentes (Carmen Sevilla) in a modern developed Stockholm. She is however, a émigré 
who is unable to sustain her Spanish restaurant. Indebted and her restaurant seized by 
the bank, incapable to thrive as an entrepreneur outside the dictatorship, she decides 
to return to Francoist Spain. In order to afford the plane ticket she impersonates the 
Swedish doctor Petersen who was invited to attend a scientific congress in Seville but 
is unwilling to travel to backwards southern Europe. Once in Seville, the premise of 
the comedy develops when she is forced to keep up with the farce during the scientific 
conference, while sharing the secret with the attractive Swedish doctor Kroll 
(Fernando F. Gómez). The happy ending leads the romantic love story between the 
Spanish Carmen and the Swedish doctor, to Catholic marriage.  
The relationship between Carmen and Dr. Kroll, as an affair between Sweden 
and Spain, responds to Aurora Morcillo’s examination of the confluence between the 
representations of women’s bodies and the body politic of the dictatorship. In this case, 
Carmen’s body as the body politic of the dictatorship proposes a shift in the 
international relations in which the regime is accepted, by means of romantic Catholic 
marriage, in Europe. By nationalistically inscribing the marrying woman’s body, and 
by making international men fall in love with her, the isolating political barriers were 
presented as melting away by the nationalistic woman’s own doing. Europe would fall 
in love with the dictatorship.  
This encounter of bodies that points towards a union between the south and 
north of Europe is also present in the stereotyping dialogues that sustain the comedy. 
In these dialogues the dictatorship is defined by the gaze of the northern European 
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characters and their contrasting affirmations about the dictatorship. If Dr. Petersen 
explains that  “La ciencia termina en los Pirineos” ‘Science ends in the Pyrenees;’ Dr. Kroll 
defends that “ese congreso en Sevilla es lo que le va a quitar a cualquiera la angustia existencial, 
no los medicamentos” ‘the congress in Seville will heal the existential anguish to 
anybody.’ This shift that presents the perspective of northern Europeans as thinking of 
the Francoist regime to be the healing force of northern Europe is wrapped up when 
the Dr. Petersen shouts “No me llames Petersen, llámame Lola” ‘Don’t call me Petersen 
call me Lola’ in reference, probably, to the Flamenco and cinema star Lola Flores. 
This gaze allows for the cynical laughter to surface. Justin Crumbaugh 
proposes the term cynical laughter in order to refer to a mechanism that perpetuates 
the dictatorship’s political project through self-mockery. Crumbaugh examines this 
cynical totalitarian laughter to explain the landismo phenomenon, during a later period 
of the dictatorship and explains that, “by lampooning the macho ibérico’s defiance of 
official ideology, by parodying his puerile rebelliousness, the representation of 
transgression may easily serve to neutralize subversiveness” (2009: 110). As 
Crumbaugh develops, this laughter became one of the central and most consumed 
technologies for the anti-modern dictatorship, to tame the population by using modern 
tropes. In the case of Congreso in Sevilla, we see shy traces of this kind of laughter 
flaring up in statements such as ‘Science ends in the Pyrenees,’ which provokes 
laughter only to reverse its effect and make Spain the solution to European anxiety. 
This normalizing reading was confirmed by the newspaper reviews of the film. 
After the 1955 premier of Congreso en Sevilla, a press note described the international 
affair as “los hombres [europeos] de ciencia que se derriten como el hielo al contacto del caluroso 
folklore [español]” ‘the [European] men of science […] melt[ed] like the ice with the 
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contact of the hot [Spanish] folklore’ (P.V.B, 1955: 21). As such the marrying modern 
woman’s desire and her sexuality were explained as effectively solving one of the most 
significant political issues of the regime. This was the normalizing response that 
Spanish-made mass cinema gave to the spectators’ desires for well being. 
This fictional normalization, however, proposed a legal impossibility and this is 
where the potentiality of a decoding for emotional survival might have taken place. 
The law made clear that a woman marrying a non-national would lose her Spanish 
nationality. The 1954 reform of the Civil Code made it clear that “La mujer española que 
hubiere perdido su nacionalidad por razón de matrimonio, podrá recobrarla, una vez, disuelto o 
declarada la separación judicial a perpetuidad” ‘The Spanish woman that would have lost 
her nationality for reasons of marriage, will be able to regain it, once the marriage is 
dissolved or having it declared a judicial separation to perpetuity’ (Franco: 4833). 
From this perspective, the film did not solve the political isolation of the dictatorship. 
Instead, it offered a juridical line of flight from the regime, to the married woman. Like 
in Los Ladrones… marriage could become, as such, a way out rather than simple tool of 
domination. 
 
In this early Cinderella motif it is not the married, but the marrying woman, not 
traditional childbearer of the law, but young and modern, who is brought to the center 
stage. Enmeshed with the potentiality of decodings for emotional survival, this new 
figure of the modern times of openness to come allowed the dictatorship to resolve in 
the mass media representations of its relationship with Europe. This makes of the 
marrying woman yet another antibody against the homosexual and terrorist contagious 
threat against Catholic morality and economic progress, which was able to operate, 
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possibly, in more effective ways than the national man and the married woman. In the 
following chapter, I will address the ways in which intellectuals aimed to perform the 







This last chapter of Part One focuses on how the Francoist political project and 
the emerging European transnational unity tried to converge, unsuccessfully, under 
conditions of immunization. These efforts of unification were theoretically outlined in 
north-south connections between intellectuals, which gave philosophical grounding to 
the early attempts of unification. At this broad social scale, the inheritance of the toxic 
paradigm became less a matter of semantic spillages than an issue of inheritance of 
technologies of inclusions and exclusions that were present in the paradigm of disease 
toxicity. I argue that there is an immunitary relationship of interdependence; of 
inclusive exclusions that circulated both ways, between the Francoist dictatorship and 
the early work of scaffolding of the transnational European project. I aim to examine 
this relationship of interdependence that did not allow for an organic unification 
through the critical dialogues of intellectuals.  
I will examine the network created between three thinkers who spoke from 
different geographic and political positions in Europe. The three interlocutors are the 
notorious philosopher and bureaucrat Alexandre Kojève from France, proponent of 
European unification; the German jurist and political thinker Carl Schmitt, who was 
then defamed in Europe and celebrated under the Francoist dictatorship; and Rafael 
Calvo Serer from Spain, outspoken historian and philosopher who advocated in favor 
of the Opus Dei’s project during the final years of the Falangist rule. The critical 
approach to this network will allow me to establish connections between immunitary 
paradigms, which the Francoist dictatorship constituted in the south; and which the 
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European project was developing in the north. It was Francoist technocratic neoliberal 
thought that was able to propose the first signs of a solution to this entanglement of 
immunizations. 
Briefly, I claim that we encounter two mirroring and entangled immunizing 
logics acted by resisting unification –both of which operated by silencing violent 
precarization of bodies behind discourses of economic progress. European discourses 
were able to think of a renewed collective continental project by including the 
dictatorship as part of a shared continental Catholic spirit, only to exclude it for 
twisting that shared spirit into laziness and backwardness. In short, Europe 
immunized itself against Francoist vagrancy. In the face of this immunitary exclusive 
exclusion, the Francoist project itself was in the process of reforming itself by 
becoming immune against the dangerous groups made explicit in the 1954 law of 
Vagrants. As examined earlier in Part One, the cure for the contagious viruses that 
threatened Catholic morality and economic progress was a cure for the dictatorships 
political project. Consequently, the solution for the Francoist political project to 
become part of Europe was not going to be ceasing anti-democratic political practices, 
but instead, developing economic policies to stop being a vagrant. 
 
The Francoist “Cortes” passed the 1954 amendment of the law of Vagrants in 
the midst of the intellectual dialogues I examine in this chapter. The 1954 law was 
enforced side-by-side the first administrative formations of Europe and the 
establishment of western capitalist economic order in the dictatorship. With regard to 
Europe the intellectual dialogues surfaced from the remains of WWII, and followed 
the 1951 constitution of the European Coal and Steel Community. During this period, 
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the financial architecture, the Bretton Woods system was put in place to foster 
international capitalist economic growth, which reproduced the Cold War division of 
the world in economic coordinates.22 Significantly, Francoist Spain did not become 
part of the Bretton Woods system until 1958. It did, however sign the Pact of Madrid 
in 1953, which aimed to start ending the years of autarchy in Spain, and to become a 
US ally in the Cold War. Necessarily, the logic of immunization that emerged in 
intellectual discourses was conditioned by and informed all these encounters and 
assemblages.  
 In this chapter I first address first the connections between the three 
intellectuals and I will present the texts I will examine. This will lead my analysis to a 
closer reading of the texts from Kojève, Schmitt and Calvo Serer. In each of the 
readings, I will draw attention to the ways in which the Francoist and European 
immunitary paradigms became intertwined, leading to an early Francoist draft of a 





22 David Harvey’s The New Imperialism situates the Bretton Woods arquitecture as part of the post-War 
America Hegemony “an international framework for trade and economic development […] was set up 
through the Bretton Woods agreement to stabilize the world’s financial system, accompanied by a whole 
battery of institutions such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the International 
Bank of Settlements in Basle, and the formation of organizations such as GATT (the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) and the OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development), designed to coordinate economic growth between the advanced capitalist powers and to 
bring capitalist-style economic development to the rest of the non-communist world. In this sphere the 
US was not only dominant but also hegemonic in the sense that its position as a super-imperialist state 
was based on leadership for propertied classes and dominant elites wherever they existed” (2005: 54-
55). The underdeveloped and semi-peripheral Francoist Spain would have to wait until the 1953 Madrid 
pact with the United States to become part of this international network of organizations. 
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Three Intellectuals on the Spanish Condition 
Published before oil took over the Euro-American imagination, the text written 
by Alexandre Kojève that I focus on in this chapter is Outline of a Doctrine of French 
Policy.23 Kojève wrote it in August 27th 1945, 25 days after Hiroshima had been 
bombed by the United States with the nuclear weapon “Little Boy.” In this text, 
Kojève presented the design of a European transnational union and referred to the 
difficulties that the Francoist dictatorship presented for this process of unification.  
Kojève was an influential figure. Earlier, during the 1930s, he had taught a 
seminar on Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit at l’Ecole Pratique des Hautes Etudes. In that 
seminar he had been the professor of some of the most influential thinkers for the 
forthcoming European production of philosophy, psychoanalysis and literature, such 
as, Georges Bataille, Jean Hyppolite, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Jacques Lacan and 
André Breton. Between 1945 and his death in 1968, Kojève was appointed to the 
Direction des Relations Économiques Extérieures au Ministere de I’Economie National 
(Administration of foreign economic relations in the ministry of national economy) as a 
chargé de mission ‘ad-hoc assignment manager,’ which granted him significant authority 
inside the Direction.  
The extent of direct influence that he could have exercised over particular 
policies aimed to the formation of Europe remains unclear. Nonetheless, his Outline 
reflects the main concerns and expectations of the Direction regarding a European 
union. Signficantly, this text gave those administrative concerns a strong theoretical 																																																								
23 Kojève’s “Esquisse d’une doctrine de la politique française” has been translated by Erik de Vries as 
“Outline for a French Doctrine.” In this dissertation we have used the original French as archival source 
and de Vries’ translation as a source of quotations for the text. De Vries’ 2002 dissertation A Kojevean 
Citizenship Model for the European Union offers also the most interesting reading of Kojève’s doctrine and 
his model for Europe. 
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and philosophical grounding.24  
Carl Schmitt’s realm of influence was different to Kojève’s. In September 1945, 
less than a month after Kòjeve wrote his outline, the U.S. detained Carl Schmitt due to 
his active alignment with the Third Reich. He was held until 1946 and re-arrested in 
1947 when he was released, without charge, after the Nuremberg trials.25 By then, 
Schmitt was already a referential thinker for the Francoist class of intellectuals and 
lawmakers. His works such as the 1928 Verfassungslehre (Constitutional Theory) and the 
1932 Der Begriff des Politischen (The Concept of the Political) had been translated into 
Spanish. He had visited the country in 1929, before the Spanish Civil War, and during 
the dictatorship in 1943 and 1944 before his incarceration.26 Once released, he 
returned to Spain in 1951 a year after the publication of Der Nomos der Erde (The 
Nomos of the Earth). The Nomos is the text by Schmitt that I examine bellow.  
The connections between Kojève, Schmitt, and Francoist intellectuals should 
not be surprising. Kojève himself employed the work of Carl Schmitt, and his friend-
enemy division, in his 1943 Esquisse d’une phenomenology du droit (Outline of a 
Phenomenology of Right), only two years before the Outline of a Doctrine of French 																																																								
24 Robert Howse’s “Europe and the New World Order: Lessons from Alexandre Kojève's Engagement 
with Schmitt's 'Nomos der Erde'” and Christoph Kletzer’s “Alexander Kojeve's Hegelianism and the 
Formation of Europe” are examples of the different positions that argue for a more or less direct effect 
that Kojève’s work had on the formation of Europe. In any case, they both agree that Kojève gave a 
strong theoretical grounding to the European project. 
25 For a more detailed account of Schmitt’s incarceration, Joseph W. Bendersky’s “Carl Schmitt’s Path 
to Nuremberg: A Sixty-Year Reassessment” narrates the different events that led to Schmitt’s 
imprisonment and to the latter interrogations during the Nuremberg trials. Berdensky accompanied his 
text with the transcript of the second interrogation of Schmitt conducted by M. W. Kemper. The other 
three had been published by in 1987. 
26 The ongoing presence of Schmitt and the influence of his work in Spain before, during and after the 
Francoist dictatorship has been addressed by both Spanish and American legal and peninsular scholars. 
Although with divergent perspectives Jerónimo Molina Cano and José Antonio López García 
published different articles that gave an accurate (even if politically contrasting) account of the 
intellectual relationships that surrounded Schmitt in Spain. Justin Crumbaugh, Lena Tahmassian, and 
Luisa Elena Delgado expand on these relationships and offer a more solid theoretical and critical 
approach for our analysis.  
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Policy.27 These concurrent intellectual discourses did not happen in the work of the 
French bureaucrat alone. Under the dictatorship, Schmitt’s work was the backbone of 
the curricula of Spanish law schools.28 The Francoist class of intellectuals, jurists and 
politicians widely accepted and disseminated his definitions of the political, understood 
as the antithesis between friend and enemy (internal or external), detached from any 
connection with the private and personal.  
The Francoist class of intellectuals did not refer to Kojève’s work directly. 
Nevertheless every consideration regarding the place of the dictatorship in Europe, 
even if unacknowledged, was already dialoguing with the design presented in the 
Outline –for the Outline was pertinent for what was being implemented by the Direction 
des Relations Économiques Extérieures au Ministere de I’Economie National. That was the case, 
for example, of the proxy intellectual debate that took place in 1949 between the 
Falangist and the Opus Dei political families for power. The European project was at 
the center of the book España como Problema (Spain as a Problem) written by the 
Falangist Pedro Laín Entralgo. The Opus Dei member Rafael Calvo Serer, whose 
work I read bellow, responded right away with the publication España, sin Problema 
(Spain, with no Problem). This debate was permeated by Kojève’s ideas insofar as it 																																																								
27 A Kojevean Citizenship Model for the European Union by Alexandre De Vries explains in detail (2002: 190-
208) the way Kojève used the work of Schmitt and more specifically the friend and enemy division in his 
1943 Esquisse d’une phenomenology du droit. 
28 As Molina Cano explains “Por Orden de 27 de diciembre de 1941 del Ministro de Asuntos Exteriores se publicó el 
temario de Derecho politico ‘para las oposiciones de aspirante a la Carrera Diplomática.’ […] encontramos […] las 
categorías típicamente schmittianas: el decisionismo, el concepto existencial de Constitución, el Estado total y la 
interpretación española (Estado, movimiento y partido) de la configuración trimembre de la unidad política, 
desarrollada por Schmitt en Staat, Bewegung, Volk (1933). Esta inclinación schmittiana no es un caso aislado, sino 
que representa una suerte de estado mental característico en los juristas y altos funcionarios de aquella época” ‘the 
order of December 27, 1941 of the Foreign Office published the Political Law curricula for the public 
examinations to apply for a career in Diplomacy. […] we find […] typically schmittian categories: 
decisionism, the existential concept of Constitution, the Total state and the Spanish understanding 
(State, movement and party) of three-membered constitution of the political unit, developed by Schmitt 
in Staat, Bewegung, Volk (1933). This schmittian inclination is not an isolated case, instead it represented a 
characteristic state of mind of jurists and high state officials of the time’ (2009: 274-275).  
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revolved around notions of European modernity and a shared Christian lineage. For 
the Falangist writer, the burden of underdevelopment was on Spain, as it had been 
unable to incorporate European traces of modernity. In contrast, for the Opus Dei 
member, Europe was to blame for having abandoned the traits of its fundamental 
Catholic spirit, which had been preserved in Spain.29  
Rafael Calvo Serer’s 1956 La aproximación de los neoliberales à la actitud tradicional 
(The Neoliberal approach to the Traditional Attitude), which is the last text that I 
examine in the present chapter, needs to be addressed as an early attempt to depart 
from previous Falangist outlines defining the dictatorship’s relationship with Europe. 
It was published already under signs of plastification of the dictatorship but still with 
the technocrats not yet in control of the dictatorship. More clearly than in Calvo 
Serer’s previous España, sin Problema (Spain, with no Problem) and ahead of its time, 
this text makes connections between the Francoist political project of immunity, 
Kojève’s and Schmitt’s proposals and economizing frameworks for the crisis of the 
dictatorship. 
Calvo Serer’s short essay originated in the lecture series “Tendencias Actuales del 
Pensamiento Europeo” (Contemporary Tendencies of European Thought) which already 
gave away the geographical and political unity presupposed for Spain by the author. In 
the text, Serer established a direct dialogue with Ordoliberal thinkers such as Wilhelm 
Röpke. For Calvo Serer, Röpke was not selected at random. The German’s work 
allowed Serer to present unquestioned the main transformations that the neoliberal 																																																								
29 Antoni Raja i Vich elaborates on this early Francoist debate about what it meant “being of Spain” and 
about the place Spain occupied internationally. Following Raja i Vich we argue that the consequences of 
this debate had effects well beyond the mere controversy and affected the eventual configuration of the 
Francoist regime itself. 
 
	 113 
“tercer camino” ‘third way’ involved, while making the case for the need for the Catholic 
fundamentalist dictatorship. In less than eight months from the publication of the 
book, in February 1957, Calvo Serer’s group of power within the dictatorship, the 
Opus Dei technocrats, officially joined the regime’s administration as the elite that 
would manage the economic and social policies aiming to modernize the dictatorship in 
crisis. 
 
European Catholic Spirit and the Vagrant South 
Kojève’s Outline of a Doctrine of French Policy established a European immunitary 
paradigm by giving a Hegelian account of the Cold War. In this account he introduced 
the notion of the Latin Empire –a project for a transnational unit comprised of France, 
Portugal, Spain and Italy. Following the text, the dialectical overcoming of the 
confrontation between the Anglo-Amercian and the Slavo-Soviet Empires (without a 
fight to death but through recognition) would only be possible if a Latin Empire 
created a space in which aggression would not be feasible, thereby securing peace.30 
Led by France, the Latin Empire was to be a “buffering, peaceful, global third” (2004: 
11) empire united by an already existing “spiritual kinship” (15), that is, Catholicism.  
In particular, with respect to Spanish Catholicism, Franco’s regime was 
																																																								
30 Kojève explains the world as follows, “if one does not want to leave the political world divided 
between the reciprocally hostile and antagonistic forces of the Slavo-Soviet and Anglo-Saxon Empires –
if one wants to complement these two powers and civilizations– with a buffering, peaceful, global third 
one, it would not fall to one Nation, and not specifically to France, to coordinate them” (2004: 10-11). 
This understanding of the world mirrors, problematically, his reading of Hegel, “in order that the human 
reality come into being as "recognized" reality, both adversaries must remain alive after the fight. Now, 
this is possible only on the condition that they behave differently in this fight. […] he must "recognize" 
the other without being "recognized" by him. Now, "to recognize" him thus is "to tecognize" him as his 
Master and to recognize himself and to be recognized as the Master's Slave. (1980: 8). Kòjeve describes 
a world in which neither the Anglo-saxon nor the Soviet empires were going to occupy the position of 
the slave. Thus, making apparent the need for a third buffering empire. 
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explained to be “delay[ed] in evolution” and needed to be replaced with a “Francophile 
Government” (27) –as in favorable to the French. This delay did not refer openly to 
the non-democratic character of the Spanish dictatorship. Spain, like other Southern 
European countries, “degenerate[d] into laziness” (16) the “art of leisure” that was 
“the fundamental unity of the Latin mentality,” hence their delay in evolution. This art 
of leisure was most clearly reflected in Catholicism, which “above all sought […] to 
organize and humanize the ‘contemplative,’ or even inactive, life of man” (17). Thus 
laziness became entangled with Catholicism as an unethical deviation from religious 
contemplation. Here Kojève’s immunitary project for Europe becomes apparent. The 
inoculation of Francoism for the shared Catholicism was the grounds for its 
vaccinating exclusion due to its laziness.   
Entangled with notion of Catholicism, laziness needed to be understood too in 
economic terms. Eight moths after Kojève had written the Outline, on December 27th 
1946, the financial architecture of the Bretton Woods system was ratified. Since 1944, 
notions of national idleness and laziness were being transformed under an anti-
communist system that aimed “to assist in the reconstruction and development of 
territories of members by facilitating the investment of capital for productive purposes, 
including the restoration of economies destroyed or disrupted by war” (1945: 531). 
Francoist Spain did not become part of the Bretton Woods system until 1958. It did, 
however sign the Pact of Madrid, mentioned earlier, in 1953. It was going to be years 
after Kojève’s Outline that against the laziness of the dictatorship, processes of 
financialization and national indebtedness of the dictatorship started ending the years 
of autarchy in Spain.  
The 1954 amendment of the law of Vagrants too refers to notions of laziness 
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and idleness while interweaving, like Kojève, threats to Catholic morality and 
economic development. Hence, a mirroring logic surfaces between this 1945 doctrine 
for Europe and the forthcoming 1954 Francoist legislation that included the 
homosexual and the apologist of terrorism. Neither of the immunitary paradigms 
excluded the vagrant and lazy (the homosexual and the apologist of terrorism). Instead 
the included them in order to constitute, in the form of vaccination, the new Francoist 
and the new European “we.”  
Under this double immunitary logic that negates the negation by including the 
excluded, full accession of the dictatorship to the European unification was unlikely. 
Francoism remained as the vagrant virus that needed to be inoculated. However, this 
double work of immunization opened up the path for the neoliberal petrotoxic 
solution. From the north, the Catholic design that Kòjeve envisaged for Europe 
explained that the only reason for the dictatorship and the Latin Empire to clash was 
Franco's regime’s delay in evolution. Meanwhile, the Bretton Woods system allowed 
for this sense of delay to be framed solely in economic terms. In the south, the new 
criminals’ contagious double threat to Catholic ethical barriers and human progress 
allowed the consolidation of a norm that was simultaneously modern European and 
Catholic fundamentalist. Within this frame, the dictatorhip’s internal politics of life and 
death that led to the violent precarization of vulnerable collectives after the Spanish 






The Francoist Inimicus 
In Schmitt’s works such as The Concept of the Political and The Nomos of the Earth 
the state was the political community that could wage war and decide upon the enemy 
–which made enmity the fundamental term of politics. The spiritual existence of the 
state and the constitutive characteristics of this national community were only 
understandable “in terms of concrete political existence” (1996: 85). The nomos, the 
“measure by which the land in a particular order [was] divided and situated; it [was] 
also the form of political, social, and religious order determined by this process” (2003: 
70), was precisely the name for that spiritual existence and the constitutive 
characteristics of the political community in the form of state. These were the legal 
theoretical grounds that the dictatorship adjusted in order to establish the immunitary 
paradigm examined in previous chapters. 
Legal scholars such as José Antonio Lopez Garcia and Ignacioa Tébar explain 
that Schmitt’s theories were considered accurate to the reality of the state. The former 
refers to this Francoist approach to Schmitt as a “realistic” (143) approach and argues 
that the appropriation of Schmitt’s theories led the Francoist state to assume the 
distinction between friend and enemy in all its radicalness. The latter explains that “los 
autores franquistas aceptaron […] esta militarización el sentido de la política que supone la 
division schmittiana” ‘the Francoist authors accepted […] the militarization of the sense 
of politics represented by the schmittian dvision’ (77) between friend and enemy. 
Francisco Javier Conde, referred to by Tébar as a kronjurist (chief jurist of the 
regime) argued that Schmitt’s concepts “son conceptos políticos genuinos, es decir, conceptos 
en los cuales ha sido comprendida la situación política tal como es” ‘are genuine political 
concepts, this means that they are concepts with which the political situation has been 
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understood as it is’ (1944: 193). Through Conde, who had been Schmitt’s student in 
Germany, the law incorporated Schmitt’s theoretical and political formulas in the 
dictatorship’s law. The Francoist legal epistemology became the space to declare 
friends and enemies and to ground the traditional nomos. It operated as the main 
terrain of the political for national self-production.  
There were some important adjustments to Schmitt’s thepretical proposals. 
Significantly, that was the case of the distinction between “hostis” and “inimicus” as 
different kinds of enemy (Schmitt, 1996: 26-38). In the words of the German thinker, 
“the enemy [imimicus] is not […] the private adversary [hostis] whom one hates. […] 
The enemy [inimicus] is solely the public enemy, because everything that has a 
relationship […] to a whole nation, becomes public by virtue of such a relationship” 
(1996: 28). Between them there was a relationship of degree and intensity rather than 
of nature. Hence, hostis was the kind of enmity that acquired the level of public and 
collective. 
The distinction of enmity on the basis of intensity did not work for Conde. He 
argued together with the official line of the dictatorship that the “war of liberation” had 
expelled the enemies from within the limits of the new state. As examined earlier, 
expulsion was the rationality behind the punishment of the terrorist with death 
penalty. Hence, for Conde the distinction between hostis and inimicus was one that 
followed the division between external and internal, and between them the difference 
was of nature rather than of instensity.  
As Conde explained, “el error es patente. Entre lo que el hombre hay de ‘naturaleza’ y lo 
que en él hay de ‘espíritu,’ no cabe, desde el punto de vista ontológico, continuidad alguna. Ambas 
dimensiones son irreductibles” ‘the mistake is self-evident. Between what there is in man of 
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‘nature,’ [private] and of what there is in him of ‘spirit,’ [public] there is no continuity 
from an ontological perspective’ (1944: 75). I agree with López García when he argues 
that “lo que Conde trata de evitar es que los actos privados pudieran tener un estatuto politico” 
‘what Conde wants to avoid id for private acts to acquire political status’ (1996: 145). 
However, I argue that the effects of this nature-based distinction between the internal-
private and external-public enemies shaped the dictatorship’s immunitary paradigm, 
hence its position towards Europe. 
 Following Conde’s framework when the homosexual and the apologist of 
terrorism joined the other vagrants and miscreants, they were cases of internal 
enemies. By nature they could not to be read as hostis but as inimicus. Hence, behind 
narrations of disease toxicity and contagiousness we encounter processes of 
depolitization of the “private enemy.” Homosexuals and apologists were regarded as a 
problem of uncontrollable desires instead of political life and death encounters.  
Conde’s approach established a frame for a legal discourse in which apologists 
and homosexuals needed to be included in their punishment, instead being expelled or 
killed like the figure of the terrorist. After the “liberation” of the Spanish Civil War the 
internal enemy could only be a delinquent, who following the Christian morality, 
should be reformed. It was following this logic of innoculation that the double threat of 
the new vagrants against Catholic morality and capitalist progress could act as 
mechanisms to alter the dictatorship. In other words, it was adding the threat to 
capitalist progress to the older risk against Catholic morality that triggered the new 
immunitary process of the dictatroship’s vaccination. 
At this point, it is possible to begin discerning some of the ways in which the 
dictatorship’s appropriation of Schmitt’s work and Kojève’s project for a Latin Empire 
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started to dialogue with each other. Calvo Serer’s work allows us to apprehend the 
first neoliberal logics of optimization for this geopolitical entanglement that engages 
the criminalization, recognition as contagious diseases, and punishment of bodies 
under Franco. 
 
The Neoliberal Cure  
The dialogue that Rafael Calvo Serer’s short essay La aproximación de los 
neoliberales à la actitud tradicional (The Neoliberal approach to the Traditional Attitude) 
establishes with the neoliberal thought collective brought an approach to market 
activity that was not so clearly present in Kojève and Schmitt’s texts. Kojève argued 
that “an adequate economic foundation” (2004: 33) was indispensable for his 
imperialistic project. The German jurist believed that the “non-state sphere of economy 
[was] permeating everything: a global economy” (2003: 235). However, it was Calvo 
Serer who was able to respond to these concerns by articulating them as an organic 
part of the immunitary solution for the dictatorship. From his perspective the 
dictatorship as a political project, a shared Catholic spirit, notions of European 
modernity and neoliberal thought, far from presenting any contradiction, would 
naturally complement each other.  
Calvo Serer aligned himself with the “‘tercer camino,’ que propugna Willhem 
Röpke” ‘‘third way’ that Willhem Röpke advocates for’ (1956: 10). For Röpke “the 
most urgent need of our time is to find, instead of the sterile alternative of either 
laissez-faire and collectivism or reactionary interventionism, that Third Way which 
will provide a solution on a new plane, which is not 'mere compromise’” (1942: 152). 
As Dardot and Laval have argued, “this ‘third way’, […] has to meet a much larger 
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challenge than mere economic malfunctioning. It must offer a remedy for a ‘total crisis 
of our society’” (2014: 223). This interpretation can also be applied to Calvo Serer’s 
proposal by adding the Christian fundamentalist approach characteristic of Francoism. 
As explained by Calvo Serer, “las restauraciones cultural, social y política, son inseparables. 
Y, como hemos dicho, tienen primacía sobre la economica, pues aun en las mas difíciles 
circunstancias materiales es possible la realización […] de una perfección crsitiana del hombre”  
‘the cultural, social and political restorations are inseparable. And, as mentioned, are 
more important than the economic restoration, because even in the most difficult 
material circumstances, the accomplishment is possible […] of a Christian perfection 
of man’  (1956: 36). Within this framework Calvo Serer welcomed the economic 
rationality presented by Röpke, that is, the enterprise-like self-government of the 
individual, who operated as a unit of production that competed against others. The 
entrepreneur of the self became complementary to the Christian perfection of man. 
Röpke’s work allowed Calvo Serer to give theoretical elaboration to the legal 
immunization of the double threat that the homosexual and the apologist of terrorism 
posed against both Catholic morality and capitalist progress. For both authors the 
crisis and weakness of liberal democracy was just a symptom of a total crisis of their 
societies. Both of them argued that the social could not be reduced to the economic. 
Finally, for neither of them was it the market that failed but the supporting social and 
moral framework. 
Since a democratic state was unable to solve any issue at a spiritual level, Calvo 
Serer proposed his own political tool, particular to Spain. By referring to neoliberal 
formulations such as the “Estado fuerte” ‘Strong State,’ Serer distinguished a totalitarian 
tyranny from an authoritarian dictatorship. Here too Calvo Serer approached Röpke’s 
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work by including his own Francoist Catholic fundamentalist stance. Röpke argued 
“Just as a free economic system needs a market police, with strong state authority for 
its protection and maintenance –in complete contradiction to the views of laissez-faire 
liberalism– so is the same state intervention necessary in other spheres of economic 
life—for economic as well as for non-economic reasons” (1942: 281). Calvo Serer 
elaborated, “al servicio de la fe es posible poner medios adecuados para construir un Estado fuerte, 
que luche contra el comunismo y logre la victoria espiritual” ‘at the service of the faith it is 
possible to create adequate means to build a strong State that fights against 
communism y accomplishes spiritual victory’ (1955: 42). Following Calvo Serer’s 
interpretation of the strong state, the authoritarian dictatorship was a regime of 
exceptional authority that allowed “que la sociedad y el Estado puedan superar una crisis y 
volver a su desenvolvimiento libre y normal” ‘society and the state to get over a crisis and 
return to its normal development’ (1956: 39). Defending, as did Kòjeve, the European 
Christian Spirit, and criticizing, like Schmitt, the rationalistic foundation of liberalism, 
Calvo Serer imagined a government of elites that would lead the healing process of 
both the European spirit and the Christian perfection of man.  
We see that this formulation began to part ways with the immunitary paradigm, 
and started incorporating economies of petrotoxicity. Serer’s strong state would repair 
the moral and social crisis that was disintegrating, not only the dictatorship, but also 
Europe. Following his proposal of España, sin Problema (Spain without Problem), 
where he dialogued with Kojève’s notion of the Spirit of Europe, the crisis was not 
Spanish but European. It was this alleged European loss of values that allowed a 
narration of a crisis, permitting Calvo Serer to approach and inherit ordoliberal 
economic rationalities. Inheriting the petrotoxic paradigm, instead of controlled 
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inoculations of external threats, Calvo Serer presented no outside to the unit formed 
by the dictatorship and Europe. As it will become clear in Part Two, this followed a 
characteristic trait of petrotoxicity in which toxic residues were already there, waiting 
for their toxicity to be exposed. It was going to be in those terms that the Francoist 





Petrotoxic Transition to Petromodernity 
 
This chapter serves as the transit from a world conditioned by a disease 
paradigm of toxicity to another dominated by petrotoxicity. In this toxic transit I will 
scrutinize the main characteristics of the petrotoxic paradigm as they surfaced in the 
Francoist dictatorship. This paradigm fully penetrated the dictatorship during the 
1960s, together with the neoliberal financialization of the regime and the plastificiation 
of its material landscape. Thus, petrotoxicity and petromodernity became two sides of 
the same coin.  
I will focus on the seven laws that addressed, for the first time, the toxic 
materiality of petroleum and its byproducts before the Francoist “Cortes” approved the 
law of “Peligrosidad Social” (Social Danger) in 1970. These seven laws present the initial 
infiltration of the petrotoxic paradigm into the law. They provide us with the 
possibility to apprehend the composition that the paradigm of toxicity assumed within 
the law, before it was inherited by the legal economy of recognition of criminals. 
During the 1960s, the growing penetration of the petrotoxic paradigm into the 
dictatorship was also revealed in the ways dissent against Francoism began to be 
imagined. The Francoist imagination was progressively being enveloped in 
petromodernity, which allowed the population to reconsider forms of resistance. Oil, 
plastics, paints, packaging, pesticides, and the proliferation of petroleum in multiple 
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other forms that became part of gadgets and appliances penetrated the country, and 
carried with them both the image of modernization of the regime and also the 
paradigm of petrotoxicity. In short, by the time the Cortes passed the law of Social 
Danger the petromodernization of the regime conditioned and dominated the 
understanding of popular resistance against the dictatorship. In this sense, a petrotoxic 
resistant couter-imagination preceded the petrotoxic regime of criminality. 
 
These elements give form to the two sections of this Chapter, which bridges 
Part One and Part Two, showcasing the transition from the domination of disease 
toxicity to that of petrotoxicity. The two sections refer respectively to the shape that 
the petrotoxic paradigm of toxicity assumed within the law; and to the way 
petrotoxicity informed the understanding of resistance against the regime. 
 
A Paradigm of Oil Spills and Dangerous Substances  
The Petrotoxic paradigm was decoded from the scientific production of 
knowledge31 and encoded into Francoist legislation. This act of decoding and encoding 
took place through seven laws that were passed in the 1960s. The seven laws were 
translations and adaptations of international laws that had already been applied in 																																																								
31 Max Liboiron examines the continuities and discontinuities between different models of harm that 
were linked to disease toxicities and to petrotoxicity “before the late nineteenth century, disease was 
perceived to be caused by ‘bad air,’ or miasmas. By the turn of the twentieth century, the miasmic model 
of harm had been replaced by germ theory” (2013, 134). This germ theory presented coinciding 
foundations with the petrotoxicity that was going to come later on, “Within 40 years, a model of 
pollution developed that privileged linear causal links between a discrete pollutant and its pollution, and 
the quantification of harm.” The scientific community utilized this pollution model of harm to quantify 
linear damage between discrete pollutants and its pollution, which both the germ theory and 
petrotoxicity came to share, however, “Pollutants and germs were not and are not synonymous” (138). 
The linear causality that is presented by environmental toxicity and the toxicity of dangerous substances 
operated unlike “theories of disease, such as contagion or infection” (136). Hence, petrotoxicity and 
disease toxicity diverged significantly in the ways they acted with respect to the body they harmed. 
	 125 
Europe, which pointed to the increasing entanglement of the transnational project with 
the dictatorship. As they were passed when petromodernity was taking over the 
Francoist regime, they addressed, for the first time, the toxic materiality of oil-spills 
and of substances derived from petroleum. By the time the 1970 law of Social Danger 
inherited the petrotoxic paradigm for penal practices, petrotoxicity dominated the 
Francoist and European culture. 
 
The 1962 law that created the “Comisión Nacional para evitar la contaminación de las 
aguas del mar por los hidrocarburos” ‘National Commission to Avoid the Pollution of the 
Sea by Hydrocarbons’ was the first law addressing oil-spills. This law ratified the 1954 
International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil (OILPOL), 
which had been amended that same year. Within this law petrotoxicity was able to 
connect with different foundations of the dictatorship in the form of risk. It threatened 
the main economic engine of the regime “al obstruir […] la industria turística” ‘by 
obstructing […] tourism” (Carrero Blanco: 8436). It threatened life of the dictatorship, 
as it “ocasiona la destrucción y muerte” ‘causes destruction and death.’ Finally, when it 
argued that due to the increasing severity of oil-spills, the government “desea en el menor 
breve plazo posible ratificar el Convenio” ‘desire[d] to ratify the Convention in the shortest 
period possible,’ it made manifest that the petrotoxict threat allowed the dictatorship to 
further incorporate itself in the international setting, which had not been too 
welcoming only a few years earlier.  
Already in this germinal law, some of the most relevant characteristics of the 
petrotoxic paradigm became entangled with the Francoist political project. Firstly, 
petrotoxicity suspended the division between the outside and the inside. By becoming 
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part of the Convention that had been enforced since 1954, the dictatorship aimed to 
lose its character of outsider from western geopolitics. Petrotoxicity, by means of the 
global circulation and transportation of oil, affected the dictatorship as much as it did 
any other country –democratic or not. Petrotoxicity did not attack from the outside, 
instead it showcased that there was not such thing as outside for the globalizing 
market. 
Secondly, the techniques to cope with the deathly toxicity of petroleum that the 
OILPOL convention proposed were different, for example, to the techniques deployed 
to prevent the contagion of leprosy, the plague or the smallpox. When the OILPOL 
argued that “a ship shall be required to be so fitted as to prevent, as far as reasonable 
and practicable, the escape of oil into bilges” (IMO, 1981: 8),32 the objective was 
neither to exclude, to contain, nor prevent from contagion. It did not divide; include or 
normalize. Instead, oil-spills were framed as economized commodities that deviated 
from the rules of the market economy. As such, oil that spilt needed to be either 
revalued or disposed of.  
This economization of the toxic matter was not limited to the oil. The tankers 
too were presented as market actors that had to behave responsibly in their work of 
prevention. Finally, from this perspective the dictatorship was also configured as a 
market actor when it identified itself through tourism. 
 
The second law that addressed the toxic materiality of petroleum aimed to 
regulate pesticides. The Francoist Cortes passed the law “Sobre venta y empleo de 																																																								
32 The Spanish legislation translated this passage as, “todo buque […] deberá estar provisto de 
dispositivos que permitan evitar en la medida que sea razonable y posible el escape de fuel-oil o de 
diesel-oil pesado hacia las sentinas” (Burriel, 1967: 14806). 
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productos fitosanitarios” ‘about the sale and utilization of pesticides’ in 1965. Unlike the 
mass media and popular culture, which produced conceptions of materials such as 
plastics attached to modernity alone, the law defined this other petroleum byproduct 
with a duplicity that was going to become a constant feature for all petroleum-based 
products: pesticides were both necessary and toxic for economic development.  
This was a characteristic of the petrotoxic paradigm that the regulation of oil-
spills did not state. Pesticides “son de uso necesario, teniendo en cuenta su eficacia y los 
beneficios” ‘[were] of necessary use taking into account their efficiency and benefits’ 
(Carrero: 3286). At the same time, they posed a risk against life due to their “toxicidad 
[…] para el hombre, los animales domésticos, las plantas cultivadas y hasta los vegetales útiles” 
‘toxicity […] for men, domestic animals, grown plants, and useful vegetables.’ This 
new definition of a toxicity was linked to “la aparición en el mercado de nuevos productos” 
‘the emergence of new products into the market.’ And the emergence of these new 
market actors were carriers of a petrotoxic paradigm that was as life threatening as 
economically necessary. Pesticides were presented, in the end, as both the cure and the 
poison of the Francoist dictatorship that endured in an economic crisis of 
underdevelopment. 
 
 By adding different characteristics, the following five laws enforced by the 
dictatorship that addressed the toxic materiality of petroleum further developed this 
distinct encoding of the petrotoxic paradigm. They did so by drawing attention to the 
twofold scale that the contaminating action occurred. Firstly, they endangered the 
invulnerability of the life at the level of the dictatorship as an enterprise society. 
Secondly, they were a threat against the life and health of individual self-
	 128 
entrepreneurs.  
The threats against the dictatorship were organized around the toxicity of oil-
spills. Three more laws regulated oil-spills after 1962. Two were enforced in 1967, 
dictating “las normas sobre prohibición de vertidos al mar de productos petrolíferos o residuos 
contaminados procedentes de fábricas o industrias de todas clases” ‘the norms regarding the 
prohibition of spills to the sea of petroleum products or polluted residues of factory 
origin or any other kinds of industry’ and establishing “medidas para evitar la 
contaminación de aguas y playas por accidentes en los terminales de túberías de carga y descarga de 
productos petrolíferos” ‘measures to avoid the pollution of seas and beaches by accidents 
in the terminals of petroleum-products loading and unloading pipes.’ The third law 
was enforced in 1969 establishing “medidas para combatir los derrames de hidrocarburos “ 
‘measures to combat the spills of hydrocarbons.’ These laws segregated oil-spills as the 
forms of petroleum that threatened a nationalistic conception of “our” territory, while 
legally framing this territory as market actor in the form of an international touristic 
economic venture. 
What was particular to these three laws is that they animated the spills treating 
them as if they had agency and presented the national territory as being vulnerable to 
their action. This vulnerable sovereignty needed to be protected by “combatir los 
derrames de hidrocarburos” ‘combating against spills of hydrocarbons’ (1969: 13194). In 
other words, it needed to be defended by, in fact, declaring war against these unruly 
commodities that when becoming spills deviated form their trade-routes.  
 
In turn, life and health at the level of entrepreneurial individuals was 
threatened by petroleum-byproducts. At this level, new characteristics emerged for the 
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paradigm of petrotoxicity. After the 1965 regulation of pesticides and before the 1970 
law of Social Dangerousness, these byproducts were regulated two more times, both of 
them in 1967. The first of these laws, the “Código Alimentario Español” ‘Spanish Food 
Code,’ regulated the potentially toxic plastic packaging of food. The second law 
adopted the European directive “en materia de clasificación, embalaje y etiquetado de las 
sustancias peligrosas” ‘in matters of classification, packaging and labeling of dangerous 
substances’ or Dangerous Substances.  
The Food Code was in charge of the regulation of plastic packaging. These 
substances had to be classified as either “recuperables” ‘recoverable’ or “no-recuperables” 
‘non-recoverables’ (Carrero, 1967: 14183). In other words, they were revalued as 
commodities; or disposed of because their toxic risk of harming entrepreneurial lives –
after losing both their exchange and use values and becoming residues. If the first law 
against oil spills established this technique for the treatment of the undefined matter 
that “attacked” the nation, the Food Code brought this treatment of petrotoxicity down 
to the level of consumer goods of individuals. 
In turn, the law of Dangerous Substances proliferated toxic forms at the atomic 
level of the molecule. It included an annex detailing further the classification of the 
substances “en fonction du numéro atomique de l’élément” (Van Elslande, 1967: 55) 
‘according to the atomic number of the element.” Fifty-five different dangerous 
substances fell into the categories of “hydrocarbures” ‘hydrocarbons’ (91) and “Dérivés 
halogènes des hydrocarbures” ‘Halogenated derivatives of hydrocarbons’ (94). Unlike oil 
spills, petroleum byproducts were multiple and singular.  
In their toxic incarnation, the separate byproducts that were categorized to a 
microscopic level were organized along an axis of danger. On their petrotoxicity, these 
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materials spanned from “inocuos” ‘innocuous,’ to “moderadamente peligrosos” ‘moderately 
dangerous,’ and finally to “muy peligrosos” ‘very dangerous’ depending on their 
“toxicidad y fitotoxicidad” ‘toxicity and phytotoxicity’ (Carrero Blanco, 1965: 3286). 
More deeply ingrained than before, at the atomic level of the molecules, there was no 
non-petrotoxic outside for the vulnerable individual that had to conduct himself as a 
market actor.  
 
These seven laws shaped the encoding of the petrotoxic paradigm within the 
Francoist legal epistemology. To put it another way, they make apparent the form that 
the four main traits of the petrotoxic paradigm, which I examined in the introductory 
chapter, acquired under Franco. Indeed, this petrotoxic paradigm reveals, firstly, that 
Francoism and the individuals that lived under Franco entered a global network of 
market economy that presented no outside. There was no outside to shared global oil 
routes, and neither had an outside the market of petroleum byproducts that reached 
the market in the form of consumer goods. Secondly, the new dominating toxic threat, 
in the form of spills and petroleum byproducts became mainly and primarily a threat of 
commodities; of economized beings that had the potentiality to go array, or acted in a 
way that they should have not. These toxic commodities became disposable residues 
when they lost their use and exchange values. Thirdly, the petrotoxic paradigm 
heightened the process of production of knowledge and subsequent categorization of 
risk, which had to be scientifically exact down to the material and molecular 
composition of each one of the dangerous substances. Finally, the law appointed these 
commodities with a double bind: they were the reason for the economic modernization 
of the underdeveloped dictatorship, and at the same time, their toxicity put at risk this 
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same modernity, by attacking the lives of entrepreneurialized governments and 
individuals. 
 
Two parallel transitions reached the dictatorship alongside the penetration of 
this paradigm of petrotoxicity. One was related to neoliberalism, the other one was 
linked to the recognition of criminality. As with the emergence of neoliberalism the 
production of the scientific knowledge of petrotoxicity can be traced back to the late 
1930s and early 1940s. Like neoliberalism, the petrotoxic paradigm had to wait for the 
end of WWII to disseminate across the different social fields. Side by side, the 
scientific knowledge that established the model of harm that made sense of 
petrotoxicity was built upon the germ model of harm, which lay behind the disease 
paradigm of toxicity. Similarly, as I argue, the regimes of criminality transited from 
being dominated by disease toxicity to petrotoxicty. In the seven laws examined above 
the penetration of both transitions into the dictatorship becomes apparent. 
 
Slick Resistance  
The petrotoxic paradigm permeated the way that anti-Francoist social 
movements imagined protest and resistance. This process happened during the same 
years that the petrotoxic paradigm penetrated the law. On April 6th 1962, during the 
first massive miner strike against the dictatorship’s precarious working conditions, 
only three months before the law regulating oil-spills was enforced, the workers used 
the image of a “mancha de aceite,” an spreading industrial oil-slick, to think about 
resistance.   
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Emmanuel Rodríguez recounts the following announcement from the Worker’s 
Commissions (Comisiones Obreras) of Madrid in the 1960’s “Nuestro camino es la huelga 
general [...] Concebimos la huelga general como la extensión y generalización de una serie de 
conflictos parciales, que pueden […] irse extendiendo como una mancha de aceite por todo el país” 
‘Our path is the general strike […] We conceive the general strike as the extension and 
generalization of a series of partial conflicts, which can […] keep extending like an oil 
slick throughout the country’ (32). The slow advance of an industrial oil slick helped 
imagine how a multiplicity of protests could disseminate and assemble escalating to a 
general strike.  
 
A search in newspaper archives for the concept “mancha de aceite” reveals a 
multiplication in the use of this expression, and more importantly, a shift in the 
semantic utilization of the term. In both ABC and La Vanguardia the use of the 
expression oil slick more than doubled – from the 1950s to the 1960s, it went from 58 
to 128 in the former and from 45 to 92 in the latter. In this proliferation of the use, the 
meaning of the term moved from understanding it first through the lens of disease 
toxicity to later be fully framed under notions petromodernity and petrotoxicity. 
In the 1950s, oil slicks and diseases operated in a similar fashion and could be 
use interchangeably. A 1952 article that reported about the foot-and-mouth disease 
that affected livestock explained “desde el país vecino ha penetrado en españa esta nueva 
variedad, que […] se ha extendido con rapidez y como mancha de aceite por […] la gran 
difusibilidad que presenta esta enfermedad” ‘this new variety has penetrated Spain from 
the neighboring country that […] has spread rapidly and like an oil-slick due to […] 
the high capacity of diffusion that this disease presents’ (La Vanguardia, 13). Six years 
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later, in 1958, an article that explained the agonic moment that the French Fourth 
Republic endured, explained that government asked for the “intervención a De Gaulle 
para que interrumpiera la mancha de aceite de contagiosas sublevaciones” ‘De Gaulle’s 
intervention to interrupt the oil-slick of contagious uprisings’ (4). These examples represent 
a normalized utilization of notions of diseases, contagion and oil-slick as if they 
operated in a similar fashion. 
 The decline of the usage in which representations of diseases and oil-slicks 
collapsed happened gradually. In 1958, for example, we see both types of 
representation surfacing the newspapers. Nine days before the example of the 
contagious uprisings mentioned above, the oil-slick acquired its own petrotoxic 
paradigm, “hoy la delincuencia de los pequeños es una mancha de aceite que se va extendiendo  sin 
que haya nada que la detenga” ‘today underage crime is an oil-slick that is extending in a 
way that ther is nothing to stop it’ (5). At some moment with the beginning of the new 
decade, the disease paradigm of toxicity and the image of an oil slick stopped sharing 
the same sematic fields. In 1961, the petrotoxicity dominated in the following article 
that revisited the Spanish Civil War, “el Ejército llamado republicano se extendió como una 
gigantesca mancha de aceite sobre un suelo resbaladizo” ‘the so-called republican Army 
spread like a giant oil-slick over a slippery surface’ (3). By 1964, the image of the oil-
slick acquired the inflammable character of the petroleum byproduct, “si el terrorismo se 
extiende por el Sur de África como una mancha de aceite, no tardará en aparecer en las Rhodesias 
[…] han creado todo lo necesario para un buen   incendio” ‘if terrorism spreads in southern 
Africa like an oil-slick, it will not be long until it reaches Rhodesia […] they have 
created everything necessary for a good fire’ (13). The slippery surfaces and the 
flammable character of the image used in the 1960s consolidated the petrotoxicity and 
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let go of the disease paradigm. 
By the time the slick of petroleum became the threading image for ongoing 
mass strikes, it referred to a petromodern world. It became an appropriation of a 
petrotoxic term that allowed an act of resistant self-namig. Mass strikes kept 
increasing in intensity during the 1960s and 1970s, leading to a peak in 1976, less than 
half year after the death of the dictator Francisco Franco in November 1975. As 
Rodríguez explains “la ‘mancha de aceite,’ metáfora industrial para un tiempo presidido por la 
centralidad obrera, servía para describir un patrón común a casi todos los conflictos” the ‘‘oil-
slick’ was an industrial metaphor led by the workers centrality, and could be used to 
describe a common model for almost every conflict.’ The “mancha de aceite” became the 
cultural phenomenon under which the struggle took place as form of collectively 
taking over the streets. This was not a linguistic performativity, but a bodily 
performativity33 that took over the toxicity of oil to operate by gathering in mass 
protests, which presented not externality but transversality, convergence and 
entanglement of bodies. What this example characteristically reveals is that, by the 
time that the law of Social Danger repealed the law of Vagrants in 1970, the petrotoxic 
paradigm had taken over the Francoist imagination and was inherited, from the law to 





33 I borrow this notion of bodily performativity from Judith Butler’s Notes Toward a Performative Theory of 
Assembly. Butler argues “the gathering signifies in excess ofwhat is said, and that mode ofsignification is 



















In this chapter, I will move forward from the penetration and domination of the 
petrotoxic paradigm explained in the previous chapter, to the inheritance of 
petrotoxicity in Francoist criminal law and the formation of the petrotoxic regime of 
criminality. I argue that the 1970 law of Social Danger became a case that 
paradigmatically characterized this inheritance. Having analyzed the domination of 
disease toxicity, the law of Social Danger allows us to apprehend, in contrast, the 
changes that the petrotoxic paradigm brought to processes of criminalization. 
The transformations undergone by the dictatorship and Europe before the 
publication of the law underscores the prevalent position that this law acquires for our 
analysis. Three substantial shifts set up the stage for the 1970 law of Social Danger. 
The first one is the dissemination of petromodernity and petrotoxicity throughout the 
dictatorship and Europe. The second is the accession to power, in 1957, of the Opus 
Dei’s technocrats with their neoliberal project for a strong state, which replaced the 
previous Falangist project –responsible for the 1954 law of Vagrants. Thirdly, the same 
year, the Treaty of Rome was signed establishing the European Economic Community, 
which accelerated transnational unification that aimed to include Spain as a part of it. 
The law of Social Danger, with its inherited petrotoxicity, sustained and responded to 
these transformations of the different political projects. 
Importantly, unlike the 1954 law of Vagrants that followed the European trend 
of the repressive punishment of homosexuals, the heightened repressive character of 
the 1970 law moved against the new prevailing western tendencies that began to 
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exclude the homosexual from the penal action of the law. As examined by Nathan 
Baidez (38-39), Germany, the U.S. and the INTERPOL started promoting the social 
integration of homosexuality. Geoffroy Huard makes the case for France, arguing that 
the 1960 sub-amendment to fight against “homosexuality” did not increase the police 
and juridical repression of gays (80-81). In Britain too, the 1967 partial 
decriminalization of male homosexuality, as examined by Brian Lewis, followed the 
same trend (211). As Argued by Huard (100) and Mora (118), it was precisely the 
British approach to decriminalization that the Spanish legislation used as a counter-
example in order to enhance the repressive character of the dictatorship’s legislation. 
The law of Social Danger introduced an opposing approach to that of Europe, 
with the objective of becoming part of the European Unification. It knowingly 
legislated against the trends of international penal legislations. At the same time, it 
argued that this law provided proof of the modernization and Europeanization of the 
regime. In this seemingly contradictory position surfaces the petrotoxic regime of 
criminality that makes the political projects of Europe and the dictatorship converge 
through the punishment of bodies.   
 
In this chapter, I will first introduce the 1970 law, then continuing with the 
analysis of the capillary presence of the petrotoxic paradigm in its text. To do so, I will 
trace petrotoxicity’s four traits that have been compiled in the previous chapter. 
Finally, following the analysis in Part One, I will study the way in which the 1970 law 




The Modernity of Social Danger  
The 1970 law of Social Danger repealed the 1954 law of Vagrants and Thugs 
arguing that a revision was necessary. There was a “necesidad de defender a las sociedad 
contra determinadas conductas individuales” ‘need to defend society against particular 
individual conducts’ (Franco: 12551). This necessity to defend society linked to 
another, that was to modernize society –to bring penal law into European modernity. 
In other words, this text brought together notions of the Europeanization of the 
dictatorship, and the defense of society through penal practices. Criminalization and 
neoliberal modernization of the regime could not be thought as separate processes. 
Within this frame, traits of the petrotoxic paradigm surface as already accompanying 
narrations of modernization. 
The change of name itself, from “Vagos y Maleantes” (Vagrants and Thugs) to 
“Peligrosidad Social” (Social Danger) was presented as “en línea con la terminología 
moderna” ‘in line with modern terminology’ (12552). The text followed up with this 
notion arguing that “la pena y la medida de seguridad vienen así a coexistir en las legislacíones 
modernas” (12551) ‘the penalty and the measure of security come to coexist in modern 
legislations,’ which was a feature that distinguished the law of Social Danger from the 
previous text. For the sake of modernity, Francoist penal law no longer dealt only with 
punishment, it also aimed to prevent. This insistence on modernization, the law argued, 
brought together anthropology, criminology and psychiatry as the objective and 
totalizing disciplines that made it possible to create new foundations to understand 
criminality.  
Modernization meant that there was a shift with regard to the categories 
introduces by the law of Vagrants. The 1970 law explained that even with “los retoques 
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parciales introducidos [por la ley de 1954,] apare[ce] hoy, al menos en parte, un tanto inactual” 
‘the partial tweaks introduced [by the 1954 law, it now] appeared […] somehow 
outdated’ (12552). As examined in Part One, these “tweaks” introduced by the 1954 
law were the introduction of two new dangerous groups to the 1933 law of Dangerous 
States –the homosexual and the apologist of terrorism. By withdrawing the apologist 
of terrorism the out-of-date character of the law was modernized.  
By critically reading this withdrawal from the 1970 law, it becomes noticeable 
that the “homosexual,” is left as the one “partial tweak” that was introduced and still 
remained since the previous law. This incidental condition of persistence in the law 
made of the homosexual the earliest dangerous group that embodied the “la aparición de 
algunos estados de peligrosidad caracerísticos de los paises desarrollados” ‘the appearance of 
some dangerous states that were characteristic of developed countries.’ What becomes 
noticeable at first sight is that the law did not refer to logics of diffusion any more, but 
of appearance; of coming into sight. This was indeed one of the traits of the petrotoxic 
paradigm. As examined earlier in the dissertation, petrotoxic residues became such 
when exposed, which points to the understanding of the dangerous states as residues 
instead of contagious diseases. 
The addition of the contagious homosexual in the 1954 law took place under 
the Falangist rule of the dictatorship, and it endured under its technocratic control 
transformed into a petrotoxic residue. This draws an uninterrupted but optimized line 
of the dictatorship between Falangist autocratic Francoism and technocratic neoliberal 
Francoism. From this standpoint, the category of the homosexual can be approached 
as the figure revealing the linkages and transformations of the different Francoist rules 
and also, as the figure, which was first exposed as a petrotoxic dangerous state that 
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was “characteristic of developed countries.” This approach allows my analysis to 
question the legal categorical separation of the different “dangerous groups.” It permits 
us to approach the new residual dangerous groups by using the homosexual’s 
preceding Europeaness in order to understand their interconnectedness.   
With the introduction of the category of the prostitute as a dangerous state, the 
regulation of women’s bodies and their compulsory desire for biological reproducibility 
persisted undisguised; however, this time the harmful relationship between sex and 
economic transaction surfaces in the text of the law. Female prostitution, male 
prostitution and homosexuality were punished under the same article, with 
confinement directed to the deviant’s readjustment and potential revaluation (12552-
12553). They were all part of the same non-reproductive sexual deviation, which now 
operated in a fully economized reality.  
Another new category was the porn-dealer or “los que promuevan o fomenten el 
tráfico, comercio o exhibición de material pornográfico” ‘those who promoted, traded or 
exhibited pornographic materia’ (12552). This followed the booming porn industry of 
the Playboy magazine in the United States and in Europe since the 1950s, which 
Preciado (2014) examines in their work. Following the figure of the prostitute the 
economic transaction of sex was brought into the law of Social Danger, however it was 
neither the producer nor consumer who was punished, but the individualized 
entrepreneur.  
The “toxicómano” (drug-addict) was one of the enduring categories from the 
1933 pre-Civil War law of Dangerous States. Significantly, in the 1970 update, the law 
referred for the first time to “drogas tóxicas, estupefacientes o fármacos que produzcan 
análogos efectos” ‘toxic drugs, narcotics and pharmaceuticals that produce analogous 
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effect’ (12553). By doing so, the penal law addressed the capacity of toxic substances34 
to act –they were not presented as inanimate objects, instead it was the substances 
themselves that produced effects. In this description, the petrotoxic dangerous 
substances examined in the previous chapter and the dangerous states that inherit the 
petrotoxic paradigm encountered. Following the petrotoxic regime of criminality a 
similar toxic capacity was acknowledged to both substances and states. 
  
 Controversy surrounded the modernization of the law from before it was 
passed. As early as 1961, the university professor Juan del Rosal published an article 
that referred to concerns regarding the notion of social danger. For Rosal any concern 
could be solved by the knowledge produced by criminological expertise. One year 
after the law passed, a seminar offered on the law of Social Danger by the Institute of 
Criminology of the University of Valencia revealed that the problems presented by 
Rosal persisted throughout the years. 
Rosal argued that the first problem of the formula “dangerous state” surfaced 
“ya precisamente en el intento de conciliar las dispares opiniones que se han vertido para explicar 
qué es y qué representa esta expresión” ‘already precisely in the attempt to reconcile the 
disparate opinions that have been expressed to explain what this expression was and 
what it represented’ (395). Nevertheless, his conclusion was that by the time he was 
writing, the experts on criminology had accomplished a clear definition “la expresión 
'estado de pelgrosidad' denota claramente […] un modo o condición de ser de ciertas personas” ‘the 																																																								
34 Mel Chen elaborates on the linguistic conception animacy, in order to understand how, like in this 
case, non-living “stuff” is animated and assigned agency in language, intersecting with discourses on 
race, gender, disability, class, sexuality and so on. She refers to this effect of animating a non-living 
matter through language as animacy: this is “a means of conceptual and affective mediation between 
human and inhuman, animate and inanimate, whether in language, rhetoric, or imaginery” (2012: 10), 
which often appears biopoliticized, entangled into discourses of race and sexuality among others. 
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expression ‘dangerous state’ clearly denotes […] a mode or a condition of being of 
some people’ (398). He elaborated further: the dangerous state was defined “por los 
factores de disposición y de ambiente, en su mutua conpenetración, el individuo constituya 
potencialmente un ser con probabilidades de delinquir o, al menos, de turbar el orden social” ‘due to 
factors related to disposition and environment, each conditioning the other, the 
individual constitutes, potentially, a being with probabilities of committing a crime or, 
at least, of disturbing the social order.’  
It was this new notion of the internal potentiality that needed to be exposed, 
and that was characteristic of petrotoxicity replacing notions of diffusion and 
contagion, that modernized the law. Rosal explained that it was necessary to “señalar en 
su favor, indudablemente, una cierta revigorización del frente contra la delincuencia” ‘point out on 
its favor, unquestionably, certain revigorization of the front against criminality’ (395). 
This revigorization dialogued with ‘la armónica conciliación de las dos funciones –represiva y 
preventive– [que] es una solución que está en la línea de pensamiento del penalista católico” ‘the 
armonic conciliation of the two functions –represive and preventive– [which] is a 
solution in line with Catholic penalist thought’ (407). To put it another way, the law 
allowed for the indiscriminate punishment of anyone that could presumably question 
the Catholic social order of the regime. 
 The professors that lectured in this 1971 seminar presented contrasting 
perspectives. The Dean of the University of Deusto explained that the law confused 
social danger and criminal danger and Professor Vives from the University of Valencia 
argued for the “imposibilidad de determinar de manera científica la peligrosidad social en una 
determinada persona” ‘impossibility to determine, in a scientific manner, the social danger 
of a particular person’ (618). Contrastingly, Rosal explained that it should be the 
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criminologist who fulfilled the “función de concretar y fijar la peligrosidad” ‘function to 
specify and fixate the danger’ (618). Professor Fairén from the University of Valencia, 
claimed that “la peligrosidad sin delito [es] algo que está ahí y, por tanto, sobre lo que hay que 
trabajar” ‘the danger with no crime [is] something that is there, hence, it is something 
to work on’ (620). Like with the petrotoxicity of residues, the anti-Catholic danger 
with no crime was something that was already there and needed to be exposed. In the 
work of theorization of the law, like in the law itself, signs blended of the 
modernization of the dictatorship as a political project, of the modernization of the 
dictatorship’s regime of criminality, and finally of the penetration and dissemination of 
the petrotoxic paradigm. 
 
Petrotoxic Residues  
 The law of Social Danger inherited the petrotoxic paradigm together with the 
enhancement of its repressive character. A different set of techniques and economies of 
recognition dominated over the ones enforced by the previous legislation. To put it 
another way, I argue that there was an emergence of petrotoxic technologies within 
mechanisms that were concerned with security, discipline and sovereignty.  
These technologies mirror the traits of the petrotoxic paradigm that have 
surfaced in the previous analysis. These variations, organized from the most micro to 
the more macro fields of the social, are the following: the production of knowledge that 
measures risk at a molecular level; the economization of every social field and 
consequent categorization of elements as subject to revaluation or disposal; the double 
bind understanding of the dangerous agent as both the cure for economic progress and 
its poison; and finally, the reorganization of the surroundings and the national 
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community and the exposure of social risk with a lack of outside. In what follows, I 




 The law of Dangerous Substances and the law of Social Danger coincided in 
their production, at a molecular level, of knowledge about risk. The former aimed to 
create provisions for the “classification, packaging and labeling” (Van Elslande, 1967: 
234) of materials. It did so by creating a list of substances and classifying them “en 
fonction du numéro atomique de l’élément” (55) ‘according to the atomic number of the 
element.’ Calling for a production of molecularly detailed scientific knowledge, it took 
the existing need of technologies of power to categorize, and added a hitherto unseen 
precision.  
The 1970 law of Social Danger reproduced the new level of production of 
scientific knowledge. As it argued, the work of technicians needed to go beyond the 
1954 law of Vagrancy and obtain “un conocimiento lo más perfecto posible […] del presunto 
peligroso” ‘the most perfect knowledge possible […] of the suspected dangerous subject’ 
(12552). This time, the “atomic elements” of the criminals were to be found in their 
“personalidad biopsicopatológica” ‘biopsycopathological personality.’ This term attached 
the prefix “bio-” to previous notions such as “psycopathology” and it had been 
borrowed from the Francoist social and scientific discourses. The prefix “bio-” brought 
with it, following Preciado’s work, notions of biochemical and biomolecular hormones 
and their synthetic development. In other words, it brought the molecular level of 
ptoduction of knowledge and exercise of power that was characteristic of the 
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petrotoxic paradigm. 
As the one legal “tweak” introduced by the 1954 law of Vagrants that persisted 
criminalized in 1970, the category of the homosexual allows us to increase our 
understanding of the transformations that the prefix “bio-” carried between the 
previous law and the law of Social Danger. The work of Antonio Sabater, who became 
one of the designers of the law of Social Danger, offers some of the evidences to 
interpret this addition.  
Sabater introduced the prefix “bio-” in his later work such as the 1965 Juventud 
Inadaptada y Delincuente (Maladjusted and Delinquent Youth), adding it to the double 
threat against Catholic morality and economic progress. It did so in the form of 
treatment. Isolation and exclusion was not enough any more. Instead what was needed 
was an intervention that penetrated and vulnerated the body at the molecular level of 
the hormone, “la homosexualidad deberá recibir un tratamiento hormonal con propionato de 
testosterona” ‘homosexuality will have to receive a hormonal treatment with testosterone 
propionate’ (291). The production of this new knowledge of bio-vulnerability of the 
body was entangled with the knowledge produced about the vulnerability caused by 
petrotoxic dangerous substances. 
As with dangerous substances, the 1970 law of Social Danger exercised an 
allocation of categories. Within this frame, the addition of the prefix “bio-” to the 
“psycopathological” personality became a sort of periodic trend. It classified from the 
perspective of this new vulnerability of the body, the “Vagos” ‘vagrants,’ “proxenetas” 
‘pimps,’ “homosexuales” ‘homosexuals,’ “prostitutas” ‘prostitutes,’ “Toxicómanos” ‘drug 
addicts,’ “los que realicen el ílicito tráfico de drogas” ‘drug dealers,’ “los que promuevan el 
tráfico de cualquier material pornográfico” ‘porn dealers,’ “mendigos” ‘beggars’ and 
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“insolentes” ‘insolents,’ which took their allocated place in a “cuadro de clasificación” 
‘classification table” (12553) of dangerousness. The law through the term 
biopsycopapthology connected, at a the molecular level, the different dangerous 
groups. 
 
Revalue or Dispose  
The process of the law of Social Danger mirrored the regulation proposed by 
the Food Code mentioned in the previous chapter, for plastic packaging. The Food 
Code referred to “envolventes recupeables” ‘recoverable packaging’ in order to talk about 
the packaging that were “susceptibles de higienización antes de ser nuevamente utilizados, 
siempre que […] conserven las condiciones exigidas en este Código” ‘liable of decontamination 
before using them again, whenever […] they preserve the conditions demanded in the 
Code’ (Carrero, 1967: 14183). The “Envolventes no recupeables” (Carrero, 1970: 14183) 
‘non-recoverable packaging’ was a material that was considered “perdido” ‘lost.’ Due to 
it’s toxicity it lost any use or exchange value and became residue that could not be 
revalued, but needed to be disposed of. 
Inheriting this same petrotoxic trait, the law of Social Danger did not speak 
about threats of pandemic contagion anymore, but about economized beings and their 
economic valuation. This economizing approach responded to a dictartorship-wide 
transformation. During the technocratic government, the dictatorship’s legislation 
redefined the “public order” in economic terms –which affected the petrotoxic 
inheritance of the criminal penal law.   
The 1963 law of “represión de prácticas restirctivas de la competencia” ‘repression of 
restrictive practices against competition’ provided legal formulation to the 
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“economized” reality of the Francoist dictatorship. The text argued that competition 
transformed the “orden público” ‘public order’ into a “orden público económico” ‘public-
economic order’ (Franco, 1963: 11146). It situated the private enterprise and the 
market at the center of the dictatorship’s social focus.  
An older understanding of public order had to be debunked arguing that it put 
limits to the “relaciones inter-privadas” ‘inter-private relationships’ of the people. Thus, 
individuals were defined by law as market actors. Following this transformation, the 
categorization of dangerous groups too took place in an economized public space in 
which every actor was already an economic being. At a criminal level, very much like 
the petrotoxic plastic packaging, individuals needed to be recovered and revalued or 
disposed. 
 “Prostitutas” ‘prostitutes’ (male and female), and “los que promuevan el tráfico de 
cualquier material pornográfico” ‘porn dealers,’ were the new additions to the 1970 law of 
Social Danger that more clearly introduced the economic character of the dangerous 
states. The twofold threatening instinct established by the figure of the homosexual in 
the 1954 vagrancy law, against Catholic fundamentalist morality and against economic 
progress, was present in these two new criminal figures. However in 1970, as both 
categories were actors in the public-economic order, they implied the need to punish 
any sex and desire that was understood as a market transaction.  
As Calvo Serer explained in his dialogue with the Ordoliberals, which I 
examined in Part One, the economic crisis was primarily a social one. Hence, even 
under the new technocratic conditions of the dictatorship, sex had to be preserved as 
the act for compulsory biological reproduction of the regime. Sex and sexuality were 
the one place that capitalist-style progress should not penetrate. If capitalist progress 
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was to penetrate sex and sexuality, the actors became part of dangerous groups that 
lost any “public-economic” value for the dictatorship’s public life, in the same way that 
commodities lost their value.   
For the non-recoverable materials, the Food Code needed to put in place 
“servicios, defensas, utillaje e instalaciones adecuados […] para garantizar la conservación de los 
alimentos […] y su no contaminación por la proximidad o contacto con cualquier clase de residuos 
[…] y materias extrañas” ‘appropriate services, defenses, tools and installations […] in 
order to guarantee the preservation of food […] and their non-contamination due to 
the proximity and contact with any kind of residues […] and strange materials’ 
(Carrero: 14181). The law of Social Danger operated accordingly.  
It was necessary to first isolate in order to decontaminate and finally recover. 
As explained by the law of Social Danger, it was necessary to “apartar temporalmente de 
la vida social al peligroso […] con el fin de […] lograr su readaptación” ‘temporarily remove 
the dangerous agent from social life, in order to […] achieve their readjustment’ 
(Franco, 1970: 12552). The law used the terms “readaptación” ‘readjustment’, 
“rehabilitación” ‘rehabilitation,’ “reeducación” ‘reeducation,’ and “reintegración” 
‘reintegration’  (12552) which reproduced the same idea of “revaluation” of plastics 
that we encounter in the Food Code.  
The question remained unanswered for those who, voluntarily or not, would 
not and could not leave the residual margins to be reintegrated –recovered and 
revalued. The law linked to the notion of revalorization its “fines humanos y sociales […] 
no limitados a una pragmática defensa de la sociedad” ‘humane and social objectives […] not 
limited to a pragmatic defense of society.’ To put it another way, the law aimed for “la 
plena reintegración de los hombres y de las mujeres que, voluntariamente o no, hayan podido quedar 
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marginados de una vida ordenada y normal” ‘the full reintegration of the men and women 
who, voluntarily or not, might have been marginalized from an ordered, normal life.’ 
However, not every residual man or woman in the margins could be reintegrated, 
revalued. There, like in the case of plastic packaging, non-recoverable individuals that 
became residues. This was, too, what the law of Social Danger called the “defensa 
pragmática de la sociedad” ‘pragmatic defense of society.’  
 
The pragmatism of the law takes us to the convergence of the petrotoxic regime 
of criminality with other regimes of power. Here, notions of the “bio-,” the “-psyco-” 
and the “pathological” need to be addressed as a confluence of regimes. Once again, 
the homosexual surfaces as the transversal category that allows us to recognize 
continuities and differences from the previous law.  
If sovereign power was plainly reflected in the act of incarceration, which 
works as a form of banishment from society, discipline was reflected by the distinct 
facilities for each kind of danger that the law built. Even if it was not against 
contagion, they were designed to contain the toxic force of the dangerous states, 
preserving and defending the ordered and normal life from the proximity and contact 
with any kind of residues. A year after the 1970 law had passed, a legal extension 
argued for the necessity of distinct facilities for each kind of danger –this time it was 
not only the homosexual that had to be isolated. 
In the particular case of the homosexual, the dictatorship built two different 
facilities which, following the dictatorship’s medical discourses, aimed to separate the 
“passive” and “active” kinds. During the three years prior to the enforcement of the 
law, the Observation Center of the Carabanchel prison facility created a specialized 
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“Centro de Observación de Homosexuales” (Centre for Observation of Homosexuals) and 
studied 200 convicted cases. It was this work of observation that the law later referred 
as the “most perfect knowledge possible.” This perfect knowledge had been based on the 
work of  “observación” ‘observation,’ “clasificación” ‘classification’ and “tratamiento” 
‘treatment’ (12552-12553) in the prison of Carabanchel. 
In these compounds, the bio-psyco-pathological became a work of security and 
politics of life. The character of the dangerous states mirrored the body of neurologists, 
psychiatrists and endocrinologists, which overtook discourses of public health and 
treated the subjects’ predisposition and probability to be a risk. Interventions and 
normalizations were necessary to foster the lives of those threatened by these 
dangerous states, or as the law put it, those that put at risk the “vida social” (12552) 
‘social life’ of the dictatorship. Hence, the petrotoxic regime of criminality, added its 
own distinct technologies to the sovereign, disciplinary and securitarian mechanisms 
that were already in place in the dictatorship. 
 
Exposing the Toxic  
The law of Social Danger introduced in two seemingly unrelated areas of the 
dictatorship’s political project a petrotoxic reality that lacked an outside and where 
toxicities did not penetrate, but preexisted on the inside previous to the act of 
discovery. One was at the level of the individual, in which the dangerous character of 
the individual was not acquired by an inoculation of an external element. The other 
one was at the level of Europe, in which the dictatorship did not endure somewhere 
outside of European modernity.   
Following the toxicity of dangerous substances that was measured in their 
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atomic number, the criminal law referred to the “evidente predisposición delictiva” (12552) 
‘obvious criminal predisposition,’ of the dangerous states. Hence, it was proposing an 
approach to risk in which the dangerous individual was already such, but it had to be 
exposed. The groups that inhabited the law of Social Danger had been dangerous 
before they acted according to their particular risk.  
The text made this clear when it established “unas normas que […] no integra[n] 
una ley penal construída objetivamente sobre hechos y tipos de delito, sino una serie de preceptos en 
función de determinadas categorías subjetivas de peligro” (12552) ‘some norms that […] do 
not put together an objectively constructed penal law based on facts and types of 
crime, but a series of precepts depending on subjective categories of risk.’ This 
subjective character of risk was why the law needed to acquire the most perfect 
knowledge in order to calculate “su probabilidad de delinquir” ‘their probability to commit 
a crime” (12552). The work of criminology became about calculating the probability to 
act on this internal toxic predisposition that was already there.  
With regard to the dictatorship this trait of the petrotoxic paradigm allowed the 
law to to situate Spain at the same economic evolutionary stage as Europe. For this 
law, the dictatorship was not outside European modernity; it was not behind in 
evolution. As explained at the beginning of this chapter, following the law, the 
dangerous groups signaled the advent of European modernity. Indeed, the dangerous 
states were “caracerísticos de los paises desarrollados” ‘characteristic of developed 
countries,’ which made of them carriers of modernity.  
If toxic substances are residues when exposed, then the very existence of these 
toxicities efficiently demonstrated that Franco’s regime was, by then, part of European 
modernity. Their character of residue revealed that the same modern toxicity could 
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appear anywhere else in Europe. It was one single “we,” Francoist and European, 
which was under threat from the same petrotoxic dangerous groups that could be 
found anywhere inside developed Europe. 
 
Petro-Dependent 
 The double bind relationship towards modernity and toxicity, operated on top 
of categorizations, economizations, punishments, preventions and revalorizations. As 
exemplified earlier with the examination of pesticide regulations, these petrotoxic 
materials were of “uso necesario” ‘necessary use’ for their “eficacia y los beneficios” 
‘efficiency and benefits’ (Carrero: 3286) and they were threatening for their “toxicidad 
[…] para el hombre” ‘toxicity […] for men.’ The 1970 law of Social Dangerousness 
mirrored this logic.  
The toxicity of the dangerous states was present in the risk they brought to the 
“social life” of the regime. Meanwhile, when the law argued that their appearance and 
exposition responded to the modernization and Europeanization of the dictatorship, it 
acknowledged the necessity for these dangerous groups. To put it another way, 
homosexuals, prostitutes, drug-dealers, porn dealers and other toxic states were the 
first signs and living proof that the dictatorship’s crisis of underdevelopment was 
coming to its end. Unlike the virus-like vagrancy, the polluting dangerous states 
presented for the dictatorship’s crisis of underdevelopment the same cure-poison 





Petrotoxic Terrorism  
So far I have referred to the paradigm of petrotoxicity that derived from 
dangerous substances and petroleum byproducts in order to understand the economy 
of recognition of precriminals put forward by the law of Social Danger. Contrastingly 
terrorist criminality, inherited the petrotoxic traits of oil-spills. With the disappearance 
of the “apologist of terrorism” from the 1970 law of Social Danger, a clear bridging 
figure between internal and external threats against the regime was withdrawn. Hence, 
with regard to terrorism, in 1970 there was no in-between space between the criminal 
act and the dangerous state.  
Like with the oil of the spills, which was transported in tankers that were part 
of a global network of commerce and trade encompassing the planet, the new anti-
Francoist movements were represented as being part of an overarching planetary 
strategy. Like oil spills, the terrorist threat was not directed at individuals but at the 
Francoist regime as a whole. Finally, like oil-spills the definition of terrorism referred 
to an undefined collective mass. 
This time around, the anti-terrorism law could refer again to armed groups that 
resisted the dictatorship by using violent actions.  The 1954 law of Vagrants was a 
reaction to the cessation in 1952 of the armed ressistance of post-war communist and 
anarchist guerrillas. In the 1960s, the dictatorship manufactured a renovated discourse 
of terrorism on top of the actions of Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA, Euskadi and 
Freedom), along with other armed groups of anti-Francoist resistance such as the 
Frente Revolucionario Antifascista y Patriota (FRAP, Revolutionary Antifascist and 
Patriotic Front), the Grupos de Resistencia Antifascista Primero de Octubre (GRAPO, First 
of October Antifascist Resistance Groups), and non-armed collectives like the Frente de 
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Liberación Popular (FLP, Popular Liberation Front).  
These groups were transporting notions of anti-capitalism, anti-imperialism, 
armed struggle, revolution and anti-colonialism into the dictatorship. Kostis Kornetis35 
explains this new turn of the anti-Francoist left by examining the “tiermondisme” 
(thirdworldism), which was the “embrace of anti-Americanism, centre-periphery 
theories and resistance against neo-colonialism, […] by radical activists” (2015: 488), 
and also to the “experiencia sincrónica del 68” ‘synchronic experience of May 68’ (2003: 
98) that took place between Spain and France.  
As with oil spills, the definition of terrorism was not individual but hazy and 
collective. The 1960 decree that “recoge los preceptos […] que parece aconsejable conservar” 
‘compile[d] the precepts […] that seemed adequate to keep” (Franco, 1960: 13405) 
from the 1947 anti-terrorism law, explained that it aimed to “reprimir eficazmente 
actuaciones subversivas o reveladoras de peligrosidad […] por motivos […] terroristas o 
simplemente por impulsos de singular criminalidad” ‘repress efficiently actions that are 
subversive or revealed dangerousness […] by terrorist motives or simply by impulses of 
singular criminality.’ These actions, always in the plural, referred to group 
organizations and collective acitvities.  
As with oil spills, the target of terrorism was not individuals but the nation as a 
whole. The 1968 decree-law of “represión del bandidaje y terrorismo” ‘repression of 
banditry and terrorism,’ explained that “recientes acontecimientos han puesto de manifiesto 
tendencias y acciones encaminadas a atacar la seguridad de la Patria” ‘recent events 
																																																								
35 Kostis Kornetis traces this concept of “tiermondisme” and the influence of May 68 into the Spanish 
and Greek contexts in his articles “‘Cuban Europe’? Greek and Iberian tiersmondisme in the ‘Long 
1960s’” and “¿Un 68 periférico? reflexiones sobre un análisis comparativo de la resistencia estudiantil de 
los regímenes autoritarios de la Grecia de los coroneles y de la España tardofranquista.” 
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expose[d] tendencies and actions directed to attack the security of the Fatherland” 
(Franco: 12191). Those “recent events,” addressed one particular action that took 
place only fourteen days before the enforcement of the law. It was the first 
assassination by the anti-Francoist group of national liberation ETA of Melitón 
Manzanas, police chief of the Brigada de Investigación Social (Brigade of Social 
Investigation) and a known torturer.36 As was made explicit by the law, this action 
operated like the action of oil spills, which attacked not individuals but the 
dictatorship.  
Finally, the lack of an outside realm became apparent when in 1969, the 
dictatorship declared the first regime-wide state of exception as a response to the 
actions of the new anti-Francoist groups. The decree-law that declared the state of 
exception explained that “acciones minoritarias, pero sistemáticamente dirigidas a turbar la 
paz de España y su orden público, han venido produciéndose en los últimos meses, claramente en 
relación con una estrategia internacional que ha llegado a numerosos países” ‘reduced actions, 
but systematically directed to disturb Spain’s peace and its public order, have been 
taking place in the last months, in clear relationship with an international strategy that 
has reached many countries’ (1175). Like the oil of the spills, the new anti-Francoist 





36 Melitón Manzana’s role as the dictatorship’s infamous torturer has been well documented in 
historiographical and critical works such as Iker Casanova’s ETA, 1958-2008: Medio Siglo de Historia and 
Pau Casanellas’ Morir Matando: el Franquismo ante la Práctica Armada, 1968-1977. 
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Chapter Six. 
Petrotoxic Iterations of the Nation 
 
Following the examination of the petrotoxic regime of criminality, in this 
chapter I will analyze the formation of the neoliberal notion of the Francoist “we.” I 
argue that this optimization developed on top of petrotoxic punishments of bodies. In 
order to do so, I will focus on the persistent categories of the “married woman” and the 
“Spanish national (indebted) man.” Preserved throughout the 1950s and 1960s, they 
were the categories for whom the dictatorship was meant to be built, and who, in turn, 
supposedly held the dictatorship together.  
The preservation of older categories was stressed with the consolidation, in 
1967, of the fundamental pre-technocratic legislation of the dictatorship, such as the 
“Fuero del Trabajo” (Labor Code) and “Fuero de los Españoles” (Code of the Spaniards) 
mentioned earlier in the dissertation, which asserted the actuality of the Catholic 
fundamentalist principles of the regime.37 Even the 1961 law regulating the “derechos 
políticos profesionales y de trabajo de la mujer” ‘the political professional and employment 
rights of the woman’ that contended to suppress “discriminaciones basadas en situaciones 
sociológicas que pertenecen al pasado” ‘discriminations based on sociological situations that 
belonged to the past,’ referred “únicamente a la mujer casada” ‘only to the married 
woman,’ to argue that “el matrimonio exige una potestad de dirección que la naturaleza, la 
religión y la historia atribuyen al marido” ‘the matrimony demands an authority to 
																																																								
37 The Decree “779/1967, de 20 de abril” merged the different fundamental laws of the regime, which 
included the 1958  “Ley De Principios Del Movimiento Nacional,” the 1945 “Fuero De Los Españoles,” de 
1938 “Fuero del Trabajo,” the 1967 “Ley Organica Del Estado,” the 1942 “Ley Constitutiva De Las Cortes,” 
the 1947 “Ley De Sucesion en La Jefatura Del Estado,” and the 1945 “Ley De Referendum Nacional.” 
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command bestowed by nature, religion and history to the husband.’ The law 
concluded, once again, that the “norma programática del Estado español” ‘the 
programmatic norm of the Spanish state” was to “liberar a la mujer casada del taller y de la 
fábrica” ‘free the married woman from the workshop and the factory.’ Hence, amid 
allegedly modernizing laws the categories of the married woman and the Spanish 
national man appeared as figures of continuity within the dictatorship. 
I examine these two categories in relation to the paradigm of petrotoxicity 
inherited by the dangerous states. By doing so I propose that, in their character of 
toxic residues, the dangerous states operated as constitutive blind spots of the 
technocratic order. Sometimes obliquely and sometimes openly, these residual blind 
spots were exposed in different legal texts such as the plans of Social Development of 
the 1960s and 1970s, and also in objects of popular culture such as cinema and the 
press. If petrotoxic criminals became marginal residues when exposed, then even 
unexposed, their latent toxic presence conditioned the Francoist political project. It 
was this petrotoxic residual blind spot that transformed tha categories of the married 
woman and the national man.  
 
The reemergence of older Falangist terms and laws within the technocratic rule 
makes it hard to talk about a break between the two managements of the Francoist 
dictatorship. An imprecise reading of the more established historiography about 
Francoism might lead one to believe that there was a rupture between the Falangist 
autocratic control of the dictatorship and the Opus Dei ‘s technocratic neoliberal 
management of the regime. Santos Juliá, for example, explains that with the accession 
of the Opus Dei technocrats into the Francoist administration “la política del régimen 
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había cambiado de dirección, sino de naturaleza” ‘the politics of the regime had changed of 
its direction, if not of its nature’ (187). Raymond Carr argues “Francoist culture […] 
could not –in the long rung– resist the influence of the Europe it was the ambition of 
the technocrats of Opus Dei to join” (163). Hence, a simplistic approach might 
establish an illusion of a clear before and after logics between Falangists and Opus Dei 
technocrats. 
By pointing to the dissemination of the petrotoxic paradigm, I argue that the 
reemergence of “the married woman” and the “Spanish national man” as part of the 
technocratic rule of the dictatorship point, certainly, to the change of direction of the 
regime (explained by Juliá), but not to a change of nature. Likewise, this reemergence 
under conditions of petrotoxicity does not reveal that the dictatorship had to transform 
due to the exhaustion caused by the European influence, as suggested by Carr; rather 
it displays the ability of the Opus Dei to make the dictatorship endure under new 
European conditions. As I will elaborate below, petrotoxic criminality emerged as the 
dictatorship’s residual blinspot that sustained its neoliberal optimization. 
 
This chapter refers to the Opus Dei’s political project as a neoliberal 
optimization38 influenced by the ordoliberal thought and built upon the petrotoxic 
regime of criminality. In order to elaborate on that idea I will examine first the toxic 
																																																								
38 Already Foucault, in The Birth of Biopolitics thought of neoliberal governmentality as an optimization 
from previous regimes of power. Foucault explains that this was “a society in which there is an 
optimization of systems of difference, in which the field is left open to fluctuating processes, in which 
minority individuals and practices are tolerated, in which action is brought to bear on the rules of the 
game rather than on the players, and finally in which there is an environmental type of intervention 
instead of the internal subjugation of individuals” (2008: 259). As will become apparent in my analysis, 
the Francoist strong state as optimization followed a different pattern to the conclusions that Foucault 
put forward. 
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residual blindspot that sustained the technocratic project. This analysis follows in turn  
the examination of different positions that the “married woman” and the “national 
man,” occupied in this optimization. The chapter continues with an analysis of the 
most popular cinema. In mass consumed cinema the legal categories of the married 
woman and the national man met with dangerous states that inherited the petrotoxic 
paradigm. If legislation tried to preserve categories separated from each other, cinema 
blurred limits when decoding and encoding the discourses and images of the categories 
that surfaced in the law. This allowed spectators to potentially perform their own acts 
of decoding, through which, within the restrictions and conditions of petromodernity 
and the petrotoxic paradigm, they could distance themselves from the optimized 
Francoist political project.  
 
The Regime on a Petrotoxic Blind Spot  
It is the law’s reference to the concept of the margins of the  “población Española” 
‘Spanish population’ (1972: 8246) that allows us to access the realm of the petrotoxic 
regime of criminality in the form of a residual blind spot. For example, the 1972 law 
that approved the “III Plan de Desarrollo Económico y Social” (Third Plan of Economic 
and Social Development) explained that the term “population” was not representing 
every individual that inhabited the territory of the dictatorship. The “factores sociales del 
desarrollo” ‘social factors of development’ were measured with modern “indicadores de 
bienestar” (8246) ‘indicators of wellbeing’ but were not able to “reflejar todos los aspectos de 
la realidad social” ‘reflect every aspect of the social reality.’ One of those aspects that the 
indicators could not address was the “población de caracter marginal” ‘population of a 
marginal character.’  
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In this reference to the margins of the dictatorship the 1972 Development Plan 
that aimed to foster the population encountered the 1970 law of Social Danger, which 
aimed to punish it. The 1970 law defined the dangerous states by referring to the 
margins. Those categorized following the petrotoxic regime of criminality were the 
ones who “hayan podido quedar marginados de una vida ordenada y normal” ‘might have 
been marginalized from the ordered and normal life’ (Franco, 1970: 12552). The 1972 
Development Plan created a picture of the modern dictatorship by actively hiding the 
population in the margins from sight –these margins became a blind spot of the regime. 
Meanwhile, the 1970 law of Social Danger shed light on this blindspot by revealing its 
petrotoxic character. In this encounter, the petrotoxic blind spot was established as a 
necessity. The dictatorship’s plans for progress and development needed non-
recoverable prostitutes, homosexuals, beggars and the rest of dangerous states to be 
disposable.  
Ultimately, the Opus Dei’s technocrats built the sense of European modernity 
against this blind spot consisting of petrotoxic criminal residues. By concealing and 
still addressing this petrotoxic blind spot, the regime was able to elaborate input-
output tables offering “información estadístico-económica” ‘statistical-economical 
information39 (Franco, 1963: 18286). This statistical work showed the growth of the 
GDP and compared it with developed countries from the European Economic 																																																								
39 The Francoist success story was translated into numbers. The law presented input-output tables 
offering “statistical-economical information” referring to these issues and others. Child mortality was 
lower “35.5 por 1.000 niños menores de un año en 1960 a 20.7 en 1970” ‘35.5 for every 1000 children under one 
year old in 1960 to 20.7 in 1970’ (Franco, 1972: 8247); regarding illnesses, the law explained that there 
was a “Morbilidad cualitativamente diferente: prolongación de la edad media de vida, retroceso de enfermedades 
incurables, y aumento de accidentes en edades jóvenes” ‘qualitatively different morbidity: longer average life 
expectancy, decrease of incurable illnesses, increase of accidents in younger ages’ (8247). The living 
standard was presented through a multiplicity of signs, such as growth of the population, education, 
illiteracy, social mobility, hospitals, doctors per head of population, construction of households, and 
public infrastructure (8247-8251).  
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Community. The growth in average incomes and the reduction of the general 
unemployment were compared as well. For the first time, indicators such as child 
mortality, growth of the population, education, illiteracy, social mobility, hospitals, 
doctors per head of population, construction of homes and public infrastructure were 
accounted for in order to explain the alleged success of Francoist planning. Following 
the 1972 Plan of Development, “la economía española ha registrado […] un proceso de 
crecimiento sin precedentes. […] indica la transformación da una economía […] subdesarrollista 
en otra más industrializada y dinámica” ‘Spanish economy registered […] an 
unprecedented process of growth. […] It present[ed] a transformation from an 
economy of underdevelopment to a more industrialized and dynamic one’ (Franco, 
1972: 8249).  
If the crisis of underdevelopment was presented as being over, it was because 
those criminalized under the law of Social Danger inhabited a petrotoxic blindspot. As 
residues they were always present inside the dictatorship, they were disposable when 
exposed and at the same time, as made clear by the law of Social Danger, they were 
the evidence of the dictatorship’s Europeanization.  
 
The Exceptional Married Woman 
Against the new petrotoxic blindspot the technocratic optimization of the 
dictatorship maintained the previous aim to “liberar a la mujer casada del taller y de la 
fábrica” ‘free the married woman from the workshop and the factory’ (Franco, 1967: 
5255). This was still justified not only by referring to threats to the nation’s biological 
reproducibility and by constituting the woman’s body as a factory of production of 
nationalistic men –reasons which were established under the Falangist rule. Under the 
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technocratic optimization, the woman’s body also became the exception to an 
economized everyday life.  
Making sex an economic transaction, instead of an action for biological 
reproduction was the defining characteristic of the threat posed by petrotoxic 
dangerous states that entered the 1970 law of Social Danger. Female prostitutes, male 
prostitutes (who could be, by definition, only homosexual), porn-dealers and porn 
consumers were all figures that emerged in 1970. Thus, the failure of these new 
dangerous states lay not in the market economy principles they enacted, but in the 
threat to the essential moral values of the Catholic fundamentalist dictatorship.  
As explained in the previous chapter, the public sphere had been transformed 
into a public-economic order, imposing economic rationality on every social field. 
However, it was a woman’s own moral failing that would be made apparent if she 
made sex a market activity. The married woman could not be a market actor. This 
legal formulation comes to the forefront as a repetition of the proposals that the 
Francoist technocrat Calvo Serer formulated when agreeing with the Ordoloberal 
thinker Wilhelm Röpke. As Calvo Serer explained, the sign of the moral crisis of 
western societies, represented by the new dangerous states, was not the failure of the 
market, but the decline of the supporting social and moral framework –a decline that I 
have termed petrotoxic. 
 
Prostitutes operated as the point of contrast to married women. Certainly, 
prostitution had been regulated earlier under Franco,40 but the legal necessity to send 
																																																								
40 For a more extensive analysis on prostitution during the dictatorship, Aurora Morcillo’s extensive 
work on the situation of woman under Franco addresses extensively the formation of the category and 
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“los que habitualmente ejerzan la prostitución” ‘who commonly practice[d] prostitution’ 
(Franco: 12553), to reclusion and recovery  was part of the 1970 optimization of the 
technocratic dictatorship which added porn consumers and dealers to the sequence of 
criminal categories. For example, the 1956 decree-law “sobre abolición de centros de 
tolerancia y otras medidas relativas a la prostitución” (on the abolition of centres of tolerance 
and other measures related to prostitution) ordered the “clausura y desalojo” ‘closure and 
evacuation’ (Franco: 1617) of brothels, two years after the enforcement of the 
vagrancy law and a year before the Opus Dei technocrats took over the 
administration. Before then, the objective of the 1952 law “sobre organización y funciones 
del Patronato de Protección a la Mujer” (regarding the organization and functions of the 
Board for the Protection of Women) was the “regeneración de las mujeres caidas” 
‘regeneration of fallen women’ (Franco: 6272), some of which were prostitutes.  
Both the 1956 and the 1952 laws made the case for the protection of a Christian 
fundamentalist morality. As the 1956 law argued, the “la absoluta ilicitud de la prostitución 
ante la teologia moral y ante el mismo derecho natural ha de tener reflejo obligado en el 
ordenamiento positivo de una nación Cristiana” ‘absolute illicitness of prostitution in moral 
theology and in the natural law compulsorily needs to be reflected in the legal system 
of a Christian nation” (1617). However, the response of both laws was not the 
punishment of the woman, but instead they argued for the “protección de la moral social 
[…] y la dignidad de la mujer” ‘protection of social morality […] and the dignity of the 
woman’ (1956: 1617) and to “adoptar medidas protectoras […] [para] la dignificación moral 
de la mujer” ‘adopt measures of protection […] [for] the dignification of the morality of 																																																																																																																																																																					
the punishment of the prostitute. I have drawn the general ideas for my specific analysis from both her 
En Cuerpo y Alma (238, 242-244) and The Female Body and the Francoist Body Politic (chapter three “Fallen 
Women” and chapter six “Strangers in the Dark”). 
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women’ (1952: 6271). That is, like the fundamental laws of the dictatorship that aimed 
to free the woman, this time too, the “objetivo ultimo” ‘final objective’ was to accomplish 
the “redención de la mujer” ‘the redemption of the woman’ (1956: 1617), not from the 
factory however, but from her own misdesires. In other words, the woman had to be 
vaccinated from external contagious dangerous threats.  
Under the 1970 law of Social Danger it was the woman who could be exposed 
as a toxic residue. The 1970 law decreed that, given woman’s so-called moral natural 
desires, she needed to be freed from the factory and also from misdesiring. This meant 
punishing any female conduct that implied making those desires into an economic 
activity. Following the petrotoxic paradigm, the toxicity of the woman who became a 
market actor and traded with her sex had to be deemed worthy of revaluing or 
disposal. 
 
The married woman’s compulsory sexuality and sexual desire, as the exception 
to the necessary economization of every other social field, made women the guardians 
of a Christian morality that was, for the neoliberalized Francoist rationality, in crisis in 
western societies. Hence, the figure of the “married woman,” insofar as it preserved the 
natural Catholic morality and made the national spirit endure through biological 
reproduction, allowed for Catholic fundamentalist principles and neoliberal 






A Stakeholder in the Nation  
The Spanish national man became the central figure of economic 
entrepreneurialism, management of the self and investment in a financialized Francoist 
political project that assessed danger in term of valuation and disposal. This contrasted 
with the valuable body of the “married woman,” which became the realm for morally 
solving the (so-called by both technocrats and ordoliberals) social crisis of the west. 
The national man and his wife complemented each other in the Francoist political 
project. 
“Todo español es accionista de la empresa nacional del desarrollo” ‘every Spaniard is a 
stakeholder in the national enterprise of development’ (8268), explained the 1972 
Social Development Plan. As a “stake-holder” in the national project, the place that the 
Spanish national man occupied in the technocratic translation of global processes of 
financialization became clearer. As explained by the plan of Social Development, this 
financialized role of the man as a stake-holder aimed to create “cohesión social […] del 
modo más eficaz poslble” ‘social cohesion […] in the most efficient way’ (Franco, 1972: 
8245). It was this “every (male) Spaniard” who was situated at the economic center of 
the Francoist neoliberal project, while being defined against the petrotoxic blind spot 
of the ‘population of marginal character.’ The man’s conduct divided the petrotoxic 
residue from the Francoist entrepreneur. 
The Francoist technocratic regime did not distance itself from founding the 
dictatorship on the family unit like the Falangists did before. However, the family was 
not addressed as a monochromatic unit. This time it revolved around the conduct of 
the individualized man. As the Third Plan of Social Development made clear, this 
individualized man became a fully financialized subject as a stakeholder in both the 
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Europeanizing neoliberal modernity and the dictatorship’s Catholic rule. Men were 
stakeholders and the nation was an enterprise; hence, the attributes and desires of this 
Spanish national man were always, first and foremost, the attributes and desires of an 
investor.  
Home-ownership remained one of the distinctive ways for this man to invest in 
the nation. As explained in Part One this ended up as a wide-spread form of 
domination in the form of conduct domestication through mortgage ownership and 
debt. The optimization of the Social Development Plan insisted that it was “evidente que 
se está aún lejos de satisfacer la necesidad de viviendas destinadas a los sectores de menor capacidad 
económica” ‘obvious that we are still far from satisfying the necessity of homes for the 
sector with the lowest economic capacity’ (8263).  The law equated home-ownership 
with the notion of “clase media” ‘middle-class,’ and indebtedness with possession. In 
part, it was this entanglement of the privately built to-buy public housing that made 
the nation an “enterprise.” Likewise, this enterprise was transforming the Spanish 
indebted national man into a “stakeholder,” who was trying to fulfill his own 
constituting desire. The logic of domination that came with the production of 
indebtedness became constitutive of the optimized Francoist national project.  
 
On the Petrol Screen 
 In cinemas, men, women and dangerous states became entangled under the 
conditions of the petrotoxic paradigm. Below I examine first No Desearás al Vecino del 
Quinto (You Shall not Covet the Neighbor on the Fifth Floor, 1970), and the highbrow 
art-house drama Mi Querida Señorita (My Dearest Señorita, 1972), which situate at the 
center of their plot notions of petrotoxic criminality and pharmaco-pornographic 
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sexual deviancy. I also analyze the 1965 Historias de la Televisión (Television Stories) 
and the 1969 Las Leandras as two box office hits that paradigmatically dialogued with 
the optimized construction of the married woman, by interweaving it with ideas of a 
unified Europe that seamlessly included the dictatorship.  
All four films gather bodies that the law would categorize as “national man,” 
“married woman” and different “dangerous states.” All of their plots present what I 
have referred to as the petrotoxic blindspot of the dictatorship. The stories establish 
the potentiality of exposing the characters in the movies as toxic residues to be 
disposed of and condemned to the margins of society or revalued, which the different 
movies deal with in distinct ways. 
 
Sexual Deviancy  
Two contrasting huge box office hits are paradigmatic examples of the ways in 
which Spanish film productions reproduced the petrotoxic blind spot of residues that 
sustained the regime’s understanding of Francoist population. The crass screwball 
comedy No Desearás al Vecino del Quinto (You Shall not Covet the Neighbor on the Fifth 
Floor) took second place in the 1971 box office after Airport. Secondly, the highbrow 
art-house drama Mi Querida Señorita (My Dearest Señorita) reached eleventh position 
in the 1972 box office. 
 
Both films approached deviant sexualities, categorized by the law as 
homosexual, and made them dialogue with categories of the married woman and the 
national man. This representation differs from the monopolization of desires that the 
Falangists aimed to accomplish by means of censorship. This time, under the 
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administration of the Opus Dei technocrats, the films did not censor the homosexual 
body and desire; instead they staged the petrotoxic blind spot as what Eve Sedgwick 
theorized as the open secret space inhabited by sexual deviants. Films transformed the 
legal blind spot into a cinematic opent secret. 
Both movies begin by putting in place the structure of an open secret in which 
every spectator was able to identify and expose the toxic residue before it was named. 
The main characters are not labeled as gay, however they display visible and invisible 
markers that the social norm defined as homosexual. This is briefly what Sedgwick 
defined as the open secret structure of the glass closet,41 which informs the 
entanglement between ignorance and power, rather than knowledge and power.  
Sedgwick explains “the position of those who think they know something about 
one that one may not know oneself is an excited and empowered one” (80). In Both Mi 
Querida… and No desearás… we do not find a glass closet as such. There are not acts of 
coming out and outing. However, the open secret structure does function to make 
sense of the petrotoxic blind spot. The spectators as well as the characters of the films, 
apart from the protagonists who inhabit the inside of toxic blindspot, become part of 
this structure of the open secret. However, each one of the movies deals in different 
ways with this structure. 
No desearás al Vecino del Quinto establishes the blind spot of unexposed residues 
by bringing to the forefront two entrepreneurial men that work with women, in a 																																																								
41 Eve Sedgwick explains in Epistemology of the Closet, “in a culture where same-sex desire is still 
structured by its distinctive public/private status, at once marginal and central, as the open secret, 
discovers that the line between straining at truths that prove to be imbecilically self-evident, on the one 
hand, and on the other hand tossing off commonplaces that turn out to retain their power to galvanize 
and divide, is weirdly unpredictable. In dealing with an open-secret structure, it’s only by being 
shameless about risking the obvious that we happen into the vicinity of the transformative” (1990: 22). 
As we will se in the movies, the open secret structure became a fundamental tool to represent same-sex 
desire under Franco, for both conservative and transformative discourses.  
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provincial capital: Antón the tailor (Alfredo Landa) and Pedro the gynecolologist 
(Jean Sorel). The toxicity of the blind spot becomes the reason for their contrasting 
success in their enterprises. The straight, candid and handsome Pedro’s practice is 
empty. The other men in town do not trust their wives, daughters and their sisters to 
the hands of an attractive heterosexual Spanish man, even if he brings the most 
modern European techniques in his field to the clinic. Contrastingly, Antón’s shop is 
packed with women. His flowery jackets, hair ornaments, the little dog that he carries 
in his arms, and the stereotypically flamboyant voice and language set up the open 
secret toxicity preventing the other men from seeing him as a threat. Antón is 
presented at first as a toxic inhabitant of the blind spot, who has not been exposed as 
residue yet. 
From the beginning, the film inserts these two protagonists inside the frame of 
the arrival of modernity to the provincial world of old prejudices and traditions. 
Furthermore, the film reproduces, almost word for word, the idea explained in the law 
of Social Danger, that the homosexual is the sign of the regime’s European modernity. 
This parallelism takes place when Jacinta (Ira von Fürstenberg), Pedro’s young chaste 
fiancé (waiting to being married before getting naked in front of her husband) explains 
that the existence of “un tipo como Antón” ‘a guy like Antón’ in the municipality can only 
be understood by taking in to account the arrival of modernity. Antón’s toxicity 
surfaces as both the cure and poison of the regime’s modernization. 
 The comedy starts unfolding when the toxic but unexposed Antón, the 
neighbor on the fifth floor (that, as the title explains, shall not be coveted), asks Pedro 
to visit him in the apartment and check a sudden toothache. At this moment the threat 
shifts directions. Instead of the wives, daughters and sisters, it is Pedro’s masculinity 
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that is at risk once he enters in contact with Antón’s private space. Antón’s homosexual 
petrotoxicity is staged much like the dangerous substances, which following the law, 
could penetrate the skin involving serious and acute risks to life. Accordingly, in the 
film, Pedro’s contact with the skin of a homosexual body threatens his future marriage 
with Jacinta –it threatens Catholic marriage itself, one of the backbones of the social 
life of the Francoist dictatorship. Pedro and Jacinta’s families’ response to this toxic 
contact is to become suspicious, pray for his safety and get scandalized.  
The twist of the film comes halfway through the movie when Pedro attends a 
conference in Madrid, a symbol of modernity that, as explained by Pedro’s mother, is 
the place of temptation. At a nightclub, Pedro encounters Antón and the open secret 
structure shatters. However, it does not confirm the secret shared by spectators and 
characters of the film alike, but instead unveils the farce. In Madrid, Antón is a 
playboy enjoying non-commited sex with foreign women. At this point, the petrotoxic 
regime of criminality and the pharmaco-pornographic regime of sexuality, put forward 
by Preciado, converge.  
As Pedro joins Antón, Madrid’s modernity unfolds as the Spanish 
“pornotopia.”42 Borrowing Paul Preciado’s term, Madrid becomes a kind of an erotic 
utopia for Spanish national men, where their male sexuality is redefined in their 
appropriation of the domestic sphere. There, male sex ceases to be confined to its 
reproductive function commanded by Catholic morality.  																																																								
42 Preciado explains Playboy’s utopia as follows, “lo singular de la pornotopía que Playboy inventa y pone 
en marcha en los años cincuenta es que puede comportarse al mismo tiempo como un ‘contra-espacio,’ 
desafiando los modelos tradicionales de espacialización del poder que propone la casa heterosexual 
como núcleo de consumo y reproducción en la cultura americana durante los años cincuenta-sesenta, y 
como una espacialización de los regímenes de control sobre el cuerpo propios del emergente capitalismo 
farmacopornográfico” (2010: 129). For this dissertation I have used both the English and the Spanish 
versions of the text as they present significant differences. 
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This was only months after the 1970 law of Social Danger punished “material 
pornográfico” ‘porn’ and “los que promuevan el tráfico de cualquier material pornográfico” ‘porn 
dealers.’ Still, No Desearás… reproduced a multiplicity of pornographic commonplace 
markers established and disseminated since the 1950’s by Hugh Hefner’s Playboy 
magazine. The bachelor pad, the female playmate, the Playboy club, even the 
consumption of Plaboy magazine and the use of the dressing-gown, which identified 
with Hefner, surface across the cinematic geography of the modern Francoist city. 
The bachelor pad, Antón’s apartment in Madrid, expels the married woman 
from her traditionally assigned social sphere in order to become the male nightclub-like 
domestic realm of compulsory heterosexuality. There, a new sex-consumer capitalist 
masculinity detached from transcendental notions of a Catholic fundamentalist nation 
is manufactured. This bachelor pad allows the Spanish playboy not to be the “carrier 
of eternal values” of the nation any more. As Antón calls it, this apartment is a refuge. 
It becomes an extension of the club at home; it creates a domestic space for the man to 
cook breakfast dressed in a dressing-gown (like Hefner) or to read the current Playboy 
magazine on the sofa. It also becomes a tower from which he can spy on the girls living 
next door.  
Following Hefner’s pornotopia, the girls-next-door are presented as 
complementary figures of the consumerist capitalist playboy. However, as is made 
clear at the beginning of the movie, these complementary girls could be neither wives, 
nor daughters, nor sisters. Addressing any of these female categories as girls next door 
would make the Francoist woman into an economized subject, undermining the 
tecnocratic preservation of the woman’s body for Catholic biological reproduction. At 
this moment, No desearás… brings to the forefront the figure of the foreign woman such 
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as the Swedish air stewardess –“las Suecas.” It is hard to read these foreign women as 
real subjects. In the film they do not speak Spanish and barely any other language, 
they are passed from one man to another, and they do not have an agency of their own 
to decide if and who they want to have sex with. Following the structure set up by 
Playboy, the real subject of the movie is the male gaze. It is through the male gaze that 
everyday life is resexualized, represented in the movie by a phallic telescope used to 
spy on the foreign women.  
Finally, the nightclub, where the protagonists meet, operates very much like a 
Playboy club. It camouflages with modern interior design and disco music the 
connection that these consumer-client based spaces of erotic utopia have with the, at 
the time, illegalized brothels. The nightclub in the movie is presented as the extension 
of Antón’s apartment where sexual labor is transformed into unpaid male’s sexual 
entertainment with foreign modern women that lack any agency and where Francoist 
sovereign Catholic morality is suspended.  
All of the pornotopian elements mentioned above were sustained by the 
petrotoxic blind spot presented in the law and operated by further consolidating the 
capitalistic consumerist neoliberal side of the technocratic Europeanizing 
modernization of the Francoist regime. In the movie, the presence of all of these 
elements was made possible only by keeping the petrotoxic blind spot of unexposed 
residues in place. It was Antón’s unexposed residual toxicity that allowed him to enjoy 
Francoist neoliberal pornotopia. 
One final comedic twist, revealing that the playboy Antón is actually a married 
man with children, brings back the position of Catholic fundamentalist morality to the 
movie. It does so by returning to the figure of the married woman. Both Pedro’s fiancé 
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and Antonio’s wife get their husbands back by sneaking into the foreign women’s 
apartment and making their unsuspectiing husbands believe that they are the new 
foreign girls next door. The sexually arousing male fantasy brings their husbands back 
to them. To put it another way, the movie is resolved when the married woman, the 
exception to the neoliberal economization of every social field and the keeper of 
Catholic compulsory biological reproducibility, takes on the erotic characteristics of 
the playboy’s playmate, the consumerized erotic entertainment lacking any agency. 
Here too, it was the potential petrotoxicity of the married woman that sustains her 
Catholic reason of being.  
This was a non-conflictive ending that entangled Catholic fundamentalist 
morality and the neoliberal economization of every social field. It was an ending in 
which the unexposed petrotoxic criminality of residues operated as the constitutive 
blindspot of Francoist modernity. The film ends by both Antón and Pedro deciding to 
maintain the farce of the homosexual open secret. It is their potential residual 
character that allows them to economically sustain their entrepreneurial activities, 
which reproduces the cure-poison duplicity of petroleum byproducts. Like pesticides, 
plastics and dangerous states, Antón and Pedro reproduce the doublebind relationship 
in which they are perceived as toxic and life threatening to Francoist masculinity, and 
at the same time, their deviance is necessary to keep their economic activity thriving 
insofar as they do not present a risk for the married or marrying women.  
 
Mi Querida Señorita followed No Desearás… in the representation of a petrotoxic 
deviant sexuality. In this film too, at first sight, the main character would be 
categorized as homosexual in the law. Similarly, both films fulfill a journey from a 
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provincial town to the capital city of Madrid –from the traditional Falangist Spain to 
technocratic modernity. In Mi Querida Señorita too, it was in the modern world that the 
toxic element could be exposed as a residue voicing the open secret. However, this 
time the film produces a different outcome.  
Like in No Desearás… the film sets up the glass closet structure at its opening 
sequence. Different photographs show the recognizable face of the (at the time) 
famous actor José Luis López Vázquez inhabiting a female body. The female body 
with the recognizable male’s face gets older with every picture until the present day of 
the movie. López Vázquez is the protagonist, Adela, a respected 43-year-old single 
woman living in a small town. 
Adela’s toxic abnormality is increasingly introduced but not named (exposed) 
in the first fifteen minutes of the movie. First she is referred to as a “adefesio” ‘hideous’ 
woman. Then she displays unusual strength when kicking a football. Finally the 
spectator sees her shaving in front of the mirror. Significantly, this open secret 
structure is placed, like in No Desearás…, in a provincial municipality where modernity 
and tradition clash. Priests act as referees in soccer matches and young girls wear short 
skirts and colorful bellbottoms. Returning marines salute the Francoist flag and older 
women dress with traditional black peinetas and mantilla veils.  
The act of exposing the residual character of the petrotoxic element as the open 
secret follows the path from a traditional setting to a modern environment. Adela’s first 
resource for solace is religion. However, her reality is finally revealed by science. First, 
she talks with the priest confessing that she is not a “normal” woman, revealing that 
she shaves, explaining that she never felt sexually attracted to men, but that, “of 
course,” she had never been sexually active with women either. The priest 
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recommends Adela to visit a doctor, shifting the power and knowledge relationship 
imposed in confession to the one instituted between doctor and patient. In the clinic 
there are no questions, instead she comes out from a test-room to hear the truth from 
the doctor, who concludes that Adela has a pathology of both mind and body, which 
even if it is “not a serious condition,” needs to go through a simple intervention. As an 
illness of both body and mind, this medical study brings to the film the term bio-
psycho-pathological that could be found in the law of Social Danger. Like the law, the 
filmic reference to the intervention points to a pharmacological procedure of hormonal 
treatment at a molecular level and surgery. Thus in this movie, we see the 
pharmacologic side of the pharmaco-pornographic regime being represented on the big 
screen. Following this logic, it is the doctor who exposes the open secret: Adela is not a 
woman. 
The next time the spectator sees Adela he is already Juan. He has already gone 
through the process of revaluation. The ellipsis between the medical production of 
truth effects and the violent making of the male body is staged in the film with a train 
coming out from a tunnel. In this ellipsis the post-WWII pharmaceutical society has 
worked its magic. This undoing of the open secret structure and exposure of the 
petrotoxic blind spot perpetuates a binary separation of gender insofar as the subject 
has been defined as a man at the molecular level of the hormone. It showcases the 
violent reinforcement of the older categories of sex that took place during the 1950s, 
that Preciado examins in their work.43 We see the perpetuation of the sex-binary 
																																																								
43 Paul Preciado traces the formation of the term “gender” and its relationship with the concept “sex.” 
Preciado argues, “to the rigid nineteenth-century categorizations of sex, John Money opposed the 
malleability of gender, using social and biochemical techniques. When he used gender as a name for ‘social 
role’ or ‘psychological identity,’ he was essentially thinking of the possibility of using technologies […] 
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system in the revaluation of Adela’s residual toxicity into a non-toxic Juan. 
At first, the film presents the congested modern city as a territory for Juan to 
inhabit anonymously, offering him a chance to start over. However, soon the urban 
space becomes a place of marginalization. Juan, educated to be a married woman, 
cannot find a job. Having his bank accounts under the name of Adela, he cannot access 
them in order to become an entrepreneurial man. Even his body performs woman after 
a life of disciplining mechanisms.  
Through these scenes the film presents the life of the criminal residue trying to 
come out of the margins of society –inhabited by residues. To put it another way, 
against the petrotoxic paradigm, even the revalued Juan looses all his value. As a new 
man he is not an indebted Spanish national man who is in part of the market, and 
neither he is a reproductive married woman preserving morality. The work of 
revaluation becomes a question. Is Juan a recoverable toxic substance able to return to 
the public-economic order, or is he a non-recoverable toxic residue that needed to be 
isolated and disposed of.  
Unable to fully perform as a man, Juan decides to behave as a woman and sew 
in secrecy to earn a living. At this point, the movie displays this secret space of 
unexposed residues. The constitutive petrotoxic blinds pot of the Francoist “we” comes 
to the surface. The film indicates that Juan can only strive and become part of the 
																																																																																																																																																																					
to modify the body or to produce subjectivity intentionally in order to conform to a preexisting visual 
and biopolitical order, which was prescriptive for what was supposed to be a female or male human 
body” (2013:100). However, Money’s first approach did not get consolidated as the one sanctioned by 
the scientific community, “instead of collectively producing an alternative (multimorphic) epistemology 
for understanding bodies and desires, the 1950s medical, biological, and political discourses decided to 
directly intervene within the structures of living beings to artificially construct sexual dimorphism using 
surgical, prosthetic, and hormonal techniques supported by the pharmacological, medical, and food 
industries” (104). Mi querida Señorita moves in between these two positions with respect to sex and 
gender. 
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normal and legal definition of the Spanish population by embracing petrotoxicity. 
While struggling to come to terms with a medical-pharmacological decision 
imposed into his body, Juan encounters two women in the city. In these encounters 
yet another open secret structure is set up. In this case the shared open secret is that 
the spectators know that the revalued Juan used to be the residual Adela. However 
neither do Feli (Monica Randall), a prostitute that shares a hostel with Juan on his 
arrival to Madrid, nor Isabelita (Julieta Serrano), Adela’s maid in the provincial town 
with an intense affective attachment to her, who later becomes a bartender in the city.  
Feli, as a prostitute, is herself a toxic dangerous state. As such, she shares space 
in the secret underworld of unexposed residues of Francoist society. In this 
underworld that they cohabit, Feli becomes Juan’s nonjudgmental ally, lending him 
money when needed. However, this alliance between different dangerous states that 
inhabit the constitutive blind spot of the regime put forward by the law is interrupted 
in cinema when, instead, the romantic love story unfolds with Isabelita.  
The film builds up to a happy ending by recovering Juan institutionally, 
parallel to the love story. Juan decides to go to school and become educated through 
the dictatorhip’s institutional apparatus. Meanwhile he manages to get a hold of his 
past possessions and decides to become indebted with a ten-year mortgage on an 
apartment, fulfilling the “natural aspiration” of the man to own.  
In the end, Juan is unable to have sex with the prostitute Feli –hence 
preserving the woman’s body as the place for biological reproduction. Instead, he 
makes love with Isabelita. In this final scene, presented with another ellipsis, the movie 
ends by undoing the second open secret sturcture, when Isabelita reveals that she was 
aware of Juan’s revalued toxicity, and calls him “my dearest Señorita” asserting the 
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recoverability of the residual dangerous states. 
  
In No Desearás al Vecino del Quinto and Mi Querida Señorita the modern city 
appears, in the former, as a pornotopia, and in the latter, as the space for 
pharmacological intervention. Both mass consumed filmic representations, together, 
offer the very particular form that the Euro-American pharmaco-pornographic regime 
of sexuality took on when it became entangled with the Francoist sovereign regime, 
and its petrotoxic regime of criminality. The allocation of subject positions that was 
singular to the regime occurs under conditions of petrotoxicty, sustaining the 
dictatorship’s project of the strong state and the neoliberal optimization of the 
Falangist violence performed by the technocrats.  
Within this frame, both films perpetuated, to certain extent, the Francoist 
political project. In No Desearás… the eroticized girl next door could not be a national 
woman. The Spanish playmate could not be a sister, a wife or a mother. That is why, 
under Franco, the pornographic next door was inhabited by foreign women. The 
figure of the foreign Swedish woman in No Desearás… dialogued with the dictatorship’s 
necessity to bring European capitalist modernity into the territory, while safeguarding 
untouched Catholic fundamentalist morality. A similar logic is presented in Mi 
Querida… when the priest’s religious faith and the scientific production of truth of the 
physician are presented as being in a convivial relationship. The film established 
connections between a Catholic dictatorship and the discourses of scientific and 
economic progress. This encounter stands out as a particularly technocratic formula of 
the time.  
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Film reviews too offered a decoding of the movie that reproduced the 
dictatorship. A review explained that No Desearás… discovered in the city “un 
sinvergonzón que se hace pasar por invertido, cuando en realidad es un juerguista y un empedernido 
mujeriego” ‘a cheeky individual that passed himself off as inverted, when in reality he 
[was] a partier and a womanizer’ (A.M.T, 1971: 47). This passage presupposed a 
relationship of sympathy towards the “cheekiness” of the protagonist, while saturating 
the category “inverted” with shame. The  “las carcajadas de los espectadores, ruidosas y 
frecuentes” ‘the guffaws of the spectators, loud and frequent’ made clear the success of 
the comic revelation of the open secret structure. We see how Crumbaugh’s notion of 
“totalitarian laughter” becomes pertinent again with No Desearás… when Antón, the 
short, chubby and unattractive playboy parodies the long lasting popular figure of the 
“Macho Ibérico” ‘Iberian macho.’ This was a parody of one of the central figures of the 
masculinity of the dictatorship. Convincingly, Crumbaugh argues that even if the 
parody of the dictatorship’s central figures, such as the Iberian male, might have a 
subversive appearance, in reality it fostered “a more deeply ingrained identification 
with official ideology” (110). The parody becomes totalizing when laughter at the 
deviant behavior in the provincial capital is revealed to be a successful market strategy 
of an entrepreneur. This was a cynical laughter, which gave endurance to Falangist 
anti-modern positions that were meant to be outdated in the technocratic modernity by 
giving them a façade of trangression.44 
 																																																								
44 Justin Crumbaugh (2009) and Barry Jordan (2003, 2004, 2005) have extensively analyzed Spanish 
film comedies produced under Franco. Jordan points to the ambivalence of these films adopt “on the 
one hand, it offers a fairly sympathetic portrayal of the effeminate gay stereotype, but it is forced to 
counter this with the device  of  the   deus  ex  machina,  involving  mafioso  Corleone  and  an absurdly  
violent  reimposition  of  fascist  order” (2005: 102).  
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Unsurprisingly, reviews of Mi Querida Señorita aimed to shut down the 
uncertainty and ambivalence of the movie mentioned above.  Instead, they reinforced a 
binary pathologizing division of the protagonist’s gender and sexuality. An opinion 
article described Mi querida…’s main character, Doña Adela, as a “bien considerada 
solterona que vive en una pequeña población de provincias” ‘respected spinster living in a small 
town’ (A.M.T, 1972: 54). The shaming and sexist term “solterona” ‘spinster’ was 
followed by the explanation of the biological side of the pathology as Adela, “desde muy 
joven ha sentido trastornos muy extraños. […] a partir de los 17 años le ha nacido barba, y tiene, 
secretamente, que afeitarse” ‘felt very strange disorders since very young […] she had 
bear since she was 17 and had to shave in secret.’ Then, the particular deviation was 
further made clear by insisting on the psychological side of the pathology as Doña 
Adela “siente repulsión física –pero no moral ni social– hacia los hombres, y admira tímidamente 
a las mujeres; sobre todo si son bonitas” ‘felt physical (neither moral, nor social) repulsion 
of men while she timidly admired women, especially if they were pretty.’ The review 
ended by reinforcing the violent truth production into gender categories, “la verdad  
estalla […] Doña Adela no es una mujer” ‘the truth exploded […] Doña Adela was not a 
woman.’ Another journalist reiterated this violent pharmacological production of sex 
when he summarized the film, amid laughter, during a showing of a selection of 
Spanish movies in the URSS. He joked about Mi Querida… by referring to the title of 
another Spanish movie,  “aunque la hormona se vista de seda” ‘you can put lipstick on a 
hormone…’ (Jordan, 1973: 49). This episode showcases the capacity and insistence 
that performative repetitions had to perpetuate the dictatorship’s technocratic 
scaffolding by making it part of the Euro-American political and social 
transformations. For these reviews, Doña Adela and her hormones affixed an allegedly 
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natural preexisting western order of the division of the sexes and, in the case of Spain, 
their particular Francoist desires.  
 
However, perpetuation and reproduction of the regime was not all that the film 
allowed. Underlying these Francoist appropriations and translations of the 
pharmacological and the pornographic realms, the films offer access to the constitutive 
blind spot of toxic elements that have not been exposed as residues yet. Whilst the film 
repeated the dictatorship’s more normative positions, it also opened up places for 
ambivalence, making room for acts of survival decodings. As Sally Faulkner argues, 
the film falls “somewhere in-between […] the film’s ‘biting criticism’ in political terms, 
and […] it's failure in feminist terms” (146). For example, when Juan had to secretly 
use the knowledge he learnt as Adela to make it as a man in the modern urban space, 
this allowed for a questioning of the rigid notions of the Francoist categorization of 
subjects. Similarly, the access to the petrotoxic blind spot did not lead to the realm of 
dangerous subjects. Instead the spectator encountered a zone where criminal residues 
endured and allied in uncertain categories. Even if the law presented the Francoist 
order as a perfect order, like a machine in which different figures assembled as 
connecting but separate elements, popular culture messed up this flawlessly arranged 
engine. Petrotoxic bodies could respond neither to the assigned gender nor to their 
assigned functions in society. By using the same petromodernity that bolstered the 





Economized Women  
In 1969, Las Leandras restored the Cinderella motif of development years, which 
I have addressed in one of its first forms with the analysis in Part One of the 1955 
Congreso en Sevilla (Congress in Seville). Las Leandras brought to this motif a dialogue 
with Francoist neoliberal rationality, which drew connections with another mass 
consumed film that situated a female character as the main protagonist. This was the 
1965 Historias de la Televisión (Television Stories). Both movies were remakes of former 
Spanish productions. Las Leandras, was a screwball comedy that became the fourth 
most watched movie in 1969 and was based on a 1930s play of the same name.  
Historias… was the sequel to of the 1955 Historias de la Radio (Radio Stories), which 
became an immediate success and a long selling cinematic production. In both films the 
figure of the Spanish woman and petrotoxic categories such as the prostitute and the 
common beggar became entangled in the same storylines. Following the logic 
established by Congreso en Sevilla, the entanglements in these movies portrayed the 
relationship between the dictatorship and Europe. This time around this relationship 
was taking place under conditions of petrotoxicity. 
In Historias de la Television, the unmarried female character of Katy (Concha 
Velasco) impersonated in 1965 the paradigmatic neoliberal subject. The gap between 
the marrying woman’s modernity and the married woman’s Catholic duty for 
biological reproduction became significantly more noticeable under technocratic rule. 
Responding to neoliberal optimization, Katy adopts a self-entrepreneurial, indebted 
and self-investing capitalist philosophy of life. As the gifted and hard working lead-
singer of a pop band from a small Spanish town, she had to invest in herself in order to 
sing her own songs in the capital city of Madrid. The other side of the coin to Katy’s 
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narrative is presented with the story of Felipe Carrasco (Tony Leblanc), a good-for-
nothing son who thinks of himself as “concursista” (someome who aims to make a living 
from going to television game shows) and that as a result of his poor performances in 
TV programs, gets into debt, putting his father’s wellbeing at risk.  
The storylines of the two main protagonists get entangled with the character of 
Don Marcelino (Antonio Garisa), a loan shark that both Katy and Felipe become 
indebted to. This loan shark makes them participate together in yet another game show 
in order to be able to pay back their debts with comical results. What is actually at 
stake in this game show is the exposition of the main character’s residual toxicity. After 
her unsuccessful appearance in television and unable to pay back her debts, the loan 
shark threatens Katy with reporting her to the authorities. Her petrotoxicity is 
exposed and could result in her being legally declared bankrupt, a non-recoverable 
residue that took the name of “mendigo habitual” (common beggar) or “vago habitual” 
(common vagrant).  
Tatjana Pavlovic argues that this film “captures the Spain’s tumultuous passage 
to modernity with its discourse of progress and consumerism that is both inscribed into 
and problematized” (89). As explained by Pavlovic, in the movie modernity appears 
tied “to the consumer frenzy and the emergence of the generacíon ye-yé (pop music 
generation) with concomitant rise of a star system.” In the end, this technocratic 
neoliberal modernization of the dictatorship operated on top of the petrotoxic blind 
spot by making every citizen potentially toxic.  
The film’s version of the happy ending comes infused with debt acquisition. It is 
a bank director, Ricardo Elósegui (Tomás Blanco), who saves Katy. However, being 
saved in this film means not only to have paid back the loan-shark, but also to be tied 
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to a significantly bigger credit and getting a contract for her next ten music albums. 
Indebtedness was presented as not only unavoidable but desirable. This was the 
dictatorship’s way of economic revaluation of toxic residues. 
In this act of revaluation, the opposition between the recoverable self-managed 
conducts of the entrepreneurial hard-working Katy and the non-recoverable 
incompetent Felipe is mirrored with the antagonism created between the banker 
Ricardo Elósegui and the loan shark Don Marcelino. In other words, the apparent 
selflessness of Ricardo Elósegui, part of the technocratic elite of the newly reformed 
financial institutions of the regime, contrasts with the selfishness and predatory 
practices of the non-regulated loan shark Don Marcelino.  
Due to technocratic “selflessness,” toxic debt becomes part of Katy’s 
identificatory modern traits, like her popular music tendencies. This formation of a 
new kind of subjectivity, for Pavlovic, “becomes an allegory for the profound changes 
that the country itself was experiencing,” which also reveals “the problematic and 
contradictory role of women”(102). As an unmarried woman who, until she gets 
married, is permitted to work under the technocratic optimization of the dictatorship, 
Katy’s forms of modern self-representation allow the spectators to renegotiate the 
enduring Catholic fundamentalist conception of women, opening up spaces for 
emotional survival. Even if Katy, still unmarried, became a figure of Spanish capitalist 
modernity and a self-entrepreneurial subject, once married her natural and moral duty 
would inevitably become to biologically reproduce the nation. During this stage prior 
to marriage, the body of the woman became, in the film, the contested space for 
decoding survival or submission. 
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The story of Las Leandras creates a narration led by two women that are 
misrecognized as a prostitute and a woman who runs the brothel. The movie was part 
of the so-called “Viejo Cine Español” (Old Spanish Cinema), which as explained by 
Nuria Triana-Toribio “is still dismissed by most critics as static, conformist and 
reactionary entertainment cinema” (75). Las Leandras was the most successful box-
office hit among other movies that fell into the category of “pre-marriage comedies and 
musicals.” As examined by Jorge Pérez, “Rocío Durcal embodied a specific type of 
Cinderella of the Development years, modern yet decent, usually of low class origins, 
and who can move up in society through marriage if she proves her qualities (purity 
being the most important one)” (139). This Cinderella recipe seemed exhausted by the 
time that Las Leandras reached to the movie theaters. Against the approaches that 
perceive this mass consumed film as a static cultural object, Las Leandras allow us to 
pin down the optimization that the Cinderella motif went through under conditions of 
petrotoxicity. 
In this movie, the separation between the women whose life the law aimed to 
foster, and the women who inhabited the petrotoxic blind spot becomes blurred from 
the start. The seventeen-year-old Patricia (Rocio Durcal) runs away from a boarding 
school in London to go back to Spain and see her mother Rosa (Celia Gámez), a 
forgotten vedette who lost all her money. Together they elaborate a plan. They decide 
to deceive Patricia’s wealthy uncle into her inheriting his dowry, saving the mother’s 
vedette company, and the mother’s exposition as toxic residue. In order to accomplish 
their objective, mother, daughter and the women in the dance company take over a 
modern boarding school aiming to make the uncle believe that Patricia is back to her 
studies, which is his condition for keeping the niece in his will. Comedy is triggered 
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when men mistake the false boarding school with a brothel.   
Three kinds of men inhabit Las Leandras.  The Spanish man with old Falangist 
money is the first one. The second type of man is the antimodern Spaniard. Finally, the 
film presents the modern European man. Significantly, the ideal “national man,” 
entrepreneur of himself, responsible debtor and stakeholder in the national project is 
nowhere to be seen.  
The wealthy uncle owns banana plantations and is the figure of the pre-
technocratic oligarchic power of the dictatorship. This man does not live in the 
modernizing city but in the Canary Islands –an archipiealgo in the fringes of the 
Spanish territory off the coast of Morocco. He is presented as unable to understand 
the young main character’s modernizing force. 
Every other Spanish national man in the film is presented as the anti-modern 
figure of the rural “paleto” –as derogatory and with similar connotations to the 
American term “hillbilly.” As explained by Luis Moreno Caballud, after the rural areas 
had been ravaged during the war and the peasants were forced to migrate to the city, 
the paleto became “one of the main counter-models of the modern Spanish imaginary, 
and probably remains so even today” (46). This man is ridiculed in the film as he feels 
misplaced in modern Madrid and misbehaves parodically. Two of them, Tío Paco 
(Antonio Garisa) and Casildo (Alfredo Landa) arrive to Madrid from a small town in 
Salamanca and confuse the boarding school with a brothel and Patricia with a 
prostitute. The poor rural inhabitant of the regime doe not fit in the Francoist project 
of modernity. 
The British citizen Robert Wilson (Jeremy Bulloch) represents the last kind of 
man. He is a young and attractive English teacher that comes from Europe to educate 
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the Spaniards. He is hired to give classes in the state-of-the-art school taken over by 
the protagonists. In the absence of any national man that could become a stake holder 
in the Francoist project, the European man is the romantic prospect for the main 
character, Patricia.   
Between these three men, the ownership of Patricia’s body is contested, as if 
she were the national body. As argued by Morcillo (2010) the woman’s body and the 
body politic of the dictatorship merged. Patricia is to be possessed either through the 
oligarch’s old Falangist money; by making her part of the inmoral sex-for-money 
transaction proposed by the Spanish men unable to adapt to modernity; or through the 
romantic love of the civilized European educator who brings modernity into the 
territory. The love story unfolds amid comedic confusions between Robert and 
Patricia. Disoriented by the Spanish paletos, Robert needs to make sure that Patricia is 
not an unexposed toxic prostitute.  
In the union between the Spanish entrepreneurial non-toxic Patricia and the 
modern European Robert the ownership of the married woman’s body becomes the 
terrain where the Spanish underdevelopment crisis appears to be solved. The happy 
ending of the movie is the result of the union between European male modernity and 
the marrying woman’s entrepreneurialism and preservation of Catholic morality. This 
is the film’s proposal for a neoliberal solution to the Spanish crisis of 
underdevelopment, which ended up in a romantic Catholic capitalist entanglement 
with Europe. 
Even within the extremely constraining determining conditions of the 
neoliberal dictatorship, the film allowed for acts of decoding for emotional survival. 
Triana-Toribio for example, explains that the film does “not present their protagonists 
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solely obsessed with appearance and ways of catching a man. This makes them 
different in their sexual ideology from the romantic comedies of the late 1950s” (76). 
Pérez agrees and follows up with this line of thought when he expresses that “Las 
jóvenes españolas podían soñar con copiar el ‘look Rocío Dúrcal’, […] con la posibilidad de 
transgredir los niveles de decencia del modelo [Franquista] recortando sus faldas por encima de las 
rodillas” (96) ‘young women could dream about copying the ‘Rocío Dúrcal look,’ […] 
with the possibility to transgress the levels of decency of the [Francoist] model by 
cutting their skirts over their uncles.’ Both authors stress on the potential that this kind 
of movies unlocked for women to fantasize about slightly alternative realities, in which 
they were just little freer. 
However, the reception in the press of these films repeated decodings that 
consolidated the technocratic optimization of the Europeanizing dictatorship. They 
showcased the way the dictatorship’s newspapers decoded the films mentioned above. 
In the case of Historias de la Televisión, the reviews referred to comedy and laughter. 
“Hacer reír en grande a los espectadores” ‘making the spectators laugh out loud’ (A.M.T, 
1965: 29) was the way the regime’s sanctioned cinema could “mantener a todos, en un 
estado de complacencia que oscila entre la risa y la sonrisa” ‘keep everyone in a state of 
complacency that oscillated between laughter and a smile.’ This appears to be another 
exemplary case of “totalitarian laughter.” This laughter “allowed spectators to join in 
the arbitrary and inconsequential suspension of authority. Parody let spectators in on 
the perverse game of exposing the emptiness of authority without questioning it as 
such” (110). By situating the woman’s body at the center of mass cinema, comedy 
allowed the spectators’ lasting desires for wellbeing to receive a normalizing response 
of complacency and identification with official Francoist ideology. 
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A review explained to the reader that Las Leandras brought a typical Spanish 
musical theatre from the 1930’s to contemporary cinema by “modernizing” the songs. 
Between theater and cinema there had been “una completa variación en la mentalidad de las 
gentes” ‘a complete variation in the mindsets of the people’ (Tarin Iglesias, 1969: 55). 
Drawing a comparison with Congreso en Sevilla examined in Part One, this time the 
main female character did not seduce the foreigner through nationalist folkloric 
appropriations, but instead did so by entrepreneurial “modernization” and the 
revaluation of the old. This was how Europe would fall in love with the dictatorship.  
The review continued this train of thought by hinting at the way Las Leandras 
showcased the end of the crisis of the dictatorship, “hay [en la película] una especie de 
filosofía de la vida que demuestra bien claro cómo se han borrado barreras que parecían 
insalvables” ‘[in the film] there is a kind of philosophy of life that demonstrates clearly 
that seemingly insurmountable barriers have been erased.’ Indeed, the barrier that 
separated the dictatorship from Europe is erased with the love affair between Robert 
and Patricia.  
The philosophy of life that stemmed from this filmic encounter of romantic love 
was neoliberal modernity built on top of the petrotoxic blind spot put forward by the 
law. The toxic sexuality of the economized prostitute was the model against which the 
Catholic fundamentalist capitalism of the technocratic Francoist dictatorship defined 
itself. Surely, as I will examine in the next final chapter, this was the same solution that 








In this chapter I focus on the intellectual network established by three 
European thinkers that spoke from different positions. I argue that, under conditions 
of petrotoxicity, their discourses found a preliminary solution to the south-north divide 
made apparent in Part One of the dissertation. The three interlocutors are Alexandre 
Kojève, Carl Schmitt and Manuel Fraga Iribarne.  
The former two create a bridge with Part One of the dissertation and allow us 
to identify the transformations suffered by the European political project under the 
new petrotoxic paradigm. The last, Fraga Iribarne, was appointed minister of 
Information and Tourism in 1962, and since then, even with outspoken disparities with 
the Opus Dei, became one of the most prominent political voices of the neoliberal 
regime built by the technocrats and also of the coming democratic state. In these 
dialogues the inheritance of the petrotoxic paradigm did not take place so much in the 
form of semantic spillages but as an inheritance for consideration of the European 
“we,” of a rationality of toxicity, economization, revaluation and disposal. 
 The exchange of ideas examined bellow runs parallel to the administrative 
transformations that took place in Europe between 1957 and 1970. As explained in the 
introduction, 1957 was the year that the Treaty of Rome was signed, establishing the 
European Economic Community (EEC) and the European Atomic energy 
(EURATOM). 1957 was also the year the Opus Dei technocrats took over the 
administration of the dictatorship. Once the treaties were signed, reports from the 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the Organisation for 
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European Economic Co-operation, in 1959 and 1963 respectively, encouraged the 
addition of the Francoist dictatorship into the new European administrative, economic 
and political union. The Francoist administration followed with a succession of plans 
of stabilization and economic development. Finally, in 1964 the European commission 
and the regime opened conversations deciding to establish by 1970 a Preferential 
Commercial Agreement that would progressively eliminate barriers between the two 
entities.  
In 1970, just over a month apart from each other, two laws acknowledged the 
transformation of the European north-south relationship. Firstly, the Preferential 
Agreement at the end of June, established the early form of the Spanish accession to a 
modern developed European unification. Secondly, as examined in Chapter Five, the 
enforcement of the law of Social Danger at the beginning of August acknowledged the 
Europeanness and modernity of the dictatorship by pointing out that the dangerous 
states exposed by the law appeared also in developed countries. Thus, in 1970, the end 
of the Dictatorship’s underdevelopment crisis was declared twice. 
In the intellectual dialogues, which span from the late 1950s to the early 1960s, 
the dissemination and penetration of the petrotoxic paradigm precedes both the 
enforcement of the 1970 Francoist of Social Danger with its petrotoxic regime of 
criminality and the Preferential Agreement allowing the dictatorship initial access to 
administrative Europe. For that reason I address this intellectual network as the 
theoretical groundwork that preceded the production of the texts that came 
afterwards, succeeding in declaring the Francoist dictatorship and the European 
project for unification part of the same economic, administrative and spiritual unit. 
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When analyzing these intellectual dialogues I will focus on two aspects. Firstly, 
I introduce the ways that the three authors became interconnected by addressing the 
manner in which the petrotoxic paradigm and the world of oil informed their 
discourses. Secondly, I point to the elements in their texts that resolved, by inheriting 
traits of the petrotoxic paradigm, the south-north divide of Europe in the form of 
acceptance of a Catholic fundamentalist capitalism. 
 
Three Intellectuals on the Residual South  
Alexandre Kójeve’s, Carl Schmitt’s and Manuel Fraga’s political projects for 
both Europe and the Francoist dictatorship dialogued with and referred to each other. 
They created a triangle of influences that messily reverberated in different social 
spheres. Alongside the technocratic rule of the dictatorship, the connection between 
Kojève and Schmitt became unambiguously personal, as they maintained a friendship 
through correspondence. From 1955 to 1960, these two European political voices 
discussed the new nomos of the earth, agreed on the Hegelian understanding of the 
state, shaped each other’s thought, and solved their disagreements in a polite, 
intellectual manner.45 
Schmitt’s and Fraga’s friendship too became explicitly personal in 1962.46 That 
year Fraga became a full member and Schmitt an honorary member of the Spanish 
																																																								
45 For further reading regarding Kojève and Schmitt’s relationship, both personal and intellectual 
Robert Howse’s and Erik de Vries’s work offer extended analyses on the issue. Howse’s critical reading 
of their relationship through correspondence argues, “Kojève would appear to break away from his 
dependence on the Schmittean conception of the ‘political’ as constituted by violent struggle against a 
political enemy; nevertheless in the correspondence with Schmitt ten years later he reaffirms his 
agreement with Schmitt on the meaning of ‘political’ and of the ‘state’, disagreeing only on whether the 
political in this sense has any future” (2006: 102).  
46 Justin Crumbaugh (2009), Luisa Elena Delgado (2014) and Lena Tahmassian (2012) too have given 
account about this close relationship between Manuel Fraga and Carl Schmitt. 
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Royal Academy of Moral and Political Sciences. It was Fraga who gave the welcome 
address for the induction as a member of Schmitt –his “noble amigo” ‘noble friend’ 
(1962: 5). While both presented in the Auditorium of the “Instituto de Estudios Políticos” 
(Institute of Political Studies). Fraga was followed by a lecture of the German jurist, 
who made reference to his “amistad y […] vinculación sinceras” ‘friendship and […] 
sincere connection’ (1962:19) with the Spanish intellectual.47  
The relationship between Fraga and Kojève closes this circle of influences. This 
affiliation took place through references in their work. Kojève aimed to solve the 
problems of southern poor Catholic Mediterranean countries that reached maturity, 
such as Spain. Meanwhile, Fraga engaged with the work of Robert Schuman, the 
president of the lobbying association “European Movement” and one of Kojève’s 
frontbenchers for France’s work on Europe.48  
The connections between the three intellectuals led to the production of various 
texts, which I examine in this chapter. These texts are Kojève’s 1957 lecture 
“Colonialism from a European Perspective,” Schmitt’s 1963 book Theorie des Partisanen 
(Theory of the Partisan), and Fraga’s book La Guerra y la Teoría del Conflicto Social (War 
and the theory of Social Conflict) and his lecture “Forma Política de la Unidad Europea” 
(Political Form of the Unity of Europe).49  
																																																								
47 Fraga’s address and Schmitt’s lecture were later published as “Carl Schmitt: el Hombre y la Obra” 
and “El Orden del Mundo Después de la Segunda Guerra Mundial” in 1962. 
48 The front and backbencher relationship between Schuman and Kojève is made apparent in 
Christopher Kletzer’s text when he explains that Bernard Clappier, Kojève and Olivier Wormser 
formed a strong alliance in the French central government, while at the same time “Bernard Clappier 
[was the] head of Robert Schuman’s private office; Schuman’s closest advisor; mediator between 
Schuman and Monnet; followed Marjolin as the director of DREE [and became] Governor of the Bank 
of France” (2006: 136). 
49 For Schmitt’s references from Theorie des Partisanen. Zwischenbemerkung zum Begriff des Politischen 
published 1963 I have used the English version of Theory of the Partisan. For the Fraga’s references, the 
translations are mine. 
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 Still during their corresponding friendship, Kojève personally visited the German 
legal thinker in 1957. This was the same year that the Treaty of Rome and the 
Euratom were signed under the awareness of their dependency on imported oil, it was 
also when the technocrats of the Opus Dei ruling family took over the Francoist 
administration implementing a government that followed the neoliberal rationality. 
During this visit, the French bureaucrat delivered, in Dusseldorf, the lecture titled 
“Colonialism from a European Perspective.” In his lecture, Kòjeve advocated for the 
end of world class struggle by means of implementation of Fordist economies and 
granting economic aid throughout the world. These were the economizing measures 
that, precisely, became central for the technocratic neoliberal project of revaluation 
through financialization for the dictatorship. 
Starting on March 15th 1962, two years after Kòjeve’s last letter, Schmitt gave 
several lectures in Francoist Spain for the following two years. These lectures were 
compiled in book form in Theory of the Partisan. In this text, the German jurist studied 
the transformation of the category presented on the title, the partisan, starting with the 
traditional telluric defendant of the nomos, to its modern motorized actualization, 
aggressive, revolutionary and sustained by petromodernity. Within this frame, Schmitt 
opposed the Spanish traditional Christian partisan, who had confronted the modern 
Napoleonic invasion, to the revolutionary partisans’ action during the anti-imperial 
wars of the 1960s.  
Wrapping up the texts examined in this chapter, Fraga’s book and lecture, 
became the Spanish contribution in these intellectual dialogues. The book War… was 
Fraga’s essay with which he was inducted into the “Real Academia de Ciencias 
Morales y Políticas” (Royal Academy of Moral and Political Sciences) as a full 
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member. Meanwhile, the lecture “Political Form…” was his inaugural lecture in this 
institution’s 1962-63 academic year. In both texts, Catholicism, which was the 
European Spirit for Kojève and the traditional nomos for Schmitt, was presented as 
the conclusive solution for the dictatorship’s political problems. With regard to 
Europe, Fraga argued that the dictatorship already shared its new economic and social 
structure, which allowed it to share the common European Catholic Spirit too.  
 All these discourses were entangled, in different ways, with the dissemination of 
a world sustained by oil and petroleum byproducts, which bore the petrotoxic 
paradigm. Kojève and Schmitt offered in their discourses an early awareness of the 
action of oil and petroleum byproducts. With regard to Fraga, it was tourism, his realm 
of governance that was the first industry to be directly threatened by the material 
toxicity of oil. 
Kojève referred to the geopolitical frictions that emanated from the gap between 
approaching oil as matter and considering oil as an abstracted economic valorization.  
He argued that “underdeveloped countries […] could not absolutely understand why 
[…] oil produced in the Middle East should cost almost half as much less than oil in 
Texas” (2001: 121). Significantly, in 1960, three years after Kòjeve’s Dusseldorf 
lecture, Venezuela, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Kuwait and Iran created the Organization of 
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) as a reaction to the import quotas imposed 
by the US and the subsequent drop in demand of foreign oil.50  																																																								
50 As Timothy Mitchell explains “in 1960, in response to the drop in demand for non-US oil caused by 
Eisenhower’s import quotas, Venezuela and Saudi Arabia – together with the other three large Gulf 
producers, Iraq, Kuwait, and Iran – set up the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries 
(OPEC). For Venezuela, where a revolution had overthrown the military government and brought an 
elected government to power, the aim was to imitate the collective arrangement among US states for 
restricting production, in order to negotiate an increased share of oil revenues and conserve supplies, 
and thus to allow an orderly process of economic growth and avoid a premature depletion of reserves. 
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Schmitt presented oil and its byproducts as active agents that affected the 
transformation of the understanding of enmity. The category of the partisan had to be 
thought differently in an age of “long-range fuel supplies, telephones, radios, and 
television” (2007: 68). This new oil-fuelled motorized and revolutionary version of the 
partisan-enemy was reinforced with plastic-made goods and was dependent on the 
transforming material formation of the world.  
Fraga became Minister of Information and Tourism in July of 1962. A month 
earlier the first law to prevent oil-spills was passed by the Fracoist courts. As the law 
argued, “los serios perjuicios que la contaminación de las aguas del mar por los hidrocarburos 
causa […] acarrean graves daños […] a la industria turística” ‘the serious damages caused 
by hydrocarbon’s pollution in the seas […] bring major harm […] to the tourism 
industry’ (Carrero Blanco, 1962: 8436). Tourism was under Fraga the industry that 
sustained the Francoist economic project and was also the first economic activity that 
was affected by the new petrotoxic model of harm.  
When in both Schmitt and Kojève’s work, oil and petroleum byproducts 
surfaced throughout the texts, even if off-centered, they preceded the Francoist 
legislation in their understanding that oil –not the economic abstraction, but the matter 
itself– conditioned the formation of the world they lived in. This understanding 
reached the dictatorship through Fraga’s policies on tourism. Their work anticipated 
and informed the Francoist legislation of dangerous substances and the deployment of 
the petrotoxic regime of criminality. 
 																																																																																																																																																																					
Initially the Middle East producers were trying to maintain their tax revenues from oil by increasing the 
volume of production. Only a decade later were they in a position to increase revenues by adopting the 
US method of limiting the volume of production” (2013: 167). 
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Revaluation of Colonized Residual Europeans  
In the 1957 lecture “Colonialism from a European Perspective,” Kojève 
proposed the practice of “giving colonialism.” Implemented by Europe this giving 
colonialism needed to focus on “the entire area (and perhaps the only area) which lies 
around the Mediterranean” (120). This exposed the Francoist dictatorship as a toxic 
element, in need of Kojève’s colonialist project of giving capitalism. From the 
perspective of the petrotoxic paradigm, this was a project for the revaluation of 
residual Southern Europe. 
Kojève argues that Fordism allowed for a depolitiziced overcoming of the 
capitalist class struggle by creating a non-poor middle class in developed Europe and 
the US. Hence he concluded that Fordism would likewise operate in the 
underdeveloped countries. In order to trigger this Fordist overcoming that eliminated 
poverty, western capitalist countries and private capital flows had to start investing 
back the surplus value extracted from the colonized countries.  
By investing in the form of loans, western countries would be “certainly, de 
facto, no longer taking anything, and […] even giving something” (2001: 122). By 
directly referring to Schmitt, who was sitting in the audience, Kojève argued that this 
global Fordist model of “giving capitalism” or “giving colonialism” was the new “nomos 
of the Western Earth.” However, Kojève addressed Schmitt’s theoretical scaffolding to 
make it clear that what he proposed was “absolutely no criticism of Professor Carl 
Schmitt. For his division implicitly includes my ‘giving:’ […] ‘to give’ perhaps sounds 
better than the ‘verb to take’” (123). For Kòjeve, giving and taking could be the same 
thing, insofar as his proposal was not so much about giving but about lending; not so 
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much about receiving but about borrowing and not so much about getting out of 
poverty but about becoming indebted. In other words, the Fordist solution to world 
poverty encountered, in the new nomos of “giving colonialism,” global processes of 
financialization and indebtedness. 
Kojève explicitly disregarded the political aspect of the issue in hand. Instead 
he addressed the problem as “above all an economic problem” (120). Within this 
frame, poor countries, in the lecture, became clients. In fact, they were not only clients, 
but more importantly, bad clients –because, as argued by the French Bureaucrat “poor 
clients are bad clients.” Surely, the solution to being bad clients was “giving 
colonialism.”  Traits of the petrotoxic paradigm that connect with the neoliberal 
economization of every social field and make of every agent a market actor become 
apparent. This giving colonialism was declaring southern bad clients toxic and 
residual; in need of a work of revaluation. 
Under the name of giving colonialism the text proposed three ways to carry out 
this process of revaluation. Firstly, the Special United Nations Fund for Economic 
Development could be the institution in charge of granting the loans. Significantly this 
Fund ended up being controlled after 1959 by the United States dominated World 
Bank’s International Development Association. Second, it could be done by going 
beyond Commodity Agreements and by implementing direct contributions of 
“consumer goods.” Third, these direct contributions could also be carried out by “on-
the-spot investments” (124). According to Kojève, out of the three options presented, 
two were viable in the case of the European south. Either the funding from 
international financial institutions, or the on-the-spot investments from private 
companies. Thus, neoliberal financialization and notions of national revaluation went 
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hand in hand for Kojève. 
Regarding southern Europe, the French bureaucrat maintained some of the key 
ideas from his 1945 Outline of a Doctrine of French Policy examined in Part One and 
incorporated new ones. Like in 1945, and conforming with Schmitt’s notion of the 
nomos, the Catholic spirit was a remarkable feature of the south, “this economic region 
[was] a region which has been blessed by God.” However, this idea appeared in 1957 
significantly thinned down and did not occupy the center stage of the project.  
Another recurring notion from the Outline… was the understanding that 
Southern Europe was “backward.” However, this time around, thirteen years later, the 
backwardness of the south was coming to its end. As he put it, “people […] bec[a]me 
more serious, more adult […]. Thus […] the economic conditions of the 
Mediterranean region’s economic unity ha[d] been restored.” Hence, Kojève decided 
that these colonial residual Europeans were indeed recoverable. 
However, the recoverability of the petrotoxic dictatorship was not guaranteed. 
Kojève’s 1957 approach to southern Europe acquired urgency and unease, “if giving 
colonialism [was] not practiced […] then the southern and eastern Mediterranean 
clients [would] remain […] poor clients; and that also [meant]: bad or even ‘dangerous 
clients’” (127). It was Schmitt who, later on, gave the name “motorized revolutionary 
partisan” to that non-recoverable danger that Kojève proposed to save his public from. 
 
A Catholic Capitalist Response   
Kojève’s urgent plan to revalue toxic Southern Europe by means of debt and 
financialization resonated with the policies enforced by the Francoist Opus Dei 
technocrats. To be more precise, the Technocratic program mirrored the Fordism that 
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had to be implemented by acquiring credit from international financial institutions and 
receiving ad-hoc investments from private companies. More importantly, Kojève’s 
economizing frame, which interpelated the dictatorship as a residual economic actor 
(“a bad client”) permitted the categorization of the regime as a country in a crisis of 
economic underdevelopment. This categorization, in turn, made it possible to silence 
any political struggle.   
The economic growth that came as a consequence of these practices acquired 
the name of “the Spanish economic miracle.” This miracle is precisely what the 
dictatorhip’s Plans of Development, examined in the previous chapter, addressed with 
their “información estatístico-económica” ‘statistical-economic information’ (Franco, 
1963: 18286). As expected, however, the plans did not address the inconsistencies of 
the miracle. The flaws of this model were directly linked with the characteristics of the 
new nomos of “giving colonialism” and also, to the disavowal of the politics invested in 
this model expressed by Kojève.  
As examined in detail by Emmanuel Rodriguez and Isidro López, Francoist 
debt incumbency grew with the technocrats and their Fordist design depended heavily 
on foreign investment, on technology, on equipment and on oil. Meanwhile, the new 
union elections and the collective agreements that were meant to improve worker life 
conditions were designed to fail from their inception.51 They led to an increasing 
pressure from the workers under the precarized conditions of the dictatorship. It was 																																																								
51 As Emmanuel Rodriguez and Isidro López study “Las elecciones sindicales, la ley de convenios 
colectivos de 1958 y las operaciones del Ministerio de Trabajo, bajo el mandato de Solís, durante los 
años sesenta trataron, torpemente, de vincular y subordinar el crecimiento salarial a la productividad. El 
fracaso de este tipo de estrategias fue en buena medida responsable de la escalada continua de la presión 
salarial y de la radicalidad obrera de los años posteriores. En definitiva, el fuerte componente de clase de 
la estructura del Estado mantuvo los niveles salariales muy por debajo de los topes salariales 
potenciales” (2010: 142). 
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actually Fraga’s tourism and the remittances from émigrés that kept the glossy 
statistical numbers of the technocrats afloat. In the end, this Fordist “miracle” of 
Francoist revaluation became more effective in creating illusions and aspirations of a 
prefigured middle class population than in establishing an overall wellbeing of life-
conditions and standards.52  
 
 Fraga’s approach to Kojève differed somewhat from the technocratic acceptance 
of the “giving colonialist” project. His 1962 lecture on the unity of Europe addressed 
Kojève’s proposals by referring directly to the frontbench French politicians whose 
project for Europe had been based on Kojève’s ideas. Fraga’s delayed and implicit 
conversations with Kojève, led to a distinct Francoist appropriation of the European 
unification project. 
While in 1957 Kojève actively dismissed the political character of colonialism 
and of Europe, Fraga referred to the “forma política” ‘political form’ (6) of “la integración 
europea” ‘European integration’ (7) right in the title of his 1962 talk. However, in his 
elaboration of the political character of the union, Fraga did not oppose Kojève. 
Instead, he referred to the French bureaucrat’s main ideas from back in 1945.  																																																								
52 Emmanuel Rodríguez and Isidro López explain it as follows “en definitiva, a pesar de la espectacular 
evolución de las principales macromagnitudes, el ‘milagro español’ ocultó una serie de problemas que 
acabarían por estallar en la crisis de 1973. La enorme dependencia energética y la necesidad de importar 
masivamente bienes de capital y maquinaria –que conjuntamente suponían entre el 35 y el 40% del valor 
de las importaciones del periodo 1960-1973– correspondían con un modelo de crecimiento industrial 
típicamente periférico. De hecho, el déficit comercial fue un síntoma crónico de todo el ciclo: ni las 
tradicionales exportaciones agrarias, ni la relativa especialización internacional de la industria española 
en bienes intermedios, consiguieron compensar el constante deterioro de la balanza comercial. La 
entrada de capitales destinados a abrir nuevas instalaciones industriales, tras la relativa liberalización de 
1959, y las remesas de los emigrantes españoles ayudaron a equilibrar mínimamente las balanza de 
pagos, pero nunca fueron suficientes como para compensarla. El elemento que permitió sufragar el 
déficit comercial, y que en general prefiguró el camino de la nueva especialización económica del 
territorio español, se encontró en una estrategia que en principio se consideró marginal y paliativa del 
verdadero objetivo: la industrialización. Se trataba, en efecto, del turismo y de los sectores adyacentes” 
(2010: 143-144). 
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Fraga’s work resonated with both Kojève’s previous approaches to the Latin 
Empire and to the Catholic Spirit. This became apparent when the Spanish politician 
understood Europe’s original articulations inside “del marco político del Imperio y del marco 
espiritual de la Cristiandad” ‘the political frame of the Empire and the spiritual frame of 
Christianity’ (11). For both Fraga and Kojève Catholicism was not only about origins. 
More importantly, it was the “substrato esencial” ‘essential sublayer’ of Europe as a 
“Comunidad de fe” ‘community of faith.’ From this, Fraga concluded that the political 
problem of the European unity was “nacionalismos, que socavan la unidad esencial europea, 
[y] nos retrotrae al dualismo religión-cultura” ‘nationalisms, that undermine[d] the 
European essential unity, and [brought] us back to the dualism religion-culture’ (12). 
Finally, Fraga argued that the substantive political task for accomplishing European 
unity was to find unity in the diversity of nations.  To this political problem, he argued 
that the common Catholic essential “valores espirituales” ‘espiritual values’ (32) offered a 
suitable solution. 
In 1962, Kojeve’s 1957 project of economic revaluation of the toxic dictatorship 
had already been completed for Fraga. He argued once Spain had already “avanzado 
[…] en lo económico” ‘advanced […] with regard to economics’ (8), the objective was to 
promote political unity on the basis of a common Christian Spirit. He explained that 
there had already been an “establecimiento de la vida europea” ‘implementation of the 
European life’ (30). When the lecture presented the evidences of this Spanish 
European life it referred to the remittances from Spanish émigrés and to predictions 
that the next economic miracle was going to be the “milagro español” ‘Spanish  miracle’ 
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(34).53 The technocratic accomplishments under Franco, which followed Kojève’s 
Fordist giving colonialism literally, suggested that the Francoist toxic 
underdevelopment was over. The dictatorship was not a residue any more. 
After the results of “giving colonialism,” Fraga’s proposal was to return to 
Kojève’s European Catholicism. For him it was decisive to acknowledge that economic 
integration brought more than just economic transformations, “la idea política estaba 
oculta tras el aparato técnico que exigía la formación de un mercado común […] en las 
consecuencias implícitas […] y en la coordinación de las Comunidades” ‘the political idea was 
hidden behind the technical apparatus that demanded a common market […] in the 
implicit consequences […] and in the coordination of communities’ (30). A single 
economic and social structure meant, for Fraga, to be able to “aspirar a compartir la 
actual hora del espíritu europeo” ‘aspire to share the contemporary form of the European 
Spirit’ (35). Revaluation, for Fraga, needed to happen at the level of the spirit. 
 
Enmity and the Plastic Partisan  
Schmitt theorized the revolutionary partisan addressing him as a new kind 
international enemy in world politics. I argue that this new kind of enmity responded 
to the petrotoxic paradigm. Being an oil-fueled and plastic-reinforced partisan was the 
sign of a time of withering states and a new nomos of the earth. Schmitt argued that 
																																																								
53 With regard to the European character of Spain, Fraga argued that, “estamos directamente ligados al 
éxito del establecimiento de la vida europea robre un cupo de instituciones nuevas […]. Partamos de 
algo que está en 'la calle y en la vida diaria del pueblo español: la emigración a Europa. Un hecho de 
inmensas repercusiones en la mentalidad popular, en el futuro de nuestras costumbres y en la marcha de 
nuestra economía, que revela, con toda espontaneidad, como uno de los caminos que conducen a la 
elevación del nivel de vida; hoy, una aspiración general de todos los pueblos pasa por Europa. […] Se 
ha llegado a escribir fuera de nuestras fronteras que el próximo milagro económico será el ‘milagro 
español’; esta perspectiva es posible gracias, precisamente, a la estructura europea del país, que ha 
potenciado los esfuerzos del régimen durante veinticinco años” (1962: 35). 
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this petrotoxic revolutionary partisan interrupted the European post-war 
accomplishment of bracketing war, and with it the decision not to criminalize the 
opponent.54  
Before the revolutionary partisan, the real enemy was one that had not to be 
eliminated, insofar as that enemy was the one defining the self through recognition –in 
a way that mimicked Kòjeve’s reading of Hegel.55 Under the new petroleum-based 
revolutionary toxicity, the absolute criminalized enemy, which following Schmitt, 
should be decided by the state, had to be destroyed and treated as an “inhuman” (94). 
This was the way to prevent being the state itself declared an enemy and a criminal to 
finally be destroyed.  
Within this narration of global conflicts, Schmitt wrote his own history of the 
Spanish Civil War. He argued that “Spain defended itself against a war of national 
liberation sponsored by the international communist movement” (2007: 56). 
Furthermore, he compared Franco’s national army on the Spanish Civil War with 
“premodern” Spanish partisans that in the 19th century resisted Napoleon’s modern 
army. By doing so, Schmitt presented the dictatorship as the enduring defendant of the 
telluric European nomos. In short, the Catholic Fundamentalist dictatorship preserved 																																																								
54 Schmitt wrote about a moment of transformation that however had not yet happened, “perhaps that 
all will change when the state ‘withers away.’ In the meantime, legality is the irresistible functional mode 
of every modern state army. The legal government decides who is the enemy against whom the army 
must fight. Whoever claims the right to determine the enemy also claims the right to his own new 
legality, if he refuses to recognize the enemy determined by the former legal government” (2007: 84). 
The partisan suspended what was accomplished with the “bracketing of war” of the states, “European 
humanity had achieved something extraordinary: renunciation of the criminalization of the opponent, 
i.e., the relativization of enmity, the negation of absolute enmity” (2007: 90). That is how “the theory of 
the partisan flows into the question of the concept of the political, into the question of the real enemy 
and of a new nomos of the earth” (2007: 95). 
55 The consonance between Kojève’s reading of Hegel and Schmitt’s proposal can be seen in the 
following reference from Theory of the Partisan, “the enemy defines us, […] An enemy is not someone 
who, for some reason or other, must be eliminated and destroyed because he has no value. The enemy is 
on the same level as am I. For this reason, I must fight him to the same extent and within the same 
bounds as he fights me” (2007: 85). 
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this nomos from petrotoxic revolutionary destruction.  
Schmitt’s particular approach to Spanish and European history brings us back 
to Kojève’s and Fraga’s understanding of the common Catholic European Spirit. This 
spirit sustained, for Kojève, his project for the Latin empire. For Fraga, years later, it 
was a single social and political aspiration that went beyond the economic union. 
Theory of the Partisan reinforced the imbricated perception of nomos and Spirit as the 
common constituting denominator of Europe. Thus, following the particular 
appropriation of Spanish history by Schmitt, there was a double proposal in The theory 
of the Partisan. It argued firstly that there was a global transformation of the sense of 
enmity, and secondly, that there was a local persistence of the telluric nomos under the 
dictatorship. 
 
Petrotoxic Enemies in European Dialogues  
Schmitt’s essays and lectures allowed Fraga to distance himself from his 
technocratic counterparts by exhaustively working on the notion of the enemy. War… 
was framed by an introductory quote, “Der feind ist unsre Frage als Gestalt” ‘the enemy is 
our own question as form,’ (1962: 10) which Fraga borrowed from the German jurist’s 
prison book Ex captivitate Salus. 56 The incorporation of what I have addressed as 
Schmitt’s petrotoxic enmity imported into Fraga’s essay notions of total war, 
revolutionary war, social transformations, which were conditioned by petroleum-based 
technical advancement, and more significantly, by the category of the partisan.  																																																								
56 Within War… Schmitt’s understanding of enmity is directly addressed with the following quote from 
Ex captivitate, which Fraga translates himself, “no hables ligeramente del enemigo. Te pones en cierta categoría 
por lo que reconoces como enemistad […] toda destrucción es autodestrucción. El enemigo, en cambio, es lo otro” ‘do 
not speak lightly of the enemy. One categorizes oneself through one's enemy […] all destruction is only 
self-destruction. The enemy, by contrast, is the other’ (43). 
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Like Schmitt, Fraga too argued that “los orígenes de la guerrilla, guerra partisana, 
guerra insurreccional o ‘guerre en surface’ son muy antiguos” ‘the origins of the guerrilla, the 
partisan war, or ‘guerre en surface’ [were] old” (99) but instead of singling out the 
premodern Spanish partisans that fought against the modern Napoleoninc army, Fraga 
maps a wide European territory looking for examples. Fraga connected the Roman 
dictator Fabius’ war against Hannibal, with the Spanish guerrillas against Napoleon, 
and the “el famoso Lawrence de Arabia” ‘the Famous Lawrence of Arabia” who fought 
with the British Empire against the Turks (100). As such, the figure of the partisan 
extended and took over Europe before its appropriation by the communists. Like with 
Schmitt, there was no outside to the partisan. 
In this respect, Fraga agreed with Schmitt that Mao’s revolution was the 
greatest example of the new partisanship as the “doctrina política y militar de la guerra 
revolucionaria” ‘political and military doctrine of revolutionary war’ (103). Hence, a 
binary division stems from Schmitt and Fraga’s work that opposes Christian Europe to 
the non-Christian world.  The former’s traditional telluric nomos that originates in 
Spain and is preserved under the dictatorship, is distinguished in degree from the 
petrotoxic motorized oil-fuelled revolutionary partisanship as the latest embodiment of 
the non-Christian threat. This threat could be tracked back in history to Hannibal’s 
barbarians, and the Turkish Muslims. 
Fraga situated the telluric partisan in Spain by, like Schmitt, rewriting Spanish 
history and making the dictatorship seem like a historical necessity. Schmitt’s 
explanation that the Civil War was in fact a Christian war of national liberation from 
communism was mirrored by Fraga’s text. The Spanish intellectual elaborated on this 
point by arguing that “los españoles que lucharon hace un cuarto de siglo […] quisieron 
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dejarnos la base de unidad […] para poder, sobre ella, seguir edificando una España” ‘the 
Spaniards that fought a quarter of century earlier […] wanted to leave the foundation 
of unity to us […] to be able to, on top of it, keep on building one Spain’ (135). The 
necessity of the dictatorship came with a justification of the sovereign power of the 
dictator Franco, insofar as peace had to be built on top of “el magisterio del Héroe que 
acaudilló el Movirniento Nacional” ‘the teachings of the Hero that led the national 
movement’ (136). As such, the Christian telluric partisan and its traditional nomos 
became spatially situated and the dictatorship was declared a necessity for the 
preservation of this nomos. 
Christianity conditioned too the way to relate to the enemy. Fraga coupled the 
Christian faith and the war against the enemy by addressing the “Divina Providencia” 
‘Divine Providence” (133). For Fraga, divine providence illustrated that “la paz hemos 
de merecerla, […] en una permanente edificación social y política” ‘peace need[ed] to be 
deserved, […] in a constant social and political edification.’ This edification, insofar as 
“el conflicto y la guerra, […] durarán hasta la consumación de los siglos, tanto como la vida y el 
pecado” ‘conflict and war […] [would] last until the end of the centuries, like life and 
sin” (134), required the dictatorship to always “estar preparados para la defensa” ‘be ready 
for defense.’ It was the traditional Christian partisanship that, at the same time, opened 
up the dictatorship to a worldwide commonality and opposed the petrotoxic 
revolutionary partisan’s communism.  
Finally, Fraga’s conclusion was that the defense granted by a military 
organization and the armed forces gave political and social order to the regime. In 
other words, it was the dictatorship’s political project that created the division between 
the inside and the outside. A military dictatorship like Francoism was justified because 
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“hacia dentro, […] toda la comunidad está en orden; hacia fuera, […] es capaz de […] mostrar 
la fuerza para no tener que usarla” ‘inside, the whole community [was] in order; outside, 
[…] it [was] able to […] show force in order not to use it.’ For Fraga, the dictatorship 
created a world order based on the defense against enemies inside and outside. It was 
against the toxicity of an enemy built on petroleum that Fraga’s dialogue with Schmitt 
resituated Francoist Catholic fundamentalism as the common European spirit, which 
necessarily, had to be protected within the limits of the dictatorship.  
  
Revaluing the Spirit of Catholic Fundamentalist Capitalism 
 Fraga’s was an expansion of, rather than opposition to, the technocratic project. 
In this political project Kojève and Schmitt get entangled in ways that the two 
European thinkers did not predict in their personal dialogues. For Kojève, his project 
of economic revaluation was the new nomos of the earth understood as giving 
colonialism; and Schmitt argued for the preservation of the traditional telluric nomos 
under the dictatorship against new global petrotoxic enemies. Fraga in turn, put 
together both approaches by resolving that the defense of the traditional telluric nomos 
(the European Catholic spirit) could only survive against the new oil-fuelled enemies 
by embracing the economic revaluation of the Fordist giving colonialism.  
 For Fraga, the technical apparatus of the economic union hid, within, the politics 
of the defense of the Catholic nomos. That was why “un pensamiento […] de simples 
expertos o tecnócratas” ‘the reasoning […] of simple experts or technocrats’ could not be 
“la solución frente al embate de la Internacional marxista” ‘the solution against the attack of 
the Marxist International’ (Fraga, War…: 133). Fraga, unlike the technocrats, 
distinctly thought of a common Christian spirit as the connecting element between an 
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understanding of enmity that dialogued with Schmitt’s work and a conception of the 
unity of Europe that resonated with Kojève’s proposal for a Latin empire. Fraga 
resolved the critical knot of an anti-modern modernity by finding a way to revalue the 
Francoist Catholic fundamentalist residual toxicity as the foundation of European 
capitalist neoliberal modernity.  
 By avoiding Spain being declared a toxic residual underdeveloped country and in 
the face of new global petrotoxic criminals, the common European Catholic Spirit 
underlaid the Fordist economic project of giving colonialism. This was, in short, 
Fraga’s revaluation of the dictatorship as a Catholic fundamentalist capitalist regime. 
As such, the dictatorship’s underdevelopment crisis was declared over twice in 1970, 
just over a month apart from each other. The Preferential Agreement declared it first; 




Re-valuing Residues for the Formation of Europe 
 
My analysis provides an alternative account of the formative phase of the 
European Union. By flipping the center-periphery logic between Europe and the 
Francoist dictatorship, the latter, which normally falls out of the common narrations of 
the process of the transnational unification, occupies the center stage as one of the 
crucibles of the Union’s unresolved political problems. By displacing the focus towards 
the deep material transformation introduced by petromodernity after WWII, hitherto 
underexamined generalized logics of inclusion and exclusion are revealed as inheritors 
of what I have called the petrotoxic paradigm. It is in the shifting regimes of 
criminality that this new dominant toxicity is exposed, and is perceptible right from the 
level of punished bodies.  
These two dislocations from commonplace narrations have allowed me to shed 
fresh light on current debates in both area studies and overarching critical thinking. I 
will address each in turn. 
 
Within peninsular studies, I have argued that the dictatorship did not merely 
succumb to European democratizing forces. In fact, Francoist criminal legislation 
underwent an unprecedented repressive turn during the early forms of accession to the 
transnational unification in 1970. This reinforcement of the dictatorship’s anti-
democratic position was enabled, from the wake of WWII, by the dissemination of 
petromodernity, the development of neoliberalism, and the categorization of the regime 
as a country in a crisis of underdevelopment.  
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The categorization of Spain as merely an international market actor in need of 
economic aid allowed for both the dictatorship and Europe to disregard undemocratic 
practices and to frame neoliberal solutions as projects of modernization. In the name of 
modernization, Francoism deployed different plans of economic stabilization and 
development, which could boast economic progress only by recognizing some lives as 
pre-criminals in the law and thus potentially disposable. These lives, which troubled 
the narrations of Francoist modernity, were conveniently swept aside as margins that 
could not be captured by statistics. They were also recognized in the mass media, and 
it was there that the spectator was given access, albeit in a veiled form, to those hidden 
figures. Meanwhile, for European intellectuals, the dictatorship became the continent’s 
guardian of its allegedly original Catholic spirit. In this entanglement of capitalist 
modernity and Catholic pre-modernity, under a European project drafted as “giving 
colonialism,” the dictatorship became increasingly indebted to international credit 
institutions.  
These were the main coordinates of the neoliberal optimization particular to the 
dictatorship, developed by the Opus Dei technocrats, addressed here as Catholic 
fundamentalist capitalism. This form of Francoist neoliberalism had been laying its 
foundations by dialoguing with Ordoliberal intellectuals since the 1950s and, only 
under conditions of petrotoxicity, were they able to put together a political project. In 
this project Catholic fundamentalism and neoliberal capitalism complemented each 
other. 
 
Petromodernity’s inherent toxicity, petrotoxicity, operates throughout this 
analysis as the dominant interpretive category that scaled up from criminalized bodies 
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to political projects. I use this overarching critical tool, that is, the historical 
generalization of logics of inclusion and exclusion generated by petrotoxicity, to read 
the European context with particular focus on the Francoist dictatorship.  
In the European context the petrotoxic paradigm was not only reproduced in 
the mutations of the Francoist regime of criminality, but also in the transformations 
experienced by the relationship between the north and the south of Europe. This 
mirroring effect that followed WWII, between the micro level of bodies and the macro 
level of transnational projects, reveals petrotoxicity to be the dominant and pervasive 
neoliberal paradigm for inflicting inclusions and exclusions.  
Under Franco, pre-criminals’ potential social danger was categorized in terms 
fitting to petrotoxicity. Firstly, it reflected the toxicity of plastics. Contrary to previous 
legal practices, pre-criminal subjects were identified as marginal residues that were 
either recoverable as actors of the Francoist public-economic order, or non-
recoverable. Men had to be revalued as stakeholders in the nation, and women as 
exceptional guardians of Catholic morality. Secondly, this social danger was 
categorized as if it were oil in a tanker, its toxicity exposed only when there was a 
spillage. Finally, it was presented as a pesticide; toxic for human life but necessary for 
economic progress. Pre-criminal subjects no longer represented some kind of external 
threat; instead they were part and parcel of the dictatorship social fabric. Once their 
toxic threat was exposed, pre-criminal subjects became indispensable for the 
dictatorship. The regime argued that their kind of danger was proper to European 
countries, hence their emergence became living proof of the Europeanization of the 
Francoist political project.  
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In the context of European unification, the dictatorship was subjected to the 
same logics of the petrotoxic paradigm. The country's potential economic threat was 
exposed as an internal toxicity, which needed to be revalued or disposed of. The 
Francoist regime was first exposed as an underdeveloped marginal country to then be 
revalued as an international market actor by means of debt acquisition –with the 
consequent loss of national sovereignty. Meanwhile, Francoist anti-democratic rule 
remained intact and it became the territory of exception that guarded European 
religious nomos –like a pesticide, both poisonous and indispensable. Once it was 
deeply financialized, the Catholic fundamentalist dictatorship ceased to be outside the 
European project, to instead carry the core identity traits of the transnational project.  
The petrotoxic paradigm as a regime of criminality gives us the key to 
interpreting this mirroring development. Both pre-criminals under Franco and the 
Francoist regime under Europe became constitutive part of the larger political project 
in which they were marginalized. At different social levels, the petrotoxic logics of 
inclusion and exclusion mimicked each other, allowing the dictatorship and the 
transnational unification to optimize their violence together. 
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